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McCARTHYISM 



THE FIGHT FOR AMERICA 

Documented answers to questions asked 
by friend and foe 

by 
SENATOR JOE McGARTHY 



THE DEVIN-ADAIR COMPANY: PUBLISHERS 

NEW YORK : 1952 



COPYRIGHT 1952 
bv Joe McCaetht 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



II 



DEDICATED 
TO MY OFFICE STAFF 



in 






CONTENTS 

Chapter I Hearing Room — March 8, 1950 1 

Chapter II Round I — -Wheeling, West Virginia 7 

Chapter III What Has Been Proved? 13 

Chapter IV Congressional Immunity 17 

Chapter V The Record of Dean Acheson 23 

Chapter VI Ambassador Philip C. Jessup . 53 

Chapter VII The Evidence on Owen Lattimore . . . 57 

Chapter VIII General George C. Marshall 67 

Chapter IX The Tydings Committee 71 

Chapter X Guilt by Association 79 

Chapter XI The Penalty For Loyalty In The State Department . . 81 

Chapter XII The Smear 85 

Chapter XIII The Evil Genius 99 

Chapter XIV A Question For Americans 101 



V 



FOREWORD 




i should be evident to everyone that the United States 
1 :irica is facing a major crisis, on the outcome of 
ri:h depends the integrity and security of the American 
pe. In 1945 most Americans were living in a fool's 
«radise. America had just emerged as the victor in a 
- world war. Germany, Italy, and Japan, all fofmid- 
enemies, had been crushed. It seemed incredible to 
people that America would again be imperilled for 
east a century. Yet in 1952 it is obvious that America's 
on in world affairs is seriously weakened, and that 
absence of capable leadership the American people 
be headed toward disaster. 
During the period 1945-1952 the Communists were par- 
ried to consolidate their position in Eastern Europe 
h the result that all of Western Europe is threatened 
I sudden and complete collapse and America has felt 
necessary to make desperate efforts to maintain inde- 
radent and friendly governments in that area. In the 
I East the amazing failure of our foreign policy is 
res more evident. For over fifty years one of the major 
sss in our foreign policy has been to maintain the Open 
! >>:.r policy in China. By the Open Door policy is meant 
laat the United States demands with respect to China, 
23.1 opportunity for all, special privilege for none, and 
political, military, and economic independence of the 
ese government. It was because the United States 
s insistent upon maintaining the Open Door policy in 
ina that she became involved in the war with Japan. 
Daring the war with Japan, America spent many bil- 
s of dollars and suffered hundreds of thousands of 
dairies. But this enormous sacrifice seemed to be worth 
ie, in 1945, when Japan was crushed and it appeared 
the Open Door policy was completely restored. In 
following few years, however, it became evident that 
sacrifice was made in vain. Today the Open Door 
::y is far closer to being nullified than in 1941. Today 
whole principle of equal opportunity has vanished into 
air. Today there is special privilege for power only, 
■nfriendly power, and to talk of the political, military, 

: nomic independence of China is a farce. 

i Korea we have met with disaster after disaster. De- 

- aapert diplomatic and military advice, we withdrew 

roops from South Korea in 1949, and made no plans 

iefend this area in case of attack. In 1950, when the 

inunist attack was launched, we suddenly threw in 

ed and ill equipped troops to check the invading 

es with the result that we came very close to complete 

pi in that area. In the end, the courage and vigor of 

Egbting forces stemmed the tide and we were able 

Mid the enemy at bay even when they were reinforced 

■he Chinese army. But political and diplomatic blun- 

ire prevented our achieving a real military victory. 

ave reached a hopeless impasse, while the enemy 

been slowly but surely building up defensive and 

. - z iter.tial. 

clear that our government has been guilty of colos- 

ana] failures in the field of international rela- 



tions since 1945. Some of these failures were due to the 
fact our responsible leaders grossly miscalculated the 
intentions and the capabilities of the Communist powers. 
In spite of the fact that the Communist leaders have fre- 
quently and definitely declared that they were actively 
working for the communization of the whole world, our 
leaders refused to believe them, and were startled when 
Communist efforts to seize power in country after country 
became apparent. Our leaders refused to believe that the 
Communists were capable of carrying out their expan- 
sionist schemes, even when these schemes became obvious 
to every casual observer. 

The inability of our leaders to understand the inten- 
tions and capabilities of the Communists in the Far East 
is especially noteworthy. For several years the dominant 
clique in the Far Eastern section of our State Department 
refused to admit that the Chinese Communists were really 
Communists. The public was given to understand that the 
so-called Chinese Communists were merely agrarian re- 
formers, or forward looking liberals, who were anxious 
to cooperate with the democratic powers. Yet all during 
this period it was clear to serious and dispassionate ob- 
servers that the Chinese Communists were clearly and 
admittedly wholehearted Communists, closely tied up 
with the Kremlin crowd, and aimed at the total communi- 
zation of the whole of the Far East. Our leaders were 
equally incompetent when it came to estimating the capa- 
bilities of the Chinese Communists. Even in 1947 our 
Department of State declared that there was no danger 
of China falling into Communist hands for another twenty 
years. 

It is clear that much of our failure in international 
affairs was due to incompetence, the inability of our 
leaders to understand or to cope with the major prob- 
lems which confronted us. But it also becomes increas- 
ingly clear that our failures were aggravated by the fact 
that disloyal elements had infiltrated into several of our 
government agencies. The number of actively disloyal 
persons was comparatively small, but they were able to 
do an enormous amount of damage. In 1945 much of our 
power and prestige was due to the fact that we alone 
were possessors of the secret of the atomic bomb. It has 
now been clearly proved that several American citizens, 
working in connection with various atomic energy proj- 
ects, gave or sold extremely important items of informa- 
tion to the Soviet authorities. This is undoubtedly one 
of the reasons why the USSR has made such rapid 
strides in developing its own atomic bomb. It has also 
been clearly proved that several persons occupying high 
and responsible positions in the government were, at one 
time or another, active members of Communist cells, and 
that such persons perjured themselves when they denied 
this fact. 

Of even greater importance and significance was a 
group of "fellow travellers," persons who never joined 
the Communist party, persons who are horrified when 
accused of treason or disloyalty, but who joyfully fob 






f 



lowed the Communist party line in their advocacy or 
rejection of causes and policies. A person may agree 
with the Communist position on one or two points, even 
on three or four, without necessarily coming under sus- 
picion. But when a person, during the course of several 
years, always speaks and writes in favor of ideas which 
closely parallel the policies advanced by the Communist 
hierarchy, it would appear obvious that either his in- 
telligence or his integrity as an American citizen is open 
to doubt. Such persons are unworthy of being considered 
"experts," as they often claim to be, or else are guilty of 
hoodwinking the American public as to wliat is going on 
in national and international affairs. I do not believe that 
such persons should be persecuted, but I do believe that 
such persons should be eliminated from positions where 
they are able to influence national policy. 

During the period 1945-1950 there were a number of 
clear-sighted people who realized that we were being led 
along a disastrous path in the conduct of our affairs with 
foreign, nations. These men raised their voices in pro- 
test, but in nearly all cases these protests were either 
suppressed or ignored. General Hurley. D. S. Ambassador 
to China, Stanley Hornbeck and Joseph Grew in the State 
Department pointed out the dangers which were likely 
to arise from the Chinese Communists, and thev were 
quickly removed from their posts. General Wedemever, 
one of the most brilliant of our strategists, with an intimate 
knowledge of the Far East, wrote his famous report on 
China, pointing out the seriousness of the situation. His 
report was suppressed, and before long Wedemever him- 
self' was driven to retire from active service. "Bill" 
Bullitt, former Ambassador to Russia, Senators Brewster, 
Bridges, Mundt, and Knowland and Congressmen Judd and 
Busbey all pointed out the futility of, our foreign policy. 
They were all politely or impolitely ignored. In the aca- 
demic field Prof. Colegrove and I tried to indicate that 
our foreign policy was based upon ignorance and incom- 
petence in high quarters. There were hundreds of others 
who embarked upon a similar task, but the public refused 
to be aroused. 

Then there arose a new and forceful figure, with a 
new and vigorous voice, the junior Senator from Wis- 



consin named Joe McCarthy. Senator McCarthy soon 
proved that he had the faculty of commanding public 
attention. He has a dynamic personality and an ability 
to speak directly and to the point. As the result of 
McCarthy's speeches, the man on the street, the average 
American citizen, became alerted to the perilous situation 
with which we are faced. I have not always agreed with 
Senator McCarthy on matters of detail, but I greatly 
admire his courage and his sincerity, and I am pro- 
foundly grateful that he has been able to awaken the 
American public out of its complacent slumber and make 
it realize that there was something radically wrong with 
the, caliber of our leadership in international affairs. 

It is not at all surprising that McCarthy's success in 
exposing the weakness of our leadership has aroused a 
great deal of resentment and animosity. Attempts were 
made to suppress or smother, his charges, or to Kill them 
by ridicule. When these attempts proved unsuccessful, 
McCarthy was made the object of a barrage of venomous 
attacks. His ideas and his charges have been grossly 
twisted and misrepresented, and every conceivable effort 
has been made to smear his private life. Time after time I 
have heard people launch into a violent attack on Mc- 
Carthy, and when I questioned them, I found that they had 
only the haziest and most inaccurate notions of what the 
Senator had really said and really done. I am, therefore, 
delighted that McCarthy has taken this opportunity to 
clarify his position and to clear up numerous misrepre- 
sentations. His most vicious enemies will not be silenced— 
such enemies never are and never can be. But I am sure 
that a great number of persons of independent thought, 
who are willing to investigate and learn the truth, will find 
this book interesting and valuable. I am sure that many 
such persons will be convinced that Senator McCarthy 
has rendered valuable service to the American public in 
exposing the messy situation which has long existed 
among the group of men who are chiefly responsible for 
guiding America's national policy during a period of 
great peril. 

William M. McGovern 
(Professor of Political Science, 
Northwestern University) 



viii 



, 



CHAPTER I 



Hearing Room — March 8, 1950 



"To sin by silence when they should protest, makes cowards of men" 

Abraham Lincoln 



\\ HEN the inter-office buzzer across the room on my 
\ \ desk sounded, it seemed as though only ten minutes 
Lad passed since I had stretched out on the leather couch 
■ my office after a night's work. 

Actually, an hour had passed since I had asked my 
c5ce manager to wake me at 10:15. 

It was now 10:15 a.m. 

This was March 8, 1950. 

In fifteen minutes I was due in the Senate Caucus 
room to begin testifying before the Tydings Committee. 

My office manager walked into the room and placed a 
pot of coffee on the desk. "Everything you dictated last 
night is typed," he said. "Still a few more pages to put in 
order, but by the time you're ready to go, we'll be set." 

I quickly shaved and checked through my briefcase 
to see that the documents, photostats, and other exhibits 
were all there. 

On my way to the corridor I detoured through the 
outer office. To my surprise I found even those members 
of the staff who had been alternately typing and taking 
dictation practically the entire night, still on duty — 
sleepy-eyed but going strong. I shall never cease to be 
amazed at the pace which the office set in those early 
days in 1950 — a pace which they have maintained ever 
since. Without the day and night work of my loyal and 
efficient office staff, my task would have been impossible. 

As I walked down the long marble corridors to the 
Senate Caucus room, I wondered if I would be able to 
accomplish what I had set out to do. 

The Senate had authorized the Tydings Committee to 
investigate Communist infiltration of government. The 
Senate had given that committee power, investigators, and 
money to run down every lead on Communists in govern- 
ment which I gave them. Today, March 8, 1950, my task 
was to give the committee the leads which would be a basis 
for their investigation. 

In the back of my mind there was faintly echoing the 
chairman's statement, "Let me have McCarthy for three 
days in public hearings and he will never show his face 
ir the Senate again." 

Over two weeks had elapsed since my Senate speech 
which had forced the creation of the Tydings Committee. 
Already it had become very apparent that this was to be 
bo ordinary investigation. It was to be a contest between 
a lone Senator and all the vast power of the federal 
bureaucracy pin-pointed in and backing up the Tydings 
Committee. 

The picture of treason which I carried in my briefcase 
to that Caucus room was to shock the nation and occupy 



the headlines until Truman declared war in Korea. But 
there was nothing new about this picture. The general 
pattern was known to every legislator in Washington, 
except those who deliberately blinded their eyes and 
closed their ears to the unpleasant truth. 

As I walked toward the hearing room, many things 
crossed my mind. For example, in a few seconds I relived 
the first trip which I had taken in the rear seat of an SBD 
to divebomb Japanese anti-aircraft on the then southern 
anchor of the chain of Japanese Pacific defenses at Kahili 
on the southern tip of Bougainville. Apparently I had 
complained too much about the lack of photo coverage 
for our dive and torpedo bombing strikes for I suddenly 
found myself the Pacific's most reluctant "volunteer" 
cameraman in the rear seat of a dive bomber. As we 
flew over the Japanese airfield on Ballale island that 
morning, a few minutes before our break-off for the 
dive through Kahili's anti-aircraft fire, there crossed 
my mind the thought: "McCarthy, why are you here? 
Why isn't it someone else? Why did you have to be 
the one who objected so much to the bad photo cover- 
age?" But then I remembered the next thought which 
I had as my pilot — I believe it was little Johnny Morton — 
cracked his flaps and I saw the red undercover as the 
dive bombing brakes opened up. My thought was: "Hell, 
someone had to do the job. It might as well be me." 

In a split second my thoughts shifted from the Pacific 
to the Arizona hills and I found myself riding a long- 
legged black mule rounding up cattle in the hills and 
canyons of the rim-rock country beyond Young, Arizona. 
It was on the ranch of Kelly Moeur, father of one of the 
less retiring and modest Marines of my acquaintance, 
who in his more generous moments admits that the Army 
and Navy also helped him win the war. 

Ten saddle-sore days which I spent on that desolate 
but friendly cattle ranch, played a most important part 
in my anti- Communist fight. It was a link in a chain of 
events leading up to that morning of March 8, 1950. Six 
years before, after having spent thirteen months as combat 
intelligence officer for Marine Dive Bombing Squadron 
235, I was ordered to the Intelligence Staff of COMAIR- 
SOLS (Commander of Army, Navy, Marine, and New 
Zealand aircraft in the Solomon Islands area). My major 
task was to study the de-coded messages from and con- 
cerning the activities of all of our search planes in the 
entire Pacific. That was my task under General Mitchell of 
the Marine Corps, General Harmon of the Army, and 
General Field Harris of the Marine Corps. Morning after 
morning I briefed some 30 of the top officers of Army, 



Navy, and Marine Corps on what our search planes had 
found throughout the entire Pacific area during the 
previous 24 hours. 

In performing that task I came to know the Pacific 
and the coast of Asia almost as well as I knew Dad's 
farm when I was a boy. And for the first time I began 
to fully appreciate the great wisdom of America's long- 
time foreign policy on Asia — the policy of maintaining a 
free, independent, friendly China in order to keep the 
Pacific actually pacific in fact as well as in name. 

Upon my return to the United States I discovered that 
our wise long-time foreign policy was being scuttled — 
scuttled without the approval of either of America's two 
great political parties. At that time, I frankly had no idea 
that traitors were responsible. In my campaign for the 
United States Senate in 1946, I referred to the State De- 
partment planners as "starry-eyed planners, drifting fro 
crisis to crisis, like a group of blind men leading I 
men through a labyrinth of their own creation.'' 
thought that we were losing to international < 
merely because of abysmal incompetence. At i 
had not even heard the names of many of those whom I 
was to later expose and force out of polky-making jobs. 
Many of them I heard discussed for the first time by 
a man who was later to be hounded to his death by the 
Communists. I arrived in Washington in December, IS- 
about two weeks before being sworn in as a ;;: a: : - 
days later my administrative assistant and I receivec 
invitation to have lunch with Jim ForrestaL 

I have often wondered how the extremely busy Secre- 
tary of the Navy discovered that a freshman Senator had 
arrived in town and why he took so much time out to dis- 
cuss the problems which, were so deeply disturbing . him. 
More than an equal number of times I have thanked God 
that he did. 

Before meeting Jim Forrestal I thought we were losing 
to international Communism because of incompetence and 
stupidity on the part of our planners. I mentioned that to 
Forrestal. I shall ferever remember his answer. He said, 
"McCarthy, consistency has never been a mark of stu- 
pidity. If they were merely stupid they would occasionally 
make a mistake in our favor." This phrase struck me so 
forcefully that I have often used it since. 

When I took on my duties as a Senator, I discovered 
that certain outstanding Senators and Congressmen for 
years had been intelligently trying to alert the American 
people. They belonged to both parties. Unfortunately, 
when they clearly and intelligently presented a picture of 
incompetence or treason which should have commanded 
banner headlines in every newspaper, the story was found, 
if at all, hidden in want-ad space and type. I witnessed 
the frustration of those honest, intelligent, loyal Ameri- 
cans who were attempting to expose our suicidal foreign 
policy. Day after day I came into contact with convincing 
evidence of treason. Obviously, unless the public was 
aroused, the downward course upon which we were em- 
barked would continue and at an accelerated pace. But 
how to arouse the public to the danger before it was too 
late? 

The tempo of events and the pressure in Washington 



make difficult the careful laying of plans and drafting of 
blueprints for an effective fight against the inconceivably 
powerful Communist conspiracy. fj 

The best place to lay the plans for this fight, I decided, 
was in the lonely relatively uninhabited rim-rock country 
of Arizona, which had been so thoroughly pictured to me 
bv J. K. Moeur while I was in the Marine Corps. It was 
there in the lonely Arizona hills that I carefully laid the 
plans for the one great fight which, as a Senator, I had to 
make. There I became convinced that the American peo- 
ple could not be awakened by merely a discussion of 
traitorous policies generally. The men who made those 
policies — the specific traitors or the dupes, well-meaning 
as I ley might be — had to be exposed. Foreign policy, 
ail, does not just happen. It is carefully planned by 
men with faces and names. Those faces and names had to 
be exposed. As J. Edgar Hoover has said, "Victory will 
he assured once Communists are identified and exposed, 
because the public will take the first step of quarantining 
them so they can do no harm." 1 

I decided that it did but little good to argue about 
changing our suicidal foreign policy so long as the men 
in charge of forming that policy were in the camp of the 
enemy. The change which had to be made — if this country 
was to live — was a change of the "experts"— the "ex- 

..- ■■".:: had so expertly sold out China and Poland 
sot the American people realizing what was hap- 

™& 

The planning was made infinitely easier by my contact 

dth real Americans without any synthetic sheen — real 
Americans who are part of the Arizona hills — real Amer- 
icans like J. K.'s mother and his father, Kelly Moeur, like 
Riliabelle, old Jim Sands, and Old Jack with the hounds, 
whose last name I cannot recall. 

All of those things crossed my mind as I headed toward 
the Senate Caucus room. And thoughts of those real peo- 
ple who are the heart and soul and soil of America ; 
thoughts of the young people in my office, toiling night 
and day, some ef them not even fully understanding the 
fight, but knowing that this fight was their fight; thoughts 
of the many young men, friends of mine, who went to their 
death in the Pacific for what they thought was a better 
world — those thoughts convinced me that this fight I had 
to win. 

So it was that I walked into the huge, red-carpeted 
Caucus room on that Wednesday morning more than 
two years ago. 

Chairman Tydings and the other four committee mem- 
bers were seated behind a long- mahogany table at one 
end of the room. The committee staff moved around in 
the background placing papers, notes, and questions in 
front of the Democrat Senators. The Republican members 
of the committee had not been given a counsel. A court 
reporter was setting up his stenotype machine. 

The chair in which I was to sit faced a table directly 
in front of the committee. Several microphones were on 
the table. On either side and in back of me were press 
tables. All of them were filled. Over to my right I could 



i J. Edgar Hoover, House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings on 
H.R. 1884, H.K. 2122, Pt. 2, March 26, 1947, p. 44. 



\ 



ace the tape recording machines of the radio men, and 
~ ■ .eft the newsreel cameramen's huge, bright kleig 
figfag were focused on my chair. 

- screed down the press table to my right. Elmer 
Ifcis. easy to identify by his heavy black-rimmed glasses, 

i ; seated at one end of the table. I remembered that 

Davis had headed the Office of War Information. Many 

the cases I was about to present had once been em- 

ee; in the OWI under Davis and then had moved into 

State Department. 

As I glanced at Davis I recalled that Stanislaw Miko- 
: : r k. one of the anti-Communist leaders of Poland, had 
warned the State Department, while Davis was head of 
.. that OWI broadcasts were "following the Commu- 
nist line consistently," and that the broadcasts "might well 
- =ve emanated from Moscow itself." 2 

_ .ere could be no doubt about how Davis would cover 
the story. 

As I began to take files and documents out of my brief- 
rase, a photographer braced his face against his camera 
for a shot. Another crouched down for an angle shot. 
Others stood on chairs. 

At one of the other press tables I noticed one of Drew 
Pearson's men. I could not help but remember that Pear- 
son had employed a member of the Communist party, 
Andrew Older, to write Pearson's stories on the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities and that another 
:ze of Pearson's limited staff was David Karr, who had 
;:e iously worked for the Communist Party's official 
publication, the Daily Worker. 8 

No doubt about how Pearson would cover the story. 

I saw Marquis Childs stop Senator McMahon on his 
way into the Committee room to chat with him. As I saw 
Childs with his hand on McMahon's shoulder, I remem- 
bered that Childs had defended both Remington and Hiss 
and had bitterly attacked General MacArthur's head- 
porters for exposing Communist Agent Agnes Smedley 
who later was to will her estate to Chu Teh, one of the 
Chinese Communist leaders. 

The wire services were there — Associated Press, United 
_ :e;s. and International News Service. In their presence 
felt some sense of security. Traditionally, their job was 
resent the facts without any editorializing or distor- 
jSn. In my opinion, they thus differed from men em- 
ed by papers such as the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, New 
Foifc Post, Milwaukee Journal, and the Washington Post. 
Lwas later to learn, however, that the cards were stacked 
i on :here. The wire service men assigned to the Hill are 
aknest to a man honest, fair, capable reporters. But after 
7 sal experiences there was impressed upon me the pain- 
fal truth that the stories written by the competent, honest 
LP, L P, or INS men assigned to cover the Senate or the 
House, might not even be recognized by them when those 
st cries went on the news ticker to the thousands of news- 
papers throughout the country. Before being sent out to 
America's newspapers the stories pass across what is 
known as a rewrite desk. There certain facts can be played 

. others eliminated. For example, so often we found 

t in the stories about McCarthy, a word like "evi- 
was changed to "unfounded charges," "McCarthy 



stated" would become "McCarthy shouted," "digging up 
evidence" became "dredging up evidence." In one case I 
recall the story as written on the Hill was "McCarthy 
picked up his briefcase full of documents and left." When 
the story left the rewrite desk it was "McCarthy grabbed 
his briefcase and stormed from the room." 

Dave McConnell, one of the intelligently honest young 
men who covered the hearings that morning in 1950 was 
later to describe the press coverage as follows: 

"To a reporter comparatively new to the Washing- 
ton scene, the intensity, frequently highly emotional, 
with which many have approached the McCarthy 
story has come as a surprise. It has come, too, as a 
surprise to many veterans who cling to the old man- 
date that personal bias or personal opinions belong 
on the editorial page and not in the news columns. 

"It is not unusual for reporters to quip to one an- 
other during the course of a Congressional hearing, 
but it is highly unusual when members of the Wash- 
ington press corps maintain a running commentary 
while a witness is testifying. Such was the case when 
Senator McCarthy was called early in March before 
the Foreign Relations Subcommittee to make his 
initial charges to that group. 

"The uproar in the press section during Senator 
McCarthy's testimony at one point made it difficult 
even to hear what the Wisconsin Republican was 
telling the subcommittee." 4 

The news coverage of the first day's testimony of Louis 
Budenz illustrates the extent to which the picture was to 
be distorted as the hearings progressed. It is an excellent 
example of what the American people were told about the 
hearings as compared to what actually happened. 

Budenz for years had been the editor of the official news- 
paper of the Communist Party, the Daily Worker. He had 
also been a member of the national board of the Commu- 
nist Party. Since he has renounced Communism, he has 
been used by the government as one of its principal wit- 
nesses in practically every criminal action or deportation 
proceeding against Communists. 

I had told the Senate that Budenz could testify that 
Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party and 
could give the committee part of the story of the im- 
portant tasks assigned to Lattimore by the Communist 
Party. This had been widely covered by the press. Inter- 
est had been built up. If Budenz did not so testify, Mc- 
Carthy would be discredited. 

Budenz' testimony was a story of a deadly conspiracy 
against America. He testified as to the part which Latti- 
more played in that conspiracy. He gave the detailed 
story about this man who was a respected university pro- 
fessor and enjoyed the distinction of being considered 
America's top expert on the Far East. He testified that 
this man, who had been employed by the government, 
consulted for years by State Department officials on Far 
Eastern policy, and looked to by newspapermen and maga- 
zine editors for news on Far Eastern trends, had been a 
member of the Communist Party. 

Budenz testified that as editor of the Daily Worker he 



2 Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland (Whittlesey House, 1948), pp. 25, 58. 

3 Congressional Record (Unbound), Deo. 19, 1950, pp. 16805, 16912, 16914, 16915; 
House Committee on Un-American Activities, July 11, 1951, pp. 744, 745. 

" New York Herald Tribune, Dave McConnell, "Reporting the McCarthy Story," 
May 18, 1950 



had been ordered to treat Latttmore in the official Com- 
munist newspaper as a concealed Communist. Lattimore, 
according to Budenz, had been a member of a Com- 
munist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations, a Com- 
munist-front propaganda organization; He further testi- 
fied that when an important party line change was sent 
from Moscow to the American Communist Party, it was 
delivered via Lattimore and Communist Frederick Van- 
derbilt Field, Budenz testified that this party line change 
was confirmed by Moscow sources. 5 

After Budenz repeatedly and positively testified that 
Lattimore was a member of the Communist Party, Tyd- 
ings' counsel, Ed Morgan, attempted to break down Bu- 
denz' testimony by showing that Budenz had not called 
Lattimore a Communist in an article which he had written 
in 1949 for Collier's Magazine. 

Morgan's question was: "Did you refer in this article 
to Mr. Lattimore as a Communist or someone carrying 
out this program?" Budenz replied: "Oh, no, no, no." He 
then went on to explain that Collier's did not want him to 
use Lattimore's name in connection with the story- let 
alone name him as a Communist. Budenz stated: "As a 
matter of fact, Mr. Lattimore is directly, so far as I could, 
referred to there by mentioning all the Communist writers 
who wrote for the Pacific Affar 

Even after the repeated positive testimony that Latti- 
more had been a Communist, one of the major wire serv- 
ices misreported Budenz' testimony as follows: 

". . . Budenz a onetime Communist who renounced 
the party in 1945 . . . said he was not saying that 
Lattimore is a Communist." 

Papers like the Milwaukee Journal used this story. The 
Journal headlined it thus: 

"Budenz Says Lattimore 'Aids Reds' But Refuses 
to Call Him Communist." 

The subhead read: 

" 'No, no.' His Answer at Senate Hearing to Flat 
Question About Party Membership." 7 

The, Milwaukee Journal, of course, was completely dis- 
honest in running this wire service story because their own 
Washington correspondent was present at the hearings and 
heard Budenz repeatedly testify that Lattimore was not 
only a member of the Communist Party but so high in 
its councils that the Party's secret instructions bore Latti- 
more's Party symbol "XL." However, a vast number of 
papers throughout the country did not have Washington 
correspondents present at the hearings. Such papers were 
honest in reporting and editorializing that Communism's 
No. 1 enemy, Louis Budenz, by his sworn testimony, had 
"completely disproved McCarthy's- description of Latti- 
more." Even to this day, many of those editors are un- 
aware of the false wire service story which they headlined. 

As I waited for the chairman to open the hearing that 
morning, I, of course^ knew the left-wing elements of the 
press would twist and distort the story to protect every 
Communist whom 1 exposed, but frankly I had no con- 
ception of how far the dishonest news coverage would go. 
One young reporter later commented that "you have to 



use a sieve to strain out the bias in the McCarthy stories 
published in many papers." 8 

An abrupt rap of the gavel stopped some of the chatter 
in the crowded room. Another rap and the room was 
quiet. The hearing was called to order. In accordance 
with my earlier request, I was sworn before starting my 
testimony. Then began the most unusual hearing which 
the Senate has ever witnessed. I was there, prepared to 
give the committee a carefully catalogued and painstak- 
ingly documented case of Communist infiltration of the 
State Department. 

So unusual was the record of the first two days hear- 
ings that Senator Brewster had a study made of the writ- 
ten record and the tape recordings which showed that on 
the first day I was allowed to devote only 8 minutes to 
direct testimony and on the second day 9 minutes and 30 
seconds. The rest of the time was used up by bickering 
and long statements by the Democrat members of the 
committee' apparently for the benefit of the press. 

Senators Hickenlboper and Lodge both objected to the 
unusual procedure. On one occasion, Senator Lodge said: 

"Mr. Chairman, this is the most unusual procedure 
I have seen in all the years I have been here. Why 
cannot the Senator from Wisconsin get normal 
treatment . . ." 9 

At another point during the hearing, Lodge said: 

"I do not understand why Senator McCarty can- 
not have the opportunity to present his statement 
and not be compelled to act as though he were in 
some sort of a kangaroo court . . . 10 

Senators Lodge and Hickenlooper repeatedly attempted 
to persuade the committee to do what the Senate had 
ordered them to do — -namely, investigate and report on 
Communist infiltration of government. They were in the 
minority, however, and were voted dawn each time by a 
straight vote of the three Democrat senators. 

The blueprint which the committee had determined to 
follow was exposed late in the first day's session when 
Chairman Tydings, white-faced and tight-lipped, leaned 
across the table, shook his finger at me and said: 

"You are in the position of being the man who oc- 
casioned this hearing, and so far as I am concerned 
in this committee you are going to get one of the 
most complete investigations ever given in the history 
of this Republic, so far as my abilities willpermit." 11 

True to his word, Tydings had his staff of investigators 
spend their time investigating and attempting to discredit 
McCarthy rather than, running down the valuable leads 
on treason which had Been given them. 

The investigation that Tydings promised did not end 
when Tydings was removed from office by an overwhelm- 
ing vote of the people of Maryland. Since Tydings' de- 
feat the investigation has been carried on by the Admin- 
istration through the Gillette-Monroney committee whose 
staff has been running down every possible rumor about 



« Tydings Committee Hearings,' Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, pp. 487-558. 

« Tydings Committee Hearings, Ptelr^ April 20; 1950, pp. 605, 506. 

■ Milwaukee Journal, Aprilj20,L I95C%;. 

s Dave MoConneli; New Yorl£ Herald' Tribune, May 16, 1950. 

8 Tydings Committee Bearltigsf Et. t; March 8; 1950, p. 6-. 

w Tydings Committee Hearings, pt. t„ March 8*, 1950, p. 17. 

11 Tydings Committee Hearings, pt. 1, March 8, 1950, p. 6. 






Cartfcr since the date of his birth in search of smear 

jarial to be used in this year's campaign. 

then Tydings made his threat that I had brought on 

: ration of McCarthy and not an investigation of 

nnists in government, I heard a slight commotion 

the press table behind me. Glancing around I saw 

..:i L. Strout of the Christian Science Monitor, sha!.- 

e hand of Rob Hall of the Communist Daily Worker. 

I had never paid much attention to the Christian Science 
->r, but had always thought of it as the paper it had 
been 20 years ago — a respected paper, known for its wide 
■wa ge of foreign news. As I witnessed that comradely 
zH-iishake between an American newspaperman and the 
reporter for the official Communist newspaper, there 
flashed across my mind the story of Gunther Stein, who 
tad been the Christian Science Monitor's correspondent 
m China. 12 General MacArthur's intelligence headquar- 
ers had exposed the fact that Gunther Stein was a Com- 
munist and an "indispensable and important member" of 
the famous Sorge Communist spy ring. 13 Within 24 hours 
after the War Department released a report on the activi- 
ties of this Communist spy ring, Gunther Stein disap- 
peared. He remained incognito until the spring of 1950 
when he was picked up by the French police as a Commu- 
nist spy. 14 

At the time of Gunther Stein's exposure as an impor- 
tant member of the internationally famous Sorge Com- 
Bsunist spy ring, I thought that Gunther Stein had clev- 
erly deceived the Christian Science Monitor when they 
made him their China correspondent — that they did not 
know they were hiring a traitor to America to write the 
news on China for the Christian Science Monitor s read- 
ers. But now I began to wonder as I watched Strout of the 
Christian Science Monitor and Rob Hall of the Daily 
Worker cheek by jowl during the entire hearing and then 
read the venomous distorted parallel stories which they 
both wrote. Knowing that many fine, trusting, deeply re- 
ligious people would get their picture of the evidence of 
Communists in government from the pen of Strout, I was 
disturbed. However, I was doubly disturbed with the 
thought that if a columnist for a paper like the Christian 
Science Monitor could so closely follow the Communist 
line, no publication and no institution in the entire coun- 
try could be secure from Communist infiltration. 

The committee displayed the greatest amount of frus- 
trated rage when, regardless of how they tried, they 
could not force from me the names of any people in 
government who were giving me information. I patiently 
explained to them over and over and over that under no 
circumstances could I or would I violate the confidence of 

:;e loyal people who were risking their jobs in order to 
disclose the extent to which the Communist conspiracy was 
- taping our foreign policy. I explained to the committee 

at they were being used by the State Department be- 
cause if I were to give the committee the name of a single 
S^ate Department employee who had been helping me, he 
would lose his job immediately. 

This was promptly labelled as an "irresponsible state- 
ment" 13 by the committee. What I said was fully con- 
firmed over a year later, however, by Carlisle Humelsine, 



the State Department's Security officer. On August 19, 
1951, he appeared on a television program and, in answer 
to a question, stated: 

"I don't know if anyone in the State Department 
is feeding Senator McCarthy information. If I 
catch anyone that is feeding him information, I 
am afraid they won't be in the State Department 
any longer." 10 

Perhaps the most astounding indication that the com- 
mittee was being used as a "Committee for the Defense of 
Lattimore" occurred when Louis Budenz was called to 
testify in closed session after he told the committee he 
wanted to give them information on other State Depart- 
ment officials in addition to Lattimore. On my way over to 
hear Budenz' testimony I met Bob Morris, who was 
selected by the Republican members as their counsel after 
the Democrats on the committee finally consented to let 
the Republicans have one counsel. I asked him why he was 
not at the very important executive session to hear Budenz 
testify. His answer. was, "Senator Tydings has decided 
that the Republican counsel should not be allowed to at- 
tend executive sessions." 

I thought about the unusual precedent Tydings was 
setting. To my knowledge, this was the only time under 
either Democrat or Republican leadership that the Major- 
ity allowed its counsel to be present at secret sessions but 
excluded the Minority counsel. 

I opened the door and stepped into the committee room. 

I could hardly believe what I saw. 

Sitting at the hearing table taking notes and listening to 
the secret testimony of Louis Budenz from which Repub- 
lican Counsel Morris had been excluded, was none other 
than Owen Lattimore and his lawyer. 

I drew up a chair to sit down. 

Tydings interrupted the questioning of Budenz. "You 
needn't sit down, McCarthy," he said, "you can't stay 
here." 

I pointed out to Tydings that it would be unusual to 
exclude me from the hearings — especially in view of the 
fact that the committee was taking the position that I 
alone had to present the entire case and that the com- 
mittee had no obligation to use their investigators to run 
down the valuable leads which I had given them. I re- 
minded Tydings that if I could not even hear the testi- 
mony of the witnesses I had asked them to call, my task 
would be made doubly difficult. Tydings' answer was that 
the committee could get along without me. 

I asked Tydings whether he would like the opportunity 
of explaining to the press waiting outside the door, why 
he had invited Lattimore, who had already been named 
under oath as a Communist, to sit in and take notes at a 
hearing so secret that the Republican counsel was ex- 
cluded. Tydings ordered me from the room. 

Thus was set the pattern for the Tydings' committee 
"investigation." 



12 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2. August 23, 1951. p. 635. 
is McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 8, 1951, p. 383. 
« McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 8, 1951, P. 384. 
is Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, March 9, 1950, p. 42. 
la Meet The Press, August 19, 1951. 



t* Os 




Senator Joe McCarthy receiving annual "Americanism Award" from Military Order of the Purple Heart, August 26, 1950, Worcester, Mass. 



(Sheraton Studios) 



CHAPTER II 



Round I — Wheeling, West Virginia 



DLVG the public phase of my fight to expose pro- 
mimists and Communist treason in government, 
ober of deeply disturbed Americans have asked 
aiitnde of questions. They want the answers — docu- 
1 and proved — so they may determine for them- 
arfics the true situation. 

.k is my answer to those questions. This is my 

■wer to every American who seeks to know the truth 

nght against pro-Communists and Communist 

easoo in government. As you read the carefully docu- 

answers to the questions those Americans have 

: er the past two years, I am confident you will 

agree that this fight is your fight — your fight for your 

res and your children's children. 

f are all the important questions that have been 
d by friends and enemies of my anti-Communist fight 
together with my answers. 

I have often heard people say "I agree with Senator 
McCarthy's aim of removing Communists from 
Government, but I do not agree with his methods." 
Senator, why don't you use methods which could 
receive the approval of everyone? 

I have followed the method of publicly exposing the 
b about men who, because of incompetence or treason, 
ere betraying this nation. Another method would be to 
the evidence to the President and ask him to dis- 
charge those who were serving the Communist cause. A 
i i method would be to give the facts to the proper 
§ t ate committee which had the power to hire investi- 
gators and subpoena witnesses and records. 

The second and third methods listed above were tried 

ithout success. The President apparently considered any 

anpt to expose Communists in the government as a 

: ; p political trick to embarrass him and would not 

even answer a letter offering him evidence of Communist 

filtration. The result of my attempt to give the evidence 

a Senate committee (the Tydings Committee) is well 

wn. Every person I named was whitewashed and given 

a clean bill of health. The list included one who has since 

era convicted and others who have been discharged 

meter the loyalty program. 

The only method left to me was to present the truth to 

t American people. This I did. Even though the Admin- 

::on has been fine-tooth combing my evidence for 

a 2 years, they have been unable to find a single item 

i f that evidence that was untrue. 

One of the safest and most popular sports engaged in 
lay fay every politician and office seeker is to "agree 
vitb. McCarthy's aim of getting rid of Communists in 
frnment," but at the same time to "condemn his irre- 
sponsible charges and shot-gun technique." It is a com- 
7 7' safe position to take. The Communist Party and 
ifci ii camp followers in press and radio do not strike 



back as long as you merely condemn Communism in 
general terms. It is only when one adopts an effective 
method of digging out and exposing the under-cover, 
dangerous, "sacred cow" Communists that all of the 
venom and smear of the Party is loosed upon him. 

I suggest to you, therefore, that when a politician 
mounts the speaker's rostrum and makes the statement 
that he "agrees with McCarthy's aims but not his meth- 
ods," that you ask him what methods he himself has 
used against Communists. I suggest you ask him to name 
a single Communist or camp follower that he has forced 
out of the government by his methods. 

I do not much mind the Communists screaming about 
my methods. That is their duty as Communists. They are 
under orders to do just that. But it makes me ill deep 
down inside when I hear cowardly politicians and self- 
proclaimed "liberals," too lazy to do their own thinking, 
parrot over and over this Communist Party line. By con- 
stant repetition they deceive good, loyal Americans into 
believing that there is some easy, delicate way of exposing 
Communists without at the same time exposing all of 
their traitorous, sordid acts. 

Whenever I ask those who object to my methods to 
name the "objectionable methods," again I hear parroted 
back to me the Communist Daily Worker stock phrase 
"irresponsible charges" and "smearing innocent people." 
But as often as I have asked for the name of a single 
innocent person who has been "smeared" or "irrespon- 
sibly charged," nothing but silence answers. 

When you hear a politician assuring you that "I am 
against Communism, but do not like McCarthy's meth- 
ods," you might ask yourself this question: "Is this poli- 
tician willing and eager to be against Communism on 
the speaker's stand but afraid to pay the high price in 
smear and abuse which is heaped upon anyone who really 
starts to draw blood from the Communist conspiracy?" 
During this fall's campaign, timid, cautious politicians 
who want to stay at the public trough regardless of the 
cost to the nation and those who would protect Commu- 
nism and corruption in government will parrot over and 
over the same stock excuse. They will tell you how "vigor- 
ously" they "condemn" Communism. With equal vigor 
they will tell you that they condemn McCarthy for taking 
off his gloves and painfully digging out, one by one, the 
Administration-protected Communists. 

The last 20 years have proved that even the most elo- 
quent speeches against Communwrn generally, are as in- 
effective as speeches against crime generally by a prose- 
cuting attorney who fails to dig out and convict the dan- 
gerous criminals. 

When I launched the public phase of this fight at 
Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950, I dis- 
cussed, among others, the case of John Stewart Service. 
At the time I was discussing the Service case with the 
people at Wheeling, Service was in India. He had just 



arrived in that country. His task was to advise the State 
Department on a policy toward India. India was then 
facing a threat from Communism as serious as was China 
when Service represented the State Department there. I 
discussed point by point how John Service had contrib- 
uted to the disastrous policy which sold 400 million Chin- 
ese to Communism. Had I merely discussed in general 
terms how disastrous our policy in China had been or how 
seriously India was threatened by Communism, Service ob- 
viously would not have been recalled, nor would he have 
been slowed down one iota in his planning. 

For the last six years we have been losing the war 
against Communism at the rate of 100 million people a 
year.' Anyone watching our civilization plunge so rapidly 
toward the abyss of oblivion, must conclude that we are 
losing the war to Communism for one of two reasons. We 
are losing either because of stumbling, fumbling idiocy 
on the part of those allegedly leading the fight again ?: 
Communism or because, like Hiss, they are '-planting it 
that way." 

I have maintained that regardless of whether our de- 
feat is because of treason or because of i 
those doing the planning should be removed from power 
if this nation and our civilization are to survive. My 
efforts have been in that direction and will continue tc 
be so. 

Have those who have criticized your "methods" of 
fighting Communists demonstrated any other 
method of exposing treason? 

In answering this question let us consider the most 
recent attack upon my "methods." On the date this manu- 
script goes to the printer, May 18, 1952, the press carries 
the story of four attacks upon "McCarthyism" and "Mc- 
Carthy's methods." The attacks, according to the press, 
were made before the National Convention of the Amer- 
cans for Democratic Action by four men who are asking 
the American people to place them at the helm of this 
government — candidates for President. 17 The candidates 
were Kefauver, Humphrey, Harriman, and McMahon. 
Each with apparently equal vigor condemned McCarthy's 
method of exposing Communists. All four of these men 
who ask to be elected President know that 10 of those 
whom I originally named before the Tydings Committee 
and who were cleared by that committee have since either 
been convicted or removed from the State Department 
under the loyalty program. (See pg. 13). 

Therefore, the following questions should be asked 
those candidates for President: 

(1) If elected President will you reinstate and return 
to positions of power those who were exposed and forced 
out of the State Department by McCarthy? 

(2) Can you name one person whom you have exposed 
and had removed from government because he was either 
a Communist or a loyalty or security risk? 

(3) Despite the opposition of the- vast power of your 
party which had been in control of the federal govern- 
ment, Senator McCarthy has forced out of high position 
10 of those whom he originally named. Three of you 
are on Senate Committees controlled by your party. You 



have the power to subpoena. You know the names of 
the Communist traitors as well as McCarthy does. There 
are still nearly six months before the November elections. 
This gives you time to prove that you can remove more 
Communists and loyalty and security risks by your 
method than McCarthy has removed by his. He has chal- 
lenged you to do that. Will you accept that challenge? 
(4) If with your combined efforts you are unable in 
the next six months to remove from government one 
Communist or loyalty or security risk as compared to 
McCarthy's record of 10, then are not the American 
people entitled to conclude that you are attacking Mc- 
Carthy's fight against Communists because of either 
stupidity or dishonesty? 

Why did you take your case of Communists in 
government to the people rather than to the Presi- 
dent or the Congress? 

The Democrat Administration obviously did not — or 
would not — recognize the fact that the Communist Party, 
in order to achieve its objective most effectively, was 
employing the technique of infiltrating our government 
so as to shape our foreign policy. No action was being 
taken to remove Communist elements from government. 
Instead those who made American policy dovetail with 
- . et aims were promoted up the scale to positions of 
greater power. 

The Democrat Party was not only unwilling to act — • 
it also effectively tied the hands of Congress and pre- 
vented it from, acting. Time and again members of Con- 
gress and Congressional committees had been prevented 
from getting at the truth by the President's order for- 
bidding any government employee from giving Congress 
information concerning loyalty matters. The difficulty a 
Congressional committee had in obtaining the facts when 
faced with the President's blackout order was rather well 
demonstrated when General Charles Willoughby appeared 
before the McCarran Committee on August 9, 1951. Gen- 
eral Willoughby had been chief of General Douglas 
MacArthur's intelligence for more than 10 years. Wil- 
loughby was being asked about three individuals who 
had been accused of' Communist activities, and who 
according to Willoughby "were hired in the United 
States [by the State Department],, and unloaded on 
Tokyo." Willoughby's testimony follows: 

GENERAL WILLOUGHBY: "Mr. Chairman, as 
a citizen, I am naturally most desirous to assist 
this important committee. However, as a federal 
officer, I am expected to observe Army orders and 
Presidential directives. 

"I invite your attention to a Department of Army 
circular letter dated Augut 21, '48, on the subject, 
'Release of Personnel Records and Information.' 
I quote: 

"No information of any sort relating to the em- 
ployee's loyalty and no investigative data of any 
type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects 
of the individual's records, shall b'e included in 
material submitted to a Congressional' commitee.' 

"The provision of trie Presidential directive of 
March 13, 1948, is intended to apply to records 



i? Washington Star, May 18, 1952, p. A-4. 



8 



unearthed evidence demolished Senator Benton s 
charge in ail material respects and thoroughly proved 
Senator McCarthy's account of the facts to be 
truthful." 21 

Why has the opposition insisted upon playing this 
"numbers game" even after all the facts about 
what you said at Wheeling, West Virginia, were 
fully known to them? 

This juggling and playing with numbers has apparently 
been for the sole purpose of confusing the issue and dis- 
tracting attention from the all-important question: Axe 
there still Hisses in the State Department betraying this 
nation? 

A great deal of light is shed on this numbers game 
by former Senator Tydings' speech on the Senate £ 
on July 20, 1950, 22 and his actions subsequent there 
On that date, Tydings told the Senate that he 
recording which would prove that I had deceived 
Senate about this question of numbers. He did not 
the recording. 

On August 4, 1950, a few weeks after Tyd 7 - spe 
I spoke to the Senate. I discussed the numbers game 
being played by Tydings— his juggling c Bgares 

205, 57, and 81. I pointed out that 1ms ::n of 

what McCarthy had said about the numbers 205 and 5 i 
now became very important, because either, as Tydrr-1? 
stated, he had a recording which proved that McCari 
did not speak the truth, or Tydings was deliberate; 
lying to the Senate and to the country. As I pointed out 
to the Senate at that time, it therefore became of the 
greatest importance to discover who spoke the truth. In 
that way the Senate and the country could better evaluate 
the entire Communist fight which, unfortunately, instead 
of being a contest between Communism and America, 
had become a fight between McCarthy and the Admin- 
istration. 23 

I suggested that while the Senate could not force 
Tydings to play the recording, perhaps the press could 
shame him into playing this recording by constantly 
asking him to do so. Various members of the press did 
this, but while Tydings referred to the recording a num- 
ber of times thereafter, especially during his campaign, 
it was never played. 

Will you explain your use of the figure 81? 

On February 20, 1950, without naming names, I gave 
the Senate a resume of the facts from the files of 81 indi- 
viduals—including the 57 referred to at Wheeling. 

While I strongly felt that the 57 were either Commu- 
nists or at least completely loyal to the Communist Party, 
the 81 included cases which were marginal. All their 
files suggested unfitness for government jobs. However, 
I felt that some might be able to prove their loyalty. I 
therefore called for a careful investigation in closed 
session by a Senate committee. 24 

To again summarize the numbers used: 

205— Number of State Department employees referred 
to in a letter of Secretary of State James Byrnes. They 
were declared unfit for government service by the Pres- 



ident's board but were not discharged. Neither the Con- 
gress nor the American people have been advised who 
those people were or whether they are today employed 
bv the government. 

81 — Cases which McCarthy presented to the Senate in 
a speech on February 20, 1950. This list included the 
57, plus additional cases of less importance against whom 
the evidence was less conclusive. 

57 — State Department employees described by McCar- 
thy in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, as either 
members of or loyal to the Communist Party. 

Incidentally, the State Department's Security Officer, 
Carlisle Humelsine, and the Chairman of the State De- 
partment Loyalty Board, Conrad Snow, admitted under 
rigorous cross-examination that 54 out of 57 cases of 
c : :e Department employees charged with disloyalty, 
resigned while their cases were pending before a loyalty 
panel. The other three, who were found to be disloyal, 
have appealed their cases to Dean Acheson. 24_A 

Were all of the names given to the Tydings Com- 
mittee? 

All except the 205 mentioned in Secretary Byrnes' 
letter. 

Whv did you not give the names of the 205 men- 
tioned in the Byrnes" letter to the Tydings Com- 
mittee? 

As I explained at Wheeling and in my wire to the 
President, I did not have the names of those mentioned 
in the Byrnes letter. However, I urged the Tydings Com- 
mittee to subpoena Secretary Acheson and obtain those 
names. This was never done. 

Do you claim there are only 57 Communists or indi- 
viduals doing the work of the Communist Party in 
the State Department? 

Obviously not. I have no committee or agency to pass 
upon the approximately 28,000 State Department em- 
ployees. 

I have no power to subpoena witnesses or records. I 
have a very limited staff of investigators. Nevertheless, 
I have been able to dig out the facts to show that 57 
are either Communists or doing the work of the Com- 
munist Party. Therefore, it is safe to assume that there 
are many more Communists about whom I have no infor- 
mation. 

Is this fight against Communists in government a 
fight against the Democrat Administration? 

No, only against those in the Administration who have 
joined forces to protect Communists in government. If 
America is to win this battle, all loyal Democrats and 
Republicans must join forces against the Communist 
conspiracy. 

Unfortunately, the Administration branch of the Dem- 
ocrat party feels that having coddled and protected Com- 

2i New York Times, Dec. 28, 1951, p. 8. 

22 Congressional Record (Unbound), July 20, 1950, pp, 10861-10872. 

2-" Congressional Record (Unbound), August 4, 1950, .p. 11990. 

24 Congressional Record (Unbound), February 20, 1950, pp. 2049, 2053, 2055. 

2iA senate Appropriations Committee Hearings, March 25, 1952, p. 385, 395. 

10 



. eminent over the past years, it must now Republicans must admit that we are paying today — in 

csl reasons avoid having them exposed. For the lives in Korea and in taxes from every week's payroll 

■station to label the Democrat party as the pro- — -because we completely failed to win the peace follow- 

Communists is extremely unfair to the millions ing World War II and that since then we have followed 

5 who have long voted the Democrat ticket. a foreign policy that is in the interest of international 

■aislv. those Democrats dislike Communists as much Communism, not America. 

Ac average Republican. All thinking Democrats and 



11 



A FEW OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM IMPORTANT 
GOVERNMENT POSITIONS SINCE THE WHEELING SPEECH 




(InlemotUmol Sacs Photo) 

Oliver Edmund Qubb, jr. 



iluiernatiowud >evx Photo) 
Edward Posniak 



(International News Phota 

John Stewart Service 




Stephen Brunauer 



UP Photo) 



'William Remington 



(International News Photo) 



12 



CHAPTER III 



What Has Been Proved? 




yon named before the Tydings Coin- 
cleared by that committee. Since 
of them been removed from the 
on the grounds that they were either 

bad security rigks? 

izs is a partial list: 

John Stewart Service 

ice was dismissed from the State Department on 

13, 1951, on orders from the Loyalty Review 

Each reversed the State Department's previous 

Edward Posniak 

liter having been cleared by the State Depart- 
:y£ty Board in November, 1948, resigned after I 
his record. He was subsequently called for ques- 
iefore a Grand Jury. 

Esther Brunauer 

Bronauer has been suspended from a high State 
job where she was handling secret material. 

Stephen Brunauer 

, an admitted former member of the Young 
League, was suspended from his job as head 
s high explosives section where he was en- 
top secret work. He resigned before the Navy's 
r Board could complete questioning him and dis- 
■sc #f iris case. 

Peveril Meigs 

irags was allowed to resign from the State Department 
dear record. He then obtained a job with the Mili- 
■stai'lishment. He was discharged from that job 
■ier tine Loyalty Program. 

Hans Lansberg 

had been allowed to resign from the State 

with a clear record. He then secured a posi- 

l Economist with the Department of Commerce. 

etary of Commerce ordered Lansberg discharged 

ihe Loyalty Program. The Loyalty Review Board, 

pcaL affirmed the action of the Secretary of Com- 

d Lansberg was removed from his position on 

Mm 25, 1951. 

Oliver Edmund Clubb 

ObMv Director of the State Department's Division of 

aairs, was cleared by the Tydings Committee, 

State Department Loyalty Board unanimously 

against Clubb. Dean Acheson, however, overruled 

Loyalty Board and gave Clubb a clean bill of 

Iter which Clubb immediately resigned to accept 

i jpi ■ i«i ii f tr/mrr* 

William Remington 

: nvicted in connection with his mem- 



bership in the Communist Party and sentenced to 5 years. 
Remington was on the Commerce Department's payroll 
but working closely with the State Department, handling 
secret material. When his case was presented to the 
Tydings Committee, that committee failed to hear the 
evidence and cleared him. Remington was later indicted 
by a Grand Jury. Evidence presented at his trial showed 
that he had supplied secret government documents to a 
Soviet courier. He was convicted and sentenced to 5 years. 
His conviction was set aside on technical grounds. He 
has since been reindicted on 5 counts. 

V. Lorwin 

Lorwin was suspended under the State Department's 
Loyalty Program (according to a letter received from the 
Chairman of the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board in 
June, 1951). 

William T. Stone 

Stone was ordered removed under the State Department 
Security Program while he was assistant to Assistant 
Secretary of State William Benton (now Senator Benton) . 
However, Benton failed to remove Stone in accordance 
with that order. On February 2, 1952, Stone resigned 
after the Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board 
had selected a panel to rehear his case. 

The list is growing from month to month. It should be 
remembered that it took ten years to get rid of Hiss after 
he had been named as a Communist spy. 

What has happened to Ambassador Jessup and the 
State Department's Far Eastern expert John P. 
Davies, who were named by you? 

A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee found Ambassador Jessup unfit to represent 
this country and rejected his nomination as U. S. Dele- 
gate to the United Nations. Nevertheless, after Congress 
adjourned, President Truman gave Jessup an interim 
appointment as U. S. Delegate to the U. N. As this is 
written, Jessup is the State Department's Ambassador-at- 
Large. 

John Patton Davies was cleared by the State Depart- 
ment Loyalty Board. His case has since been referred to 
the Attorney General by the McCarran Committee. ; 

You have referred to the State Department Loyalty 
Board and the Civil Service Commission Loyalty 
Review Board. Will you explain the difference? 

The State Department Loyalty Beard consists of a panel 
of State Department employees selected by Dean Acheson 
or his assistant. Their task is to hear the evidence and 
pass judgment upon their fellow State Department em- 
ployees who, as a result of investigations by the FBI and 

*While I gave the Tydings Committee information on Clubb, he 
was not one of the 81 cases. 



13 



other government agencies, are suspected of being disloyal 
or security risks. 

The Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board 
is, as the name implies, a loyalty board set up by the 
Civil Service Commission. It has no connection with the 
State Department. Its function is to review loyalty cases 
which have been passed upon by the loyalty boards 
within various departments, such as State Department, 
Treasury Department, and Department of Agriculture. 

This review board has power only to review loyalty 
cases. It has no power to review security cases. 

Why were the people who were removed from the 
State Department as a result of your evidence all 
cleared by the State Department's Loyalty Board? 

This is best answered by the following excerpts from a 
transcript of a meeting of the Civil Service Loyalty Re- 
view Board on February 13 and 14, 1951 : 

CHAIRMAN BINGHAM: ". . . The State Depart- 
ment . . . has the worst record of any depai 
the action of its Loyalty Record. The Loyalty Board 
in all the cases they have considered :: : be ■r.ate 
Department has not found any-: — ; Q I say 
guilty — or not found anyone disloyal under oar rule. 
It is the only board which has acted in that way . . ." 

CLARK: "What are you going to do when the at- 
torney who is presenting the charges sets is though 
he were the attorney for the incumbent? I read 100 
pages of a record where the three members of the 
[State Department] hoard were acting as attorn e= 
for the employee . . J™ 

MELOY: "Oh, you're talking about the State 
Department, They're taking the attitude that they're 
there to clear the employee, and not to protect the 
government. We've been arguing with them since the 
program started." [Emphasis mine] 25 

Since the above Loyalty Review Board meeting in Feb- 
ruary of 1951, the State Department Loyalty Board has 
found three cases of disloyalty in the State Department. 2 6 
All three have appealed their cases to Dean Acheson. 

What is your answer to the State Department's at- 
tempted ridicule of your evidence on the ground 
that your cases are "old cases?" 

It is true that many of the cases were "old cases" in 
the sense that the evidence of their Communist activities 
extended over many years. They should have been dis- 
missed years ago. The fact that a State Department offi- 
cial has a long record of Communist activities over many 
years certainly does not make him less dangerous than 
the case of a new Communist arrival in the State Depart- 
ment. It would indeed be an odd district attorney who 
would scoff at and refuse to prosecute a bank robber 
because he was an "old case" — because he had been ply- 
ing his trade over a period of many years. If old cases of 
Communists should be ruled out, then the House Commit- 
tee on Un-American Activities should not have exposed 
Alger Hiss and he should not be in jail today. Informa- 
tion about Hiss' espionage activities was brought to Dean 
Acheson's attention more than ten years ago. 27 

William Remington's case could be considered an old 



When I first named him before the Tydings Com- 
mittee he was holding an $11,000 a year job even though 
his file showed Communist connections and activities 
over a long period of time. At that time he was on the 
Commerce Department payroll working closely with the 
State Department. A House Committee had already done 
an excellent job of exposing Remington. Senator Fer- 
guson had also exposed many of Remington's activities. 
When Ferguson investigated the Remington case in 1943, 
the President refused to release loyalty data to the com- 
mittee. The President's Loyalty Review Board then 
^cleared" Remington. 

STien I brought the facts in the Remington case up to 
late and presented them to the Tydings Committee, col- 
umnists such as Marquis Childs shed crocodile tears for 
his "innocent" man. Re m ington, who had been pre- 
viously cleared. The Tydings Committee labelled my evi- 
dence a "fraud and a hoax." This was an "old" case 
and according to one Washington columnist, "warmed- ^ 
over bisquits." 

Since then, however, a New York Grand-Jury heard 
the evidence and indicted Remington on the ground that 
he had perjured himself when he said he was not a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party. For this he was then con- 
victed, which conviction was set aside on technical 
grounds. Since that time he has been re-indicted on five 
counts of perjury in connection with Communist activities. 

How many sex deviates have been removed from 
the State Department? 

Ninety-one were forced to resign from the State De- 
partment prior to 1950, and 54 since that time. 

The Senate Special Investigating Committee had this 
to say about those who were allowed to resign: 

"In most of those cases these known homosexuals 
were allowed to resign for 'personal reasons,' and no 
information was placed in the regular personnel files 
of the State Department indicating the real reason 
for resignation nor was the Civil Service Com- 
mission informed of the true reason for the resig- 
nation. . . . Due to the manner in v:hwh these cases 
were mishandled, 23 of those 91 State Department 
employees found their way into other departments of 
the government." 2 ^ 

Do you claim that the sex deviates removed from 
the State Department were all disloyal? 

No, but all are considered security risks. One reason 
why sex deviates are considered by all intelligence agen- 
cies of the government to be security risks is that they 
are subject to blackmail. It is a known fact that espion- 
age agents often have been successful in extorting in- 
formation from them by threatening to expose their 
abnormal habits. 

To illustrate the seriousness of this problem, let me 
cite from the Report of the Senate Special Investigating 



25 Congressional Record (Unbound), January 15, 1952, pp. 192-194. 

*> Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings on State Dept. Apnropriation 

March 25, 1952, p. 395. " 

« Hearings on Communist Espionage in the United States, House Committee on 

Un-American Activities, August 30, 1948, pp. 1291-1300. 

28 Report on Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government 

Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Subcommittee 

on Investigations, Dec. 1950, p. 11 



14 



nrittee. the classic case of Captain Raedl who was 
:: die Austrian Counter-intelligence Service in the 
:'.- ':ar: of World War I. 

Captain Raedl became chief of the Austrian 

Hier-intelligence service in 1912. He succeeded in 

ilding up an excellent intelligence net in Russia 

.:ad done considerable damage to the espionage 

..t: ' Rich the Russians had set up in Austria. 

""However, Russian agents soon discovered that 
Raedl was a homosexual and shortly thereafter they 
ijed to catch him in the act of perversion as the 
; ih of a trap they had set for the purpose. 
"L nder the threat of exposure Raedl agreed to f ur- 
•/. and he did furnish, the Russians with Austrian 
iBtary secrets. He also doctored or destroyed the 
teUigence reports which his own Austrian agents 
gee sending from Russia with the result that the 
Austrian and German General staffs, at the outbreak 
World War I in 1914, were completely misin- 
rmed as to the Russians' mobilization intentions. 
"On the other hand, the Russians had obtained 
| ::_: Raedl the war plans of the Austrians and that 
i art of the German plans which had been made avait- 
le to the Austrian government. Shortly after the 
\: reak of the war, Captain Raedl's traitorous acts 
e t : discovered by his own government and he com- 
mitted suicide." 29 



In addition to the security question, it should be noted 
that individuals who are morally weak and perverted and 
who are representing the State Department in foreign 
countries certainly detract from the prestige of this 
nation. 

The Special Senate Investigating Committee had this 
to say about the high percentage of sex deviates in gov- 
ernment: 

" [The homosexual has a] tendency to gather other 
perverts about him. Eminent psychiatrists have in- 
formed the subcommittee that the homosexual is 
likely to seek his own kind because the pressures of 
society are such that he feels uncomfortable unless 
he is with his own kind. Due to this situation the 
homosexual tends to surround himself with other 
homosexuals, not only in his social but in his busi- 
ness life. Under these circumstances, if a homosexual 
attains a position in government where he can influ- 
ence the hiring of personnel, it is almost inevitable 
that he will attempt to place other homosexuals in, 
government jobs." 30 



2" Report on Employment of Homosexuals In Government, Senate Subcommittee 
on Investigations, Dec. 1950, p. 5. 

30 Report of Employment of Homosexuals In Government, Senate Subcommittee 
on Investigations, Dec. 1950, p. 4. 



15 



CHAPTER IV 



Congressional Immunity 



mm «■*"«■ made tout charges against Commu- 

rrv-:_:eiit without the protection of Con- 
limity ? 

i«r the past two years I have made speeches from 

: hi Pacific and from the Gulf of Mexico 
Cjiradian border exposing Communists and pro- 
Mi f in government. I have repeatedly named 
documented cases. At such times there was 
■■gfirssional immunity — nor is there Congressional 
. - =::=:hed to this book. 

do Senators and Congressmen have Congres- 
ii. : -_: — unity? 

swer to this question is found in the long strug- 
the human race to establish a workable representa- 
e government. History records that legislative immu- 
i • ritten into English law after "The Case of the 
i Bishops" which precipitated the Revolution of 
During that Revolution Parliament triumphed over 
g James II who had been ignoring the Parliament 
•ring to impose one-man rule upon England. Mat- 
were brought to a head after James II ignored the 
Lament and passed a law by proclamation. The King 
required the clergy to read this law to their church 
rs. Seven bishops protested and issued a petition to 
Cing setting forth their reasons for objecting to this 
litrary procedure. The King immediately had the seven 
sbt'ps arrested and charged them with "libelous and Bedi- 
ms" 5 statements'. When the court set the seven bishops 
we. the people of England cheered the court. The same 
j an invitation was sent to William and Mary to take 
the throne of England. After this experience, the 
became determined to make sure once and for all 
their representatives should have the freedom to 
peak out against the government without fear of arrest 
Sec what they said. After William and Mary succeeded 
=res II in 1688, the Bill of Rights was drawn up by the 
scple. One of the rights provided for in that document 
was the right of the representatives of the people to speak 
against anything which they thought endangered 
k welfare or security of the nation and its people, withr 
it fear of reprisal. The new monarchs, William and Mary, 
■£Bed that document. 31 

When our forefathers drew up the Constitution, they 

o considered this right a basic one and wrote it into 

~lx Constitution. It is today known as Congressional 

■mnnity. Its purpose is to make a Republic workable. 

people are to have a voice in government through 

■fcdar representatives, then those representatives must be 

to speak out even though their remarks may embar- 

bbb and Kurt the party in power and tend to remove 

Aat party from power. 

b should be remembered that the provision for Con- 
■:onal immunity was written into our Constitution 



not for the benefit of the individual Congressman or 
Senator, but for the benefit of the people of this country. 
This was made clear in a court decision in one of the first 
lawsuits testing Congressional immunity. The court stated: 

"These privileges are thus secured, not with the in- 
tention of protecting the members against prosecu- 
tions for their own benefit, but to support the rights 
of the people, by enabling their representatives to 
execute the functions of their office without fear of 
prosecutions, civil or criminal." 32 

The real liberals of their day provided for Congres- 
sional immunity in the English Bill of Rights and the 
United States Constitution. The Communists and the 
phoney and deluded liberals of today would take from 
the people the right to hear all of the facts from their 
representatives. Unfortunately, the freedom of Senators 
and Congressmen to speak unpleasant and embarrassing 
truths without fear of prosecution in lawsuits is at times 
abused. Rather than remove this freedom of speech, 
it would seem wiser for the Voters to remove those who 
abuse that freedom of speech. 

Do you feel that you properly used Congressional 
immunity to expose Communists and pro-Commu- 
nists in government? 

The test is whether the facts which I gave to the Senate 
and the country were true. If it could be proved that 
the facts which I gave the Senate and the country 
were untrue, then, of course, the use of immunity was 
improper. If, on the other hand, the facts which I gave 
the Senate were all true, there should be no objection to 
my giving the country the truth under the usual rules 
of Congressional immunity. 

Even though the opposition has at its command the 
vast power of the federal government, it has been unable 
to disprove any of the evidence on the Communists, 
fellow travelers, and well-meaning dupes of the Kremlin 
which I gave to the committee and the Senate. One by 
one, those whom I named before the Tydings committee 
are being exposed and removed from government. Were 
I being proved wrong on the cases of John Stewart 
Service, Owen Lattimore, Philip Jessup, Edward Posniak, 
William T. Stone, and others, then the argument that I 
should not have used Congressional immunity to expose 
them would have merit. 

A Senator who is aware of treason but who refuses 
to expose the dangerous unpleasant facts for fear that 
he will be politically scarred and bloodied if he does, is 
actually guilty of a greater treason than the traitors 
themselves. Every Senator has the duty to use the means 
provided by the Constitution to protect the people who 



M 1 William and Mary, Session 2, Chap. 2; Frederick George Marcham, A 
History at England, Revised Edition (New York, 1950), p. 484; William, Political 
History of England, Edited by William Hunt, Vol". 8, pp. 273, 278. 
>" Coffin v. Coffin (1808) 4 Mass. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 189. 



17 



have entrusted him with the task of manning the watch- 
towers of this nation. 

Can newspapers freely publish the facts proving 
corruption and Communism in government with- 
out benefit of Congressional immunity? 

This question was answered rather well by David Law- 
rence in his column of August 9, 1951, which follows : 

"Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wis::::;::.. Republi- 
can, has given a public demonstration of the impor- 
tance, as he sees it, of congressional immunity — and 
why he thinks the press, too, recognizes its advan- 
tages. 

"Congressional immunity is the right of a member 
of Congress to say what he pleases on the floor or in 
a committee proceeding and yet to be free from 
prosecution for libel or slander by those individuals 
who may consider themselves unjustly attacked or 
subjected to ridicule. 

"The Wisconsin Senator offered on a television 
program to make public the names of the 29 employ- 
ees of the State Department who, he says, are now 
being investigated by the department's loyalty- board 
in connection with charges involving 'security' risks. 
"But promptly the moderator of the television pro- 
gram declined to have the names given, and Senator 
McCarthy said he understood and sympathized with 
the desire of the broadcasting companv and the 
sponsor to avoid responsibility for such disclosures. 
"So the Wisconsin Senator announced that he 
would meet the next morning at his office the reporters 
from the press associations and give them the naire- 
for publication. He said he not only would announce 
the names but would permit the reporters to give his 
own name publicly as their source or authority for 
the information. He made, however, one condition — 
that the press associations assure him in advance 
they would print the 29 names. 

"The press associations declared that they would 
give no guarantees in advance that they would print 
anything about anybody and that, if Senator McCar- 
thy issued the names, they would then decide on their 
own whether or not to publish them. 

"Mr. McCarthy, of course, knew that, the moment 
the names -were printed, all immunity vanished not 
only for him but for the press associations as well 
as all the newspapers served by them which printed 
the names. There is no certainty that the individuals 
would refrain from filing lawsuits against the news- 
papers and sue only the Wisconsin Senator, though 
the press would be jointly liable with him ... 

"But the purpose of the stunt was achieved. What 
Mr. McCarthy wanted to do was to emphasize the 
real reason for congressional immunity — to protect 
not only members of Congress but the newspapers 
and periodicals which desired to publish the infor- 
mation made available by members of Congress and 
governmental agencies. Without congressional immu- 
nity, many a scandal, like the recent revelations of 
the RFC, would appear in print in only a few publi- 
cations ready to risk lawsuits. Nation-wide publicity 
on such wrongdoings would occur rarely . . ," 33 
Why do Communists object so strenuously to the 
use of Congressional immunity? 

Part of the answer is found in the following testimony 
of Louis Budenz, former editor of the official Communist 
newspaper, the Daily Worker, and member of the na- 
tional committee of the Communist Party: 

". . . the Communist Party — and this is something 



that everyone should know— agreed that after that 
period of 1945, that with the cold war beginning, all 
concealed Communists should sue anyone who ac- 
cused them of being Communists, sue them for libel. 

"As Alexander Trachtenberg [member of the Com- 
munist Politburo], who made the report, said, 'This 
is not necessarily for the purpose of winning the libel 
suit. It is to bleed white anyone who dares to accuse 
anyone of being a Communist, so that they will be 
shut up.' As a matter of fact, that became the policy. 

". . . this plan was very successful, those who might 
speak in organs, or in the press or over the radio of 
concealed Communists — that the Communists, as a 
matter of duty, were to sue them for libel ... we 
have a very striking case of Mrs. McCullough . . . 
who, even if she wins the case, is going to lose 
Soo,000 from the cost of the case." 34 

An example of what Budenz was discussing is William 
Remington's lawsuit against Elizabeth Bentley. Reming- 
ton sued Miss Bentley after she named him as a Com- 
munist on a radio program. 

In this lawsuit, Miss Bentley had no power to order 
the government through a subpoena to produce the files 
on Remington which contained full information about 
his Communist connections. It would have been useless 
to have subpoenaed and brought into court the indi- 

duals who had been fellow-Communists with Remington 
because ill they could have availed themselves of the 
common Communist dodge of "I refuse to answer on 
the grounds my answer might tend to incriminate me," 
or (2) if they did choose to testify, Miss Bentley as a 
former Communist knew that they were bound "to prac- 
tice trickery, to employ cunning, and to resort to illegal 
methods ... to overlook or conceal the truth." 35 

Faced with this situation, Miss Bentley's co-defendant, 
the radio program sponsor, had no choice but to settle 
the case. It is reported that a $10,000 settlement was 
made. 

A jury later convicted Remington of perjury in con- 
nection with his Communist activities. However, the 
program sponsor is still out $10,000, and Miss Bentley 
is out her attorney's fees. 

If on that radio program Miss Bentley had named all of 
the Communists in her spy ring and all the other Com- 
munists with whom she had contact, each of them, under 
orders from the Communist Party, would have been 
obliged to sue her. Even if she had finally won all of the 
lawsuits, if would undoubtedly have bankrupted her, the 
radio program sponsor, and the radio network. 

Instead of using Congressional immunity to name 
names publicly, why were not the names given in 
closed session of the committee? Could not the 
same results have been obtained in that fashion? 

In answer to that question allow me to quote from a 
speech made by Senator Hickenlooper on April 5, 1950: 

Senator Hickenlooper Tells Senate: 

Tydings Insisted on Public 

Disclosure of Names 

"The Senator from Wisconsin [on February 20, 

|3 David Lawrence, Washington Star. August 9. 1951 

3* Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 506. 

36 Lenin, Should Communists Participate in Reactionary Trade Unions?, p. 13. 



18 



] repeatedly stated, and restated on the floor 

mt Ae Senate that he did not want to make names 

izlz. iat he would not tell the names to the Senate 

- -i . . . 
"The junior Senator from Massachusetts and I, 
:*h at the first executive meeting of the subcommit- 
suggested and proposed the procedure, that the 
: : mmittee meet in executive session, call the Sena- 
: ::om Wisconsin before it, and ask him to dis- 
pose the names in private, together with whatever 
_:: relation he had in connection with the names; 
feat the majority- of the subcommittee said no, this 
most be brought out in public. So they held their 
first hearing, requiring the Senator from Wisconsin 
i come, in public, to name the names. I tell the Sen- 
tie that, if it is not familiar with it, merely to keep 
the factual history of the publicity of those names 
accurate. 

"I should like to say also that so far as I am con- 
cerned, while we did not have the machinery to set 
p a court of inquiry such as the Canadian spy-ring 
case called for, we did propose and urge that an 
■qairy in secrecy without naming names be made 
ith the facts collected. But we were overruled, and 
Senator from Wisconsin was required, or re- 
-:td, to come before the committee in public 
hearing, with klieg lights, television, and; all the rest 
l the fanfare of such, an emotional, occasion, there 
bring out his cases, name names, and produce 
facts." 36 

y was your advice that the names be taken in 
et session not followed? 

eannot guess why the Democrat Majority Party in 
Senate did not follow this advice. 
$K Majority leader, former. Senator Scott Lucas, 

upted my February 20th Senate speech five times 
I insisted that the names be made public. 

jr example, on page 2046 of the Congressional Rec- 

he had this to say: 

I want to remain here until he names them — that 
j :iat I am interested in." 

! -in, on page 2049, he said, 

"Will the Senator tell us the name of the man for 
toe record? We are entitled to know this. I say this 
in all seriousness." 

Again, on page 2053, 

"The Senator should name names before that Com- 
tee." 

again on page 2063, he said, 

Why does the Senator refuse to divulge names 
before the Senate?" 

sal was yonr answer to Senator Lucas' demand 
t the names be made public? 

insurer was as follows: 

Hie names are available. The Senators may have 

- -} they care for them. I think, however, it 

d be improper to make the names public until 

s appropriate Senate Committee can meet in exec- 

session and get them. I have approximately 

cases. I do not claim to have any' tremendous 

; igative agency to get the facts, but if I were 



to give all the names involved, it might leave a 
wrong impression. 

"If we should label one man a Communist when 
he is not a Communist, I think it would be too bad. 
However, the names are here. I shall' be glad to abide 
by the decision of the Senate after it hears the cases, 
but I think the sensible thing to do would be to 
have a proper committee go over the whole situa- 
tion.'^ 

If you felt it was wrong to name the names publicly, 
why did you do so under the orders of the Tydings 
Committee? 

Because this is still a Republic and the majority rules. 

Where in the record of the Tydings Committee did 
you object to giving the names in public? 

On Page 17 of the Tydings hearings I stated: 

"... On the Senate floor I said that I would not 
divulge any names. I said I hoped any names that 
were divulged would be developed in executive ses- 
sion. Mr. Lucas, who is the leader of the majority 
party, demanded time after time on the Senate floor 
and publicly that I divulge names. I- am now before 
the committee. In order: to present the case B must 
give the names, . otherwise I cannot intelligibly pre- 
sent it. If the committee desires to go into executive 
session, that is a decision that the committee and 
not I can make, but if I am to testify, I say it is 
impossible to do it without divulging names . . . 

"I personally do not favor presenting names, no 
matter how conclusive the evidence is. The commit- 
tee has called me this morning, and in order to 
intelligibly present this information I must give 
names. I think this should be in executive session. 
I think it would be better. However, I am here. 
The committee has voted to hold open sessions, so 
I shall proceed." 

At that point I handed copies of my testimony on 
Kenyon to the press. After Tydings saw that the testimony 
had been distributed to the press he then offered to 
allow me to testify in executive session on the Kenyon 
case — a cleverly deceptive gesture because he knew there 
could be nothing secret about the evidence after some 
50 newspapermen had been given copies of it. 

After holding public sessions to hear the evidence on 
nine of my cases, the committee decided to hear the 
balance in closed session. However, the only case in 
which the committee allowed me to present evidence in 
closed session was the Lattimore case. 

How about the claim that you have used Congres- 
sional immunity to smear innocent people? 

This is the type of general statement which has been 
parroted over and over by such men as Drew Pearson, 
and publications such as Time Magazine, the St. Louis 
Post Dispatch, the Milwaukee Journal, as well as the offi- 
cial publication of the Communist Party, the Daily 
Worker. 

This is the well-known and effective Hitlerian tech- 
nique of shouting loud and often a lie that is so big that 
at least part of it will be repeated and finally come to be 
accepted as fact. 

w Congressional Record, (Unbound), April 5, 1950, pp. 4957, 4958. 
3' Congressional Record (Unbound), Feb. 20, 1950, p. 2049. 



19 



AH of those critics refuse to name a single "innocent"' 
person whom they claim I have "smeared." If by expos-; 
ing Communists and pro-Communists I have smeared 
them, then the district attorney who convicts a murderer 
and his accomplice is also guilty of "smearing innocent 
people." 

Did you publicly name Lattimore as one of Russia's 
top agents? 

No. Lattimore was named in a closed session of the 
Tydings Committee with the strict understanding that 
his name would not be made public by the committee 
until his case had been fully investigated. 

At that time I urged the committee to consider the 
Lattimore case as a test case. I suggested that if the com- 
mittee found my evidence on Lattimore true in every 
respect, then they could reasonably assume the accuracy 
of my evidence on the other cases. I suggested that if, 
on the other hand, my evidence against Lattimore proved 
untrue — if the charges against him were "irresponsible" 
— then they could assume that the evidence which I gave 
them about others in the State Department was equally 
unfounded. I told the Tydings Committee at that time 
that I was willing to stand or fall on the Lattimore case. 

Who made public the fact that you had named 
Lattimore as one of Russia's top agents? 

Drew Pearson made Lattimore's name public. Accord- 
ing to Lattimore's book, Mrs. Lattimore wrote him that 
on the night of March 26, 1950, Drew Pearson's broad- 
cast "really broke the story." 38 In his broadcast Pearson 
stated, "I am now going to reveal the name of the man 
whom Senator McCarthy has designated the top Commu- 
nist agent in the United States . . . The man is Owen 
Lattimore." Pearson continued, "Now I happen to know 
Owen Lattimore personally, and I only wish this country 
had more patriots like him." 89 

Lattimore's book, Ordeal by Slander, reveals the fact 
that Abe Fortas, Lattimore's lawyer, invited Mrs. Latti- 
more to listen to the broadcast, knowing in advance 
that Pearson was going to make Lattimore's name pub- 
lic. 40 Thus it seems that the name was made public upon 
agreement between Lattimore's lawyer and Pearson for 
a definite purpose. Lattimore's "Ordeal by Slander," it 
would appear, was deliberately commenced by his good 
friend, Pearson, upon the advice of Lattimore's lawyer. 

This was secret information until Pearson made it 
public. After having made it public, Pearson then started 
a running smear compaign against me for having "pub- 
licly smeared Owen Lattimore under the cloak of Con- 
gressional immunity." 

Owen Lattimore has challenged you to make your 
statements about him away from the Senate floor 
so he could sue you. What is your answer to this? 

I have offered to waive all immunity in the Lattimore 
case if he would consent to have the legal evidence in 
his FBI file made available in any lawsuit which he 
might start. 

On page 483 of the Tydings hearings, he was asked 



by Senator Hickenlooper whether or not he was willing" 
to have the legal evidence in his file made available. 
In his answer Lattimore refused to ask that his file be 
made available on the ground that "I should be asking 
for a favor and that I refuse to do." 41 

Did an Administration Senator, who repeatedly 
used Congressional Immunity to charge people 
with being crooks, racketeers, gamblers, and thugs, 
viciously attack you for having exposed Commu- 
nists in government under the same immunity 
rules? 

Yes. Senator Kefauver in his bid for the support of the 
left-wing and Communist-controlled elements of press and 
radio in his campaign for the Presidential nomination 
has conducted a running public attack on my exposure 
of Communists in government. He has been unable to 
find one single thing good for America in my fight against 
Communists. His parroting of the stock left-wing phrases___- 
against McCarthy has sounded like a broken record — 
phrases such as "irresponsible charges," "shot-gun tech- 
nique," "smearing innocent people," ad infinitum. To 
date, of course, he has not named a single "innocent per- 
son" who was "hit by a stray bullet" nor a single "inno- 
cent person" who was "smeared." No mention is made of 
the fact that a sizable number of the "innocent" people 
who were "irresponsibly" charged by McCarthy have 
since either gone to jail or have been gotten rid of under 
the Loyalty Program. 

Why do some Senators feel that it is proper to use 
Congressional immunity to accuse people of being 
dishonest and of being crooks and gamblers but 
improper to use the same immunity to expose 
traitors ? 

I cannot answer that question. It is safe, of course, for 
a politician to trumpet against and "expose" men long 
known and publicly recognized as racketeers. 

Was Senator Kefauver offered a bribe to protect 
certain racketeering activities? 

Yes, according to Kefauver's story in the Saturday 
Evening Post of April 7, 1951, pages 76 and 79. 

Was the person who offered Kefauver this bribe to 
protect racketeers guilty of a crime? 

In the Post article Kefauver says that the man offering 
the $100,000.00-plus bribe was not committing a crime. 
However, under federal law and the laws of each of the 
48 states, it is a crime — a felony to bribe a public 
official. 

In order to expose crime and convict criminals, is 
it not extremely important to expose and convict 

those who try to bribe public officials? 

Obviously so. 

In this connection, three things should be kept in mind: 

(1) Unless he who is offering the bribe is guilty of 



as Owen Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander (Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p. 14. 

8 ^ Owen Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 48. 

*o Owen Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 44 

4i Tydings Committee Hearings. Pt. 1, April 6. 1950, p. 433. 484. 



20 



t: serious wrong doing, he would not, as Kefauver 
said, offer a bribe "in six figures" — meaning $100,000 
or more. 

(2) Offering to pay a public official a huge bribe is a 
serious crime. 

(3) Unless the criminal who makes the offer is ex- 
posed and prosecuted, he and other criminals and racket- 
eers will rightly understand this as a green light to at- 
tempt to buy protection from other public officers. 

Why has not Senator Kefauver who claims to be 
against crime ever exposed the name of the man 
who offered him this bribe to protect racketeering? 

? ? ? 

This racketeer, according to Kefauver's story, was 
offering a huge bribe to keep the Kefauver Com- 
mittee from investigating him. In other words, he 
was trying to buy protection from the Senate Crime 
investigators. Did he get that protection or was he 
investigated ? 

Only Kefauver, the Crime Fighter, and the crook who 
offered him the bribe can answer this question. Kefauver 
has refused to disclose either the name of the individual 



or the racket in which he was involved. Kefauver's story 
merely shows that this racketeer was worried about being 
exposed by the Senate Crime Committee and that he tried 
to buy Kefauver off by offering (1) to contribute $100,- 
000 or more t© the Democrat National Committee, or (2) 
to hire workers for Kefauver with "nobody knowing any- 
thing about it," or (3) to send out campaign material 
for Kefauver. 42 

Senator Kefauver in the Saturday Evening Post 
article admits that he refused to expose a man who 
offered him a bribe to ignore or whitewash racket- 
eering. Obviously, Communist traitors have much 
more at stake than this bribing racketeer. They, of 
course, would pay a much higher price to have 
their activities covered up and whitewashed. Why 
does Presidential candidate Kefauver so bitterly 
condemn you throughout the country for refusing, 
where Communist traitors are concerned, to follow 
the same cover-up rule that he followed where this 
cheap racketeer was concerned? 

I would prefer not to speculate as to Kefauver's motives. 



« Saturday Evening Post, April 7, 1951, p. 79. 



21 



CONFIDENTIAL 

FRCMs SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTER 

TO j SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE C. MARSHJJ2. 



June 10, 1947 



It becomes necessary due to the gravity of the situation to call your 
attention to a condition that developed and still flourishes in the State De- 
partment under the administration o f Dean A cheson. 

It is evident that there is a deliberat e, c alculated program being carried 
out not only to protect Coamunis^ personnel in high places, but to reduce security 
and intelligence protection to a null ity. * — — — — 

Regarding the much-publicized M1RZANI case, the evidence brought out at his 
trial was well known to State Department officers, who ignored it and refused to act 
for a full year. " — ■ 2 " S " 



MABSANI and several other Department officials, with full knowledge of the 
gjj gfce Department, and with Government time and money, promoted a scheme called 
PRESENTATIONS, INC., which contracted with a Communist dominated organization to 
disseminate propaganda. 

Security objection s to these and other even more dangerous developments 
ve J e ■gkBffffitiy high administrative officials j and there followed the substitution < 
of unqual ified men for these competent, highly respected personnel who theretofore '" 
held the intelligence and security assignments in the Department. The sew chief cf 
controls is a man u tterly devoid of background and experience for the job, who is 
and at the time of his appointment was know n to those who appointe d himto be, a 
cousin and close associate of a suspected ^joviet e s pionage ageiit p fae next develop- 
ment was the refusal of the FBI, G-2, ONI^nd other- federal investigative agencies to 
continue the whole hearted cooperation they had for years extended to the State Department. 

On the file in the Department is a copy of a preliminary report of the FBI on 
Soviet espionage activities in the United States, which involves a large number of State 
Department eimployes, some in high official positions. This report has been challenged 
and ignored by those charged with the responsibility of administering the Department 
with the apparent tacit approval of Mr. Acheson. Should this case break before the 
State Department acts, it will be a national disgrace. 

Voluminous files are on hand in the Department proving the connection of 
the State Department employes and officials with this Soviet espionage ring. Despite 
this, only two persons, one of whom is MARZANI, were released under the McCarran 
rider because of their subversive activity. 





are only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected 
and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to 
national security. There is also the extensive employment in highly classified posi- 
tion of admitted homosexuals, who are historically known to be security risks. 

The War and Navy Departmen ts have been thwarted for a year in their ef- 
forts to carry out the German Scientist program. 'They are blocked )sy one man in the 
State Department, a protege of Acheson named mmrnmm ; who is also the chief 
instrument in the subverting of the over-all security program. 

This deplorable condition runs all the way up and down the line. 
Assistant Secretary Braden also surrounded himself with men like SsfesssKSisss 
and with IBa a ^ a who has a notorious international reputation. The network 
also extends into the office of Assistant Secretary Benton. 



SUBCOMMITTEE OF 

SEmTE APPROPRIATIONS GOMMIIM 



22 



CHAPTER V 



The Record of Dean Acheson 




" 



pal target of your criticism has been 

Aebeson. Will you give the record — not 

o prove that Acheson has aided 

st cause? 

- • the documented record of Acheson's aid 
_ : romunism over the past 20 years. 
opposite page there is reproduced a confidential 
from a subcommittee of the Senate Appro- 
mittee in 1947 to the then Secretary of 
ige Marshall. It will be noted that the Senate 
e : -••arned that "under the administration of 
es :::" there was being carried out "a deliberate, 
i : ;ram ... to protect Communist personnel 
j.i:e;. The memorandum included the names 
Department officials and warned that "the 
:rnds into the office of the Assistant Secretary 
Senator Benton]." 
fcs warning was disregarded by Marshall. 

Communist Russia Hires 
Acheson and Pressman 

: re Russia was recognized by the United States in 

'. Dean Acheson was paid by the Soviet Union to 

£^ Stalin's lawyer in this country. 43 Lee Pressman, an 

lilted member of the Communist Party, also was on 

jp s payroll as one of his American lawyers. 44 Some 

Acheson's duties were to appear before such agencies 

he L. S. Tariff Commission. 45 

Felix Wittmer in the American Mercury asks: 

"'Just why among all the American lawyers, did the 
oviet leaders hire these two : Acheson and Lee Press- 

i d ''. It's easy to explain why they hired Pressman : 
lie was a Communist and a member of the Ware cell 
organized for espionage in the government. The So- 
viet Union, of course, followed a general policy in all 

untries of hiring sympathetic lawyers. Then why 
did Stalin hire Acheson?" 46 

This has never yet been satisfactorily explained by our 
i rtary of State whose job it is to "fight" the Commu- 
ist threat to this country. 

Communist Infiltration of Government 
Commences 

Acheson first entered the government in 1933, when 

he was appointed Under Secretary of the Treasury. It 

■s in 1933 also that the Communist Party began the 

Sematic infiltration of our government under the direc- 

d of Harold Ware, son of Ella Reeve Bloor, the so- 

:i_ed "mother" of the American Communist Party. Alger 

Hiss, in those early days, was a member of the Ware cell. 

_ b r far-reaching importance of this Communist cell in 

pbe U. S. government was described by Whittaker Cham- 

irr; who said that its members have "helped to shape 

the future of' every American now alive and indirectly 

ifiected the fate of every man now in uniform." 47 



After leaving the Treasury Department, Acheson served 
in the Attorney General's office for one year. In 1941 he 
entered the State Department. 

Vouched for Hiss in 1941 

When Told Hiss Was a Communist 

Adolph Berle, the State Department official in charge 
of security, has testified that he notified Acheson (both 
before and after Acheson became Assistant Secretary of 
State) of a conversation he had in 1939 with Whittaker 
Chambers about Alger Hiss and his brother, Donald, 
Chambers had advised Berle that the Hiss brothers were 
underground Communists. Assistant Secretary of State 
Berle's notes on Chambers' knowledge of the Hiss broth- 
ers' Communist activities were headed "Underground 
Espionage Agent." 48 At the time Berle warned Acheson, 
Acheson ridiculed the fears of this State Department se- 
curity officer and stated that he "could vouch for therm 
absolutely." 

Following is Berle's testimony before the House Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities: 

"Specifically, I checked with Dean Acheson and 
later I checked when Acheson became Assistant Sec- 
retary of State [1941] and Alger Hiss became his 
executive assistant. That, to the best of my knowledge, 
was the first time when Hiss would have been in a 
position to do anything effective. Acheson said he 
had known the family and these two boys from child- 
hood and could vouch for them absolutely." 49 

Ignored Reports on Hiss 

Acheson ignored loyalty reports on Alger Hiss and 
continued to help him up the ladder of success. It is 
interesting to note that Hiss' meteoric rise in government 
began after Acheson was advised that Hiss had been 
named as an underground Communist. 

Hiss moved up the ladder, first becoming attached to 
the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Next he became Special 
Assistant to the Adviser on Political Relations; Special 
Assistant to the Office of Special Political Affairs ; Deputy 
Director, Office of Special Political Affairs; and finally 
Director, Office of Special Political Affairs. 50 

In addition Acheson helped secure for Hiss the appoint- 
ment as Executive Secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference, which laid the foundation for the United 
Nations. 

Sends Hiss to Yalta 

At Yalta, Hiss was one of the chief advisers to the 



43 American Mercury Magazine, "Freedom's Case Against Dean Acheson," Pelis 
Wittmer, April, 1952, p. 5; Congressional Record, May 16, 1933, p. 3484. 

44 House Un-American Activities Committee, Hearings on Communism in the 
United States, Pt. 2, August 28, 1950, pp. 2843-2901. 

45 American Mercury, April,. 1952, p. 5. 

46 American Mercury, April, 1952, pp. 5, 6. 

a Whittaker Chambers, Saturday Evening Post, "I Was The Witness," February 

23, 1952, p. 22. 

«s Whittaker Chambers, Witness (Random House, 1952), pp. 466-469. 

« Hearings on Communist Espionage in United States, House Committee on 

Un-American Activities, August 30, 1948, pp. 1291-1300. 

6! > Letter from Department of State to Library of Congress. (Author has copy). 



23 



President, and with Gromyko of Russia and Jebb of Eng- 
land drafted major portions of the Yalta Agreement. 
It was at Yalta that China and Poland were sold out to 
Communist Russia and the stage was set for the present 
war in Korea. As Hiss said about his activities at Yalta: 

"I think it is an accurate and not immodest state- 
ment to say that I helped formulate the Yalta agree- 
ment to some extent." 50_A 

In 1945, Hiss reached the heights when he was made 
Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference in 
San Francisco. There he presided during the drafting of 
the United Nations Charter. 

"I Do Not Intend to Turn My 
Back on Alger Hiss" 

In 1950, after serving Communist Russia well for many 
years as an agent, Hiss was convicted of perjury in con- 
nection with his espionage activities. Acheson then called 
a press conference and announced to the world that 
"whatever the outcome" of Alger Hiss' appeal, "I do not 
intend to turn my back on him." 51 

This statement is significant not because it expressed 
undying support for an old friend who was a convicted 
traitor. Acheson's statement was extremely important be- 
cause it served public notice on every other "Hiss" in 
the State Department that he could bank upon the power- 
ful backing of the Secretary of State if he were caught 
and accused or convicted of treason. 

Donald Hiss, brother of Alger, who was also named 
by Chambers in 1939 as an underground Communist, 
remained in the State Department until 1945 when it 
was arranged for his transfer to the Acheson law firm. 
Donald Hiss is today a member of the Acheson law firm. 

Acheson and Hiss Head Pro-Communist 
Group in State Department 

On August 30, 1948, Adolph Berle, former Assistant 
Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities as follows: 

". . . In the fall of 1944 there was a difference of 
opinion in the State Department . . . the intelligence 
reports which were in my charge indicated a very 
aggressive Russian policy . . . and I was pressing 
for a pretty clean-cut showdown then when our posi- 
tion was strongest. The opposite group in the State 
Department [the pro-Communist group] was largely 
the men — Mr. Acheson's group, of course — with Mr. 
Hiss as a principal assistant in the matter ... I got 
trimmed in that fight and, as a result, went to Brazil 
and that ended my diplomatic career." 52 

Communist Party Campaign 

To Remove Anti-Communists from 

State Department 

According to the testimony of Louis Budenz, former 
editor of the Daily Worker and a former member of the 
American Communists' national committee, the Com- 
munist Party mapped out a campaign in 1942 which 
"began with an attack on Mr. Adolph Berle ... to clean 
the State Department of all anti-Soviet elements." 53 Berle 



at that time was the official in charge of security matters 
in the department. 

According to Budenz' testimony, word was sent out 
through the Daily Worker to all loyal Party members 
to attack and demand the resignation of "those who were 
considered to be against Soviet policy in the Far East." 54 
As a result, there was unloosed a barrage of insidious 
smear attacks and an all-out attempt to discredit the anti- 
Communists in the State Department. This was done 
through Communist front organizations and by the "lib- 
eral" elements of press and radio. 

The Communist Party, according to the testimony, also 
used men within the State Department to sabotage the 
work of the anti-Communists. In this they had the active 
assistance of Acheson's group. Budenz cited one example : 

"The Communists relied very strongly on Service 
and John Carter Vincent in the campaign against 
Ambassador Hurley." 55 

Budenz testified that the Communist Party's opening 
attack — a speech delivered by Earl Browder to the Young 
Communist League on October 2, 1942 — was "prepared 
through an arrangement with Lauchlin Currie [Adminis^ 
trative Assistant to the President who was named under 
oath as "a full fledged member" of a Communist spy 
ring] 56 in order to smoke out the people who were 
opposed to Soviet policy in the Far East in the State 
Department." 57 

Following the reprinting of this speech in the Daily 
Worker, on October 4, Earl Browder, the head of the 
Communist Party in the United States met with Under 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Lauchlin Currie 
and secured from Welles a statement on State Department 
policy on China that was acceptable to Browder. Welles' 
memorandum to Browder, which was then published in 
the Daily Worker of October 16, stated: 

"With regard to the specific charge that 'these offi- 
cials continue the old policy of "war against the 
Communists" in China,' this government has had no 
such policy, either 'old' or new. This Government 
has in fact viewed with skepticism many alarmist 
accounts of the 'serious menace' of 'Communism' in 
China. We have, for instance, as is publicly and well 
known, declined to be moved by Japanese conten- 
tions that presence and maintenance of Japanese 
armed forces in China were and would be desirable 
for the purpose of 'combating Communism.' With 
regard to the specific charge that officials of this 
Government 'tell Chungking [headquarters of the 
anti-Communist government of China] it must con- 
tinue to fight the Communists if it wishes United 
States friendship,' the simple fact is that no official 
of this government ever has told Chungking either 
that it must fight or that it must continue to fight the 
'Communists'; this government holds no such be- 
lief . . ." (Emphasis mine) 58 

Asked what anti-Communist officials in addition to Berle 



bo-a Testimony before House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1948, quoted 
by The Freeman, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 817. 
si World Almanac, 1951, p. 208. 

52 Hearings on Communist Espionage in United States, House Committee on Un- 
American Activities, August 30, 1948, pp. 1291-1300. 

53 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, August 23, 1951, Pt. 2, p. 602. 
5* McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 602. 
55 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2. August 23, 1S51, p. 624. 
so McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 14, 1951, p. 423. 
5? McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 594 

"» McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, pp. 599, 600. 



24 



were slated for removal by the Communist Party, Budenz 
replied: 

"Jo?eph C. Grew, Under Secretary of State; Lt. 
Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, not technically with the State 
Department but connected at least diplomatically 
with the State Department relations ; Eugene C. Doo- 
man, whr> was head of the Far Eastern Division, if 
I remember correctly, at least he was in control of 
the details; of far eastern policy; and Gen. Patrick 
Hurley, Ambassador to China, who particularly was 
under attack from the Communists." 59 

In all easels the Communist Party, with the aid of their 
friends witl'lhi the department, was successful. 

It is ii.iteresting that in almost every case the men 
singled rout for removal by the Communist Party were in 
bitter conflict with Acheson, particularly over his Far 
Eastern policy. 

S *"" / Grew Resigns after Insisting on 

Prosecution in Amerasia Case 

Joseph Grew was one of the State Department officials 
"T>ri~trle~ Communist black list. Budenz testified that "the 
Politburo laid plans against Mr. Grew" because: 

". . . he didn't have the right policy in China, and 
secondly, as we approached the question of what to 
do with Japan, he favored a soft peace with Japan. 

"'The Communists wanted a tough peace just as 
there was to be the Morgenthau plan in Germany. 
They didn't hesitate in their own discussions to show 
that this would tend to drive the Japanese into the 
hands of the Soviet Union." 60 

According to Freda Utley, author of The China Story, 
"so long as Grew was in charge of Far Eastern affairs at 
the State Department, the Communists had compara- 
tively little influence there." To circumvent Grew, who 
stymied the pro-Communists' attempts to send their re- 
ports into the White House, Acheson had already made 
State Department official John Carter Vincent a special 
assistant in the White House to Lauchlin Currie 61 (named 
under oath as a Communist and as a member of a Com- 
munist spy ring respectively). 

Grew's final anti-Communist act in the State Depart- 
ment came in 1945 when he insisted upon prosecution 
in the Amerasia case. The Washington Daily News has 
reported that Grew insisted on the arrests because he was 
under the "certain impression at that time that the case 
against the 6 persons arrested was so air tight as to make 
convictions all but assured." 62 According to Fred Wolt- 
man's newspaper series "The Amerasia Case," this assur- 
ance came to Grew from the FBI. 63 John Stewart Service 
was one of the State Department officials arrested in this 
case. The FBI had wire recordings of Service visiting the 
hotel room of Philip Jaffe (who has been named as a 
Soviet agent) and turning over to him military informa- 
tion which Service warned Jaffe was secret. 64 Soon after 
Grew insisted that the cases go to trial, he resigned from 
the State Department because of "bad health." 

Communists Praise Acheson 

Acheson then replaced Grew as Under Secretary of 



State. Service was reinstated in his State Department job 
and later put on the board which had charge of place- 
ments and promotions of State Department personnel in 
the entire Far Eastern area. 

The official publication of the Communist Party, the 
Daily Worker, had already praised Acheson on June 7, 
1945, as "one of the more forward-looking men in the 
State Department." In the same article the Daily Worker 
stated that the real test of the President's concern over 
anti-Soviet policies would be "what he does about it, 
whether he removes those in the State Department re- 
sponsible for anti-Soviet policies, whether he finds solu- 
lutions for outstanding points of friction with the Soviet 
Union . . ." When Grew resigned and Acheson replaced 
him, PM (which John L. Lewis has described as the "up- 
town edition of the Daily Worker") wrote: 

"What the government seeks now is to develop a 
diplomacy based on a better appreciation of what 
the Soviet wants . . . That explains in part the search 
for liberals..." 65 

Removes Anti-Communist Who Opposed Him 

The day after Acheson replaced Under Secretary of 
State Joseph Grew, he announced he was replacing 
Eugene Dooman, long-time Far Eastern expert, with John 
Carter Vincent. 66 It was little wonder, for Dooman, who 
was another anti-Communist official slated for removal by 
the Communist Party, had just run head-on into Acheson's 
vigorous attempts to inject the Lattimore line into postwar 
policy toward Japan. 

This occurred during a meeting of the powerful inter- 
departmental committee representing the State, War and 
Navy Departments, known as SWINK. Dooman, who was 
chairman of the Far Eastern subcommittee of SWINK, 
had just made his report on proposed postwar policy to- 
ward Japan. At the end of that report, according to Doo- 
man's testimony before the McCarran Committee, Mr. 
McCloy, chairman of the full committee, turned to Dean 
Acheson and said: 

"Dean, you are a great authority on Far Eastern 
matters. What do you think of what we have just 
heard?" 

Acheson's answer was: 

"I have discovered that Far Eastern experts are a 
penny a dozen. And you can find some experts who 
will support any point of view that you care to have. 
And I, myself, do not go along with what we have 
just heard. I prefer to be guided by experts who think 
more along my point of view." 

Dooman testified that Acheson from then on: 

". . . quoted virtually textually from this Solution 
in Asia by Dr. Lattimore." 67 

Lattimore, in Solution in Asia, had advocated the 



1951), 



.'•» McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 604. 

eo McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 604. 

«i Freda Utley, The China Story (Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 

pp. 117, 118. . . 

62 Washington Daily News, June 7, 1950, p. 3. 

»s Fred Woltman, "The Shocking Story of The Amerasia Case," Pamphlet, 

Scripps-Howard, 1950, p. 14. 

64 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, June 26, 1950, p. 1404. 

6* PM, October 7, 1945, p. 6. 

68 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, September 14, 1951, p. 716. 

•' McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, September 14, 1951, p. 723. 



25 



straight Communist Party line on Japan, namely, that 
we should force a "hard" peace on Japan — remove the 
emperor, destroy all successful business, confiscate all 
private property, in short, reduce Japan to a weak state 
which would be ripe for Communist conquest. 

In a government policy-making meeting, Professor Wil- 
liam McGovern of Northwestern University heard Latti- 
more argue the Acheson-Lattimore case for a "hard" 
peace against Japan. Testifying under oath before the 
McCarran Committee, Professor McGovern said: 

"I was somewhat shocked and horrified, not only 
as to his [Lattimore's] views with regard to the em- 
peror, but he wanted to have not only a strict and 
stern policy, but a bloody peace in Japan ... he 
wanted to completely reduce Japan to beggary and 
impotence." 68 

The Acheson-Lattimore plan for Japan was the same as 
the plan masterminded for postwar Germany by Harry 
Dexter White, named under oath by government witnesses 
as having aided a Communist spy ring in Washington. 

Shortly after Dooman opposed Acheson's attempts to 
inject the Communist Party line into postwar U.S. policy 
toward Japan, Dooman was removed by Acheson from 
the State Department. Acheson then promoted John 
Carter Vincent to Dooman's job. 

State Department Document Altered 
to Conform to Communist Line 

Once Vincent came into power as chairman of the 
subcommittee which was setting up postwar policy on 
Japan, he immediately set out to inaugurate policies for 
Japan which, according to the sworn testimony of Eugene 
Dooman, were the same as Russia dictated for satellite 
countries. 6 9 

| Vincent's first act, according to Dooman's testimony, 
i was to alter an official program entitled "U. S. Initial Post- 
Surrender Policy for Japan" — a program which had al- 
ready been officially adopted by the government and 
telegraphed to General MacArthur "as firm United States 
Policy for Japan." 70 

The testimony was that the major surgery which Vin- 
cent performed on that already adopted policy was to 
inject into it the Communist Party objective of destroy- 
ing and eliminating the capitalist class in Japan. 

Following are some excerpts from Dooman's testimony, 
appearing on pages 718 to 720 of the McCarran hear- 
ings, in which he explains the changes made by Vincent: 

DOOMAN : "The first thing that was done, and this 
was in 1946, was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 
90 percent on all property in excess of $1,000 . . . 
That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalistic 
class . . . The next thing was to appropriate all land 
in excess of 5 acres held by any one owner." 

SENATOR EASTLAND: "That was a Communist 
system, was it not? . . . they were following now the 
Communist system, were they not?" 

DOOMAN: "Yes . . . Then all holdings by any one 
individual in any large corporation in excess of 3 per 
cent were confiscated . . . They were transferred to a 
government pool. And then the Japanese Government 
was ordered to sell those shares . . . [and] ordered 



to disregard any relationship between the price o'i- 
fered and the real value . . . Practically the whyle 
white-collar element in Japanese big business wapj re- 
moved at one stroke. Not because there was aryy rec- 
ord against them, but because they occupied certain 
positions ... It was an attempt to destroy ar id elimi- 
nate the brains of Japanese business. 

". . . The net result was then to destroy the previ- 
ously existing capitalist class . . . Their p daces have 
been taken by hordes of black marketeer s and . . . 
thugs of various kinds who have been e mgaged in 
illicit trade of various kinds and have them amassed 
this enormous fortune. The net result was to replace 
people who had traditionally had property with 
these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards 
of various kinds." 

Service Recommends "Sympathetic Support" 
For Japanese Communists 

In this connection there should be recalled the views 
on Japan of Acheson's protege John Stewart Service. One 
of the State Department documents picked up by the Fr?i 
in the Amerasia offices was an official report on Japan-by 
John Stewart Service. Following is an excerpt from that 
report, S187 with "Q" number 524: 

"The Japanese Communist Party is still small (Mr. 
Okano himself does not claim more than 'a few 
thousand members'), but it has the advantages of 
strong organization and loyal, politically experienced 
membership. If its policies as claimed, seek to 
achieve our own hopes of a democratic, non-mili- 
taristic Japan, we may wish to consider the adoption 
toward it of an attitude of sympathetic support." 

Acheson and Vincent Attack MacArthur' 's 
Anti-Communist Policies in Japan 

General Douglas MacArthur vigorously opposed the 
State Department's plans and its attempts to Communize or 
create a fertile ground for the Communization of Japan. 
He was viciously attacked by both Vincent and Acheson. 
Vincent accused MacArthur of violating State Depart- 
ment directives to use Japan for "building a bridge of 
friendship to the Soviet Union." The New York Times 
of September 20, 1945, printed the following story of 
Acheson's rebuke of MacArthur: 

"The State Department revealed today a decision 
for a social and economic revolution in Japan and 
emphasized that it would be carried out regardless of 
what might be said about slashing the American 
army of occupation. 

"Secretary Acheson said that the United States 
government and not General MacArthur was deter- 
mining American policy toward Japan." 

Communist Press Hails Acheson's 
Attack on MacArthur 

For Acheson's public criticism of MacArthur's anti- 
Communist policies, the Communist Daily Worker ap- 
plauded "the repudiation of General MacArthur by Dean 
Acheson of the State Department . . ." 71 

PM, the "uptown edition of the Daily Worker," hailed 
Dean Acheson's action with the following editorial: 






es McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 4, Sept. 28, 1951, p. 1016. 
ra McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 718. 
?o McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 717, 
'i Daily Worker, Sept. 30, 1945. 



26 



"Acheson is the leader of the younger, more pro- 
gressive men in the State Department." 72 

General Wedemeyer on Communist Black List 

Another man on the Communist black list was General 
Albert Wedemeyer. He was scheduled to be removed from 
the scene, because, as Budenz testified: 

". . . the Communists viewed General Wedemever 
as the enemy of the Soviet interests in the Far 
East." 73 

After Wedemeyer's return from China where he was 
sent on a special mission by the President, he submitted 
his report containing his recommendations on how China 
could be saved from Communist conquest. This report 
was steadfastly denied the Congress. When the Senate 
Armed Services Committee asked General George C. 
Marshall, "Why did you join in the suppression of the 
Wedemeyer Report on China?" Marshall replied: 

"I did not join in the suppression of the Report. 
I personally suppressed it." 7 * 

Communists Select Ambassador to China 

When Wedemeyer was scheduled to be Ambassador to 
China, Marshall and Acheson vetoed his appointment 
because the Chinese Communists objected. In July, 1946, 
Wedemeyer's appointment was on Truman's desk and 
Wedemeyer was awaiting his commission when Acheson 
sent for him to say that his appointment had been 
cancelled. He read Wedemeyer a telegram from Marshall 
saying. "The Communists are protesting violently." Upon 
the recommendation of Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist 
leader, Marshall and Acheson secured the appointment 
instead for Dr. Leighton Stuart, an educator who had 
at one time taught Chou En-lai. 7S 

Ambassador Lane Next on 
Communist Black List 

Arthur Bliss Lane was another intelligently anti-Com- 
munist State Department official on the Communist black 
list. Lane, like other anti-Communists in the department, 
had learned from bitter experience that Dean Acheson 
was a tough man to reckon with when the chips were 
down. 

Acheson Grants Communists in Poland 
$90,000,000 'V. S. Loan 

In 1946 the Communist-controlled government of Po- 
land requested a $90 million loan from the United States. 
Ambassador Lane protested strongly against this loan. 
"With the greatest earnestness of which I am capable," 
he cabled the State Department, "I beg the department 
not to approve the extension of any credits at this time." 76 
Lane pointed out the terroristic activities of the Commu- 
nists, the imprisonment of American citizens and the fact 
that much of the loan was slated to equip the Communist 
terror police. Nevertheless, Acheson granted the loan. 

Acheson Law Firm Gets $50,000 
Fee jrom Communist Loan 

Acheson reluctantly admitted to a Senate committee 



that he, as Under Secretary of State, had the power of 
decision in the matter and was responsible for granting 
the loan. He further admitted that his own law firm had 
handled the private end of the negotiation for the loan, 
with Donald Hiss personally in charge, and that the 
Acheson law firm had received a fee of over $50,000 
when the loan was granted by Acheson. He stated, how- 
ever, that he personally received no part of the fee. 7 7 

Another Anti-Communist Purged 

After the Polish loan was granted, Ambassador Arthur 
Bliss Lane resigned. He has since told the sordid story of 
how the State Department betrayed Polish and American 
interests in a book entitled, / Saw Poland Betrayed. 

Acheson's action on the Polish loan could not have 
come as too great a surprise, however, because in 1945 
he gave the world fair warning of what his policy toward 
Communist aggression would be. 

Speaks to Communists At Madison 
Square Garden Rally 

On November 14, 1945, Acheson traveled to New York 
City to address a rally at Madison Square Garden which 
was called for the purpose of welcoming to American soil 
the Red Dean of Canterbury, a loud supporter of Com- 
munist Russia. 79 The rally was sponsored by the National 
Council of Soviet-American Friendship, which more than 
a year before (March 29, 1944) had been cited as sub- 
versive by the House Committee on Un-American Activi- 
ties. It has also been listed as subversive by the Attorney 
General (December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948.) 

On the speakers platform with Acheson were Paul 
Robeson, Corliss Lamont, Albert Fitzgerald, and Joseph 
E. Davies. Paul Robeson is the noted Negro singer, active 
in a vast number of Communist fronts, who has stated he 
would never bear arms against Soviet Russia. Corliss La- 
mont was so well known as a spokesman for Communist 
fronts that the House Committee on Un-American Activi- 
ties stated in Appendix IX, page 1471, that when Lamont's 
name appeared on the speakers program for a suspected 
Communist front, that fact could be considered as part 
of the proof that the organization was in fact doing the 
work of the Communist Party. Albert J. Fitzgerald, who 
also appeared on the speakers platform with Acheson, was 
president of the Communist-controlled United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers of America, which was ex- 
pelled by the CIO for being Communist dominated. Joseph 
E. Davies, of Mission to Moscow fame, while Ambassador 
to Moscow, revealed confidential information to the Krem- 
lin, according to the sworn testimony of Igor Bogelepov, 
former Red army Colonel. 80 

Such were Acheson's platform and speaking companions 



■"•■ PM, September 21, 1945, p. 13. 

™ McCarran Committee Hearings on IPB, Pt. 2, August 23, 1951, p. 62S. 
74 Hearings on Nomination of Gen. George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense, 
Senate Armed Service Committee Hearings, Sept. 19, 1950, p. 22. 
13 Constantine Brown, Column of June 13, 1951, Washington Star, Russell Com- 
mittee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 11, 1951, pp. 23il-2312. 

ra Arthur Blics Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 
1948), p. 237. 

77 Hearings on Nomination of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State, Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee Hearings, Jan. 13, 1949, pp. 2-6. 
™ Daily Worker, Nov. 16, 1945, p. 8. 
8tt McCarran Committe Hearings on IPR, April 7, 1952 (now being printed). 



27 



when he addressed the Madison Square Garden Rally of 
left-wingers and Communists. 

Favors "Friendly Borders" 
for Soviet Union 

In addressing this audience of Communists and Com- 
munist sympathizers, Acheson served public notice that 
we would approve Communist Russia's conquest or control 
of her neighbors. Acheson said: 

"We understand, and agree with them [Communist 
Russia] to have friendly governments along her 
borders is essential, both for the security of the 
Soviet Union and for the peace of the World." 81 

It is easy to understand how the "security" of Com- 
munist Russia has been enhanced by the enslavement of 
the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Ger- 
m^iy, ^Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, China, 
North Korea, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But even 
the most tortured reasoning cannot support the view that 
the terroristic Communist rule in those satellite countries 
has promoted the "peace of the world" or the security 
of America. Certainly, the people of those countries 
would not agree with Acheson. It would be impossible to 
over-estimate the awful and terrifying effect upon Rus- 
sia's neighbors of this statement by the United States Sec- 
retary of State that we would not only abandon our friends 
along the borders of Communist Russia but actually ap- 
prove of their conquest by Russia. 

State Department Honors Communist 
Picket of Churchill 

While going out of his way in 1945 to assure Commu- 
nist Russia that her aggressive plans were acceptable to 
America, Acheson made it clear to Winston Churchill the 
following year that his Fulton, Missouri, speech warning 
the world of the Communist threat, was distasteful to 
him. 

The Communist Party showed its disapproval of 
Churchill's Fulton speech by throwing a picket Sine around 
the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel when a dinner was later given 
there in Churchill's honor. 82 Acheson honored that 
picket line and showed his disapproval of Churchill's 
warning of the Communist threat, and according to the 
New York Times of March 15, 1946, "abruptly cancelled" 
the speech he was scheduled to give at the dinner. 83 

Turns His Back on 
Anti-Communist Governments 

Achesorx's attitude toward anti-Communist Spain stands 
in sharp contrast to his 1945 speech approving of Com- 
munist Russia's conquest or control of her neighbors. 

When the United Nations proposed in 1946 that all UN 
members recall their ambassadors from 'Spain in protest 
to the "non-free" government of Spain, the United States 
voted in favor of the proposal. However, we retained an 
ambassador t© Russia. 

Acheson's attitude toward anti-Communist govern- 
ments was further illustrated when, as Acting Secretary of 
State, he refused to see the anti-Communist representatives 



of the Spanish Republican government, hut granted an 
appointment to the pro-Communist elements of the' Span- 
ish government-in-exile. 84 According to the Daily Worker 
of December 21, 1945, Acheson also received Con- 
gressman Vito Marcantonio and Milton Wolff, head of 
the Abraham Lincoln Brigade which recruited Americans 
to fight illegally on the side of the Communists during 
the Spanish Civil War. He promised those visitors, ac- 
cording to both the New York Times and the Daily 
Worker, that he would intervene with Franco in behalf of 
imprisoned Communists in Spain. 85 

Civil Service Loyally Review Board Says 
State Department Has Worst Record 

in Loyalty Cases 

Acheson's record of intervening in behalf of State De- 
partment officials under suspicion of Communist activities 
is a long one. His protection of those whose activities 
caused Congress and even the government's top Loyalty 
Review Board to call for investigation, is recorded" 
throughout his years in government in numerous govern- 
ment documents. -~ "~~" 

The official minutes of a secret meeting of the Loyalty 
Review Board on February 13 and 14, 1951, make note 
of this record which Acheson has made on Acheson. 86 At 
one point during the meeting of the board, Chairman 
Bingham said, "The State Department . . . has the worst 
record of any department in the action of its Loyalty 
Board . . . The State Department has not found anyone 
. . . disloyal under our rule." Additional excerpts from 
those minutes are quoted on page 14. 

Halts Investigation hy 
Un-American Activities Committee 

The April, ,1952, issue of American Mercury describes 
Acheson's assistance to Russian Foreign Minister Molo- 
tov's brother-in-law as follows : 

"When, in September, 1945, the House Un-Amer- 
ican Activities Committee prepared to hold hearings 
relative to one Sam Carp, Acheson's office prevailed 
upon the committee to drop the proceedings. Carp, a 
filling station operator in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 
had been discovered dispensing large amounts of 
money under suspicious circumstances. But it devel- 
oped that he was the brother-in-law of Molotov, the 
Russian foreign Minister, so Acheson got the case 
dropped . . ." 87 

Refuses to Fire Loyalty Suspects 

In 1.946 Acheson told a Congressional committee that 
many persons who had been listed as loyalty suspects or 
security risks were affiliated with "progressive organiza- 
tions" and that he would not fire "progressives." Many 
of those "progressive organizations" have been cited as 
subversive and Communist by the Attorney General. 88 



81 Daily Worker, Nov. 15, 1945, p. 3. 

» 2 New York Times, March 16, 1948, pp. 1, 3. 

83 New York Times, March 15, 1946, pp. 1, 3. 

&* Victor Lasky, "The Case Against Dpjin Acheson," Congressional Record, 

Dec. 6, -1950, p. 16338. 

85 Dally Worker, Dee. 21, 1945, p. -16; Ne ; York Times, Dec. 21, 1945, p. 5. 

8' Congressional Record (Unbound), Jan. 15, 1952, pp. 192-194. 

87 The American Mercury, April, 1952, p. 11. 

88 Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336. 



28 



Was Lawyer for Lauchlin Currie, Who Was 
Named as Member of Soviet Spy Ring 

In 1948 Acheson acted as the lawyer for Lauchlin 
Currie before the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities, after Currie had been named as a member of 
a Soviet spy ring in Washington. 

While Currie denied that he was a Communist or an 
espionage agent he did admit that he used his powerful 
influence in government to save the government job of 
Gregory Silvermaster, also named under oath as a mem- 
ber of a Soviet spy ring. 

While Acheson did not appear publicly at the hearing to 
represent Currie, he did personally go to the office of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities and as 
Currie's lawyer discussed the case with the Committee 
staff. 

Defends John Service 

In 1950, after I brought the Service case up to date and 
presented the facts 10 the Tydings committee, Service 
was recalled from India by the Loyalty Review Board. 

"When I told the Tydings Committee that the Loyalty 
Review Board had ordered Service recalled, the State 
Department issued a statement saying that this was un- 
true. When I suggested that I was about to make public 
the Loyalty Board order providing for Service's recall, 
the State Department reversed itself, and admitted that 
the Loyalty Review Board had demanded Service's re- 
call. Thereafter the following statement was authorized 
for release by Acheson: 

"... I can't refrain from calling attention at this 
time to the spectacular way in which the so-called 
'case' of John S. Service dramatizes the harmful re- 
sults of such techniques as the Senator [McCarthy] 
is using in an effort to bolster up his attack on the 
Department — results that are harmful both in terms 
of the day-to-day conduct of the foreign relations of 
United States Government and in terms of human 
relations. 

"Here, in the person of Jack Service, we have an 
able, conscientious, and — I say again, as I've already 
said many times before — a demonstrably loyal for- 
eign service officer, a veteran of 17 years with the 
Department, and one of our outstanding experts on 
Far Eastern affairs. 

"As I've recounted in considerable detail more 
than a month ago, when Mr. Service's name was first 
mentioned by Senator McCarthy, this isn't the first 
time that his loyalty has been questioned. On the 
same basis of implied 'guilty-by-association' that has 
been used in most of the other 'cases' thus far pre- 
sented to the Senate subcommittee, he underwent a 
Grand Jury investigation back in August 1945, in 
connection with charges that he had transmitted clas- 
sified material to unauthorized persons. 

"He had the satisfaction at that time, though, of 
having the Grand Jury return a 'no true bill' and of 
being notified of his full reinstatement to the Depart- 
ment in a personal letter from then Secretary of State 
James F. Byrnes himself and also a similar letter 
from the then Under Secretary, Joseph C. Grew. 

"As a matter of Departmental routine, Mr. Serv- 
ice's file has been reviewed 5 times during the ensu- 
ing 5 years, and in each instance the findings of the 
reviewing agents have been completely favorable. 



"But now, as a result of Senator McCarthy's resus- 
citation of these dead, discredited, disproven charges 
against him, Mr. Service finds his character once 
more called into question, his name once more blaz- 
oned in headlines of the whole country's press, and 
his brilliant career as a diplomat once more inter- 
rupted so that he can be defended, and can defend 
himself, against such baseless allegations all over 
again." 

". . . it's a shame and a disgrace that he and his 
family should have to face, once again, such humili- 
ation, embarrassment, and inconvenience; and I'd 
like to say that the sympathy and good wishes of the 
entire Department go out to them." 89 

The State Department Loyalty Board then held a secret 
hearing and cleared Service. However, after the Loyalty 
Review Board examined the evidence in the case, they 
ordered Acheson to discharge Service. 

Acheson Law Firm Defends Loyalty Case Before 
Acheson Loyalty Board 

One of the many loyalty cases defended by Acheson's 
law firm before Acheson's State Department Loyalty 
Board was that of Edward Posniak. Dean Acheson states 
that he is no longer a member of the firm but that his son 
is. 

In 1948 Letters of Charges were filed against Posniak 
after the reports of 9 FBI investigators were presented 
to the State Department. Posniak thereupon retained 
Attorney Westwood of Acheson's law firm to represent 
him. Westwood succeeded in getting the charge against 
Posniak reduced before any evidence was taken. At the 
hearing he was cleared by a 2 to 1 vote of the State De- 
partment loyalty panel. After I gave the Senate a resume 
of the 9 FBI reports on Posniak, 90 his loyalty-security 
case was reopened and he was allowed to resign while his 
case was pending. He has since been before a federal 
grand jury, but as far as is known at the time this is 
written, no action has been taken on his case. 

The acting chairman of the State Department loyalty 
panel which heard the Posniak case was Darrel St. Clair. 
St. Clair cast the deciding vote clearing Posniak. At the 
time this is written he is the chief clerk of the Senate 
Rules Committee and is helping to write a report on the 
Benton Resolution which asks that McCarthy be expelled 
from the Senate because of his activities in connection 
with exposing Communists and fellow travellers in the 
State Department. 

Clears Clubb After State Department 

Loyalty Board Had Unanimously 

Ruled Against Clubb 

Oliver Edmund Clubb was a top State Department 
official against whom the State Department Loyalty Board 
had ruled. Acheson overruled his own Loyalty Board, in 
early 1952. After being "cleared" by Acheson, Clubb 
resigned with a lifetime pension of $5,800 a year. 

Clubb was chief of the China Division of the State 
Department. Evidence on Clubb was given to the Tydings 
Committee, but he was not called to testify, nor was any 
of the evidence checked by the committee. He was part 



S3 Department oJ State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 560, March 27, 1950, pp. 479. 480. 
80 Congressional Record (Unbound), July 25. 1950, pp. 11105-11114, 11120-11122. 



29 



of the group given a blanket clearance by the Tydings 
committee. He was later called before both the McCarran 
committee and the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities. 

Following is the Washington Times-Herald's report of 
some of Clubb's testimony and of the contents of his 
diary : 

"The diary revealed Clubb's meetings with the fol- 
lowing persons: 

"Whittaker Chambers, admitted spy for the Soviet 
Union in the 30s, whose testimony resulted in the 
conviction of Alger Hiss for prejury to conceal 
espionage. 

"Agnes Smedley, identified by Maj. Gen. Charles 
A. Willoughby, Gen. MacArthur's intelligence chief, 
as a member of the celebrated spy ring headed by 
Richard Sorge, executed by the Japanese in 1944. 

"Michael Gold, a well-known Communist writer 
and revolutionary. 

"Lawrence Todd, Washington correspondent for 
r«*v Soviet News agency. 

'Vfider prolonged questioning, Clubb admitted a 
long and friendly relationship with Owen Lattimore, 
State department consultant identified as a Soviet 
agent by Gen. Alexander Barmine, Russian intelli- 
gence agent; and John Carter Vincent, State depart- 
ment official repeatedly accused in Congress of pro- 
Communist operations. 

"He also conceded an acquaintance with Philip 
Jaffe, center of the Amerasia stolen documents case 
of 1945 and other figures in that incident. 

"When Clubb had been questioned secretly by the 
committee last March, he denied recalling a meeting 
with Chambers in .the office of New Masses, a Com- 
munist magazine, -in July 1932. Chambers had pre- 
viously testified to this meeting. 

"But Clubb later informed the committee that an 
entry in his diary had refreshed his recollection and 
that he had talked with Chambers on July 9, 1932, 
according to the diary. A subpoena was then issued 
for the entire diary but Clubb brought in only two 
volumes. 

"Another diary entry dated in Washington, July 
7, 1932, revealed Clubb's seeking out of Todd, the 
Tass correspondent . . . [Tass is the official Soviet 
newspaper which has been described, under oath, by 
a former Russian Army Intelligence Officer as a front 
for Russian espionage.] 

" 'I went with Todd to the State department press 
room and was introduced to several journalists, 
among them, Drew Pearson,' the entry said. T had 
dinner at the Press club with Todd and also had din- 
ner in Pearson's home with Lawrence Duggan of the 
Latin- American section . . .' [Duggan, who has been 
named as a Communist spy, either committed suicide 
or was murdered after it became apparent he would 
be called during the House investigation of the Hiss 
case.] 

"Clubb said his relationship with Lattimore ex- 
tended over a long period, beginning in 1929 or 1930 
and extending to the present date. In 1935, Clubb 
was the certifying officer on an affidavit signed by 
Lattimore, who declared he had lost his passport at 
the headquarters of Communist leader Ten Wang in 
Inner Mongolia. Lattimore was then issued a new 
passport." 91 

The State Department's Loyalty Board held a hearing 
on Clubb, and on February 11, 1952, Acheson's publicity 
office called in the press. The head of the office announced 



that Clubb had been "cleared on both loyalty and secur- 
ity." 

The following questions were asked of him by news- 
men: 

Q. "Did you say he was cleared of these charges?" 

A. "Absolutely cleared, — cleared on loyalty and se- 
curity." 

Q. "If there were loyalty charges, this new standard 
was used and he was judged innocent?" 

A. "That is right." 

Q. "Mac, you say he was cleared on both loyalty 
and security charges, — then there were both 
charges against him?" 

A. "He was cleared on both loyalty and security. It 
doesn't say charges. There is no question about 
either one and he was restored to duty." 92 

Clubb's clearance was headlined throughout the coun- 
try. Clubb thereupon resigned, indicating that the reason 
for his resignation was that his usefulness in the State 
Department had been greatly impaired by the unfounded 
charges made against him. 

Senator Homer Ferguson and I then revealed that 
Clubb had not been cleared by the State Department's 
Loyalty Board, but that the Loyalty Board by a verdict 
of 3 to had ruled against him, and that this ruling was 
approved by Assistant Secretary of State Humelsine who 
is in charge of Security, but that Dean Acheson reversed 
his own Loyalty Board and his top security officer and 
ordered Clubb restored to active duty. 

When questioned by the press as to whether his press 
office had attempted to deceive the American people or 
whether Senators Ferguson and McCarthy were in error, 
Acheson first refused to answer. Finally, on March 5, 
1952, he called a press conference and admitted (1) that 
his own Loyalty Board had unanimously ruled against 
Clubb, (2) that his security officer, Humelsine, had ap- 
proved of that ruling, and (3) that he, Acheson, had 
reversed the decision and cleared Clubb. 

Acheson, however, refused to discuss his reason for 
clearing Clubb, stating, "I did not study the record be- 
cause as I have said I do not have time to do that." 95 

Refuses to Fire William Stone 

Even Though Security Office 

Requested His Dismissal 

Another typical case of State Department "clearance," 
is that of William T. Stone. On March 22, 1946, the State 
Department Security Office made the following recom- 
mendation on Stone : 

"In behalf of the above-mentioned, it is recom- 
mended that action be instituted to terminate his 
services with the State Department immediately. It 
is suggested, to achieve this purpose, than an appro- 
priate officer of the Department should inform Mr. 
Stone that his continued employment in the Depart- 
ment is embarrassing to the Department and he 
should be given an opportunity to resign. If he should 
not resign voluntarily, action should be immediately 
instituted under Civil Service Rule No. 3 to termi- 



81 Washington Times-Herald, August 21, 1951, pp. 1, 4. 

«2 Record of State Department Press Conference of Michael McDermott, Special 

Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, Feb. 11, 1952, pp. 3, 4. 

us Press Conference of Secretary of State Dean Acheson (No. 171), March 5, 

1952, p. 3. 



30 



nate his service with the Department." (Emphasis 
Mine) 9 4 

Stone's immediate superior was William Benton (now 
Senator from Connecticut) who was at that time Assistant 
Secretary of State in Charge of International Information 
and Cultural Program. 

Stone remained and was promoted. 

Six years later, on February 2, 1952, Stone "volun- 
tarily" resigned. His resignation came when his case was 
being considered by the Civil Service Commission Loyalty 
Review Board. I pointed out at the time that Stone's 
"voluntary resignation," coming at the time the Loyalty 
Review Board was considering his case, was for the 
purpose of saving the State Department the possible em- 
barrassment of another Service case. Stone called me 
a liar and threatened to sue, saying that he had been 
cleared. The State Department also issued a statement 
that Stone had been fully cleared. 

However, under cross-examination the State Depart- 
ment Security Officer, Humelsine, admitted before the 
Senate Appropriation Sub-Committee that Stone, resign- 
ed after the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board (which 
had previously ordered Service fired after he was 
"cleared" by the State Department) had ordered a loy- 
alty board panel to hear the evidence on Stone's case 
and had requested the State Department for additional 
investigation and information on Stone. 95 

It is impossible to know how many times and in how 
many cases the State Department has followed the same 
pattern of issuing false press releases and making "mis- 
leading statements calculated to deceive the public as they 
did in this case. 

Promotes Man Named as Member 
of Communist Party 

Haldore Hanson is another young man who was rapidly 
promoted under Acheson. He is now holding a vitally im- 
portant position in the State Department high in the Point 
IV Program. In 1949 he was designated- by Acheson as 
head of the Technical Staff of Point IV. As pointed out 
on page 76, Hanson was named under oath by a govern- 
ment witness as a member of the Communist Party. He 
had once been arrested with a Communist group in China 
according to his own. book, Humane Endeavor. In that 
book he extolled the virtues of the Communist leaders 
and the Communist movement in China. He has never- 
repudiated that book. 

Vouches for Mian Named 
as Communist 

Another of the men whom Acheson refused to turn 
his back upon was Harold Glasser. Glasser had been Ache- 
son's technical adviser at the founding meeting of the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 
known as UNRRA. Glasser also was named under oath 
by a government witness as a Communist. 96 Thereafter 
Acheson wrote a letter of recommendation stating that 
Glasser "was a good working companion." Glasser used 



this letter to obtain a high post in a New York charitable 



organization. 97 



Former Law' Partner Attempts . 
to Smear FBI 

A former law partner of Dean Acheson, Charles A. 
Horsky, circulated a petition in February, 1950, demand- 
ing a public investigation of the FBI and accusing the 
FBI of "lawless conduct, of illegal wire tapping, rifling 
private mail, destroying evidence, and advising false 
sworn testimony by FBI agents." 98 He did this after 
the Communist Party had launched its own anti-FBI 
campaign in which it constantly refers to the FBI as a 
"Nazi Gestapo" and as a "collector of . . . political gar- 
bage, rumors on the political thinking of millions of citi- 
zens . . . junk and filthy scandal." Acheson's former 
partner, Horsky, was of course "against Communism," 
but he was much more- against the FBI's "lawless and 
illegal methods" of fighting Communism. 

Punishes Anti-Communist Expert on 
China and Russia 

A State Department officer who would appear to be 
the direct opposite of Service, Clubb, Lattimore, Stone, 
etc., is Angus Ward. Ward slowly worked his way to an 
important post in the State Department. When the Com- 
munists took over in China he was the Consul General at 
Mukden. Being anti-Communist he was arrested by the 
Chinese Communists and held for 13 months until he 
was convicted by the Chinese Communists and ordered 
out of China. 

After Ward returned to this country, he clearly and in- 
telligently spoke out, warning the world of the terrors and 
dangers of Communist conquest. Instead of using Ward 
in the State Department in a position where his vast 
knowledge of China and Communism could be utilized to 
the benefit of China and the U. S., he was assigned by 
Acheson to a remote post in East Africa — Nairobi, Kenya 
— where there is no current Communist drive and where 
he can do the least amount of damage to the Communist 
movement. 

Sends $17,000,000 Lend-lease to 
Russia After the War 

Two years after World War II had ended, Acheson in- 
sisted, over Congressional protests, that the United States 
deliver $17,000,000 of lend-lease to Russia. This included 
oil-refinery equipment, electric motors, locomotive parts 
and other machinery. 99 At this same time, under the For- 
restal Plan, we were giving military aid to Greece and 
Turkey in their fight against Communism. Fortunately, 
the will of Congress prevailed. 



»« Third Supplemental Appropriation Bill 1951, Senate Appropriations Committee, 

April 17, 1951, p. 408. 

'■'= Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings on State Sept. Appropriations, 

March 25, 1952, p. 389. 

«" Congressional Record (Unbound), Deo. 6, 1950, p. 16S36. 

07 Author has Photostat of letter. 

»8 Congressional Kecord (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336. 

»3 Congressional Record (Bound), April 21, 1947, p. 3736; Congressional Record 

(Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16338. 



31 



Calls Russian Communists 
"Little Boys" 

During a 1946 State Department lecture, Acheson told 
a group of college professors: 

"I don'.t believe the Soviet leaders are bad men. 
They are like little boys who enjoy throwing brick- 
bats at other people's greenhouses!" 100 

Invites Soviet to Bikini Tests 

and Recommends We Turn Atomic Secrets 

Over to Russia 

Perhaps this was the reasoning that prompted Ache- 
son in that same year to invite Communist ^Russia to 
send observers to TJ. S. atomic bomb tests at Bikini. 

Together with David Lilienthal, he prepared an Atomic 
Energy Report which recommended in effect that we ex- 
change atomic knowledge with the Soviet Union. "When 
the plan is in full operation," the Acheson-Lilienthal Re- 
port stated, "there will no longer be secrets about atomic 
energy. 



'101 



Allows Soviet Espionage Agents 
to Enter V. S. 

Acheson's description of the Soviet leaders as "little 
boys who enjoy throwing brickbats at other people's 
greenhouses" cannot, however, explain all of his actions. 
It cannot, for example, explain why it was that he allowed 
foreign agents of the Soviet to enter and leave the United 
States freely for years, even though he was warned -about 
their espionage missions. This fact was made public in 
November, 1951, by the McCarran Internal Security Com- 
mittee. 

Admits Soviet Agent to V. S. Who Stole 
A-Bomb and Bacteriological Warfare Secrets 

From 1948 to 1951 Colonel Otto Riheler was given 
visas by the State Department to enter this country and 
travel between the U. S. and Mexico, Canada, and Czecho- 
slovakia. This was clone despite warnings that Biheler 
was a "high ranking member of the counter-intelligence 
corps of Czechoslovakia and had a notorious record of 
Communist activity abroad." 103 According to Senator 
O'Conor, Chairman of the Senate subcommittee that in- 
vestigated this matter, ..Biheler was a "key figure in the 
Communist espionage apparatus 'in the United States . . . 
engaged in the procurement of information concerning 
atomic energy, the uranium stock of the United States and 
bacteriological and chemical warfare." 

Senator O'Conor also stated that: 

"In April, 1950, he is reported to have been the 
mastermind behind a plot to effect the .assassination 
of Major Carlos y Paz-Tejuda, Chief of the Army of 
Guatemala, arid is reported to have given the instruc- 
tions to two Soviet nationals -in Guatemala to effect 
the assassination." 104 

Allows Professional Killer for 
Communist Russia to Enter V. S. 

Another such case was that of Jiri Stary, head of a 
Czechoslovakian spy ring. Senator Pat McCarran on 



November 21, 1951, described Stary as "a man trained 
in 'silent killing' by a Communist spy school, f who] ha3 
been harbored in the United States for more than two 
years ... a director of an espionage network ... in 
charge of the discipline of Czechoslovakian nationals who 
stray from the Communist influence.*" 106 

There was also a Communist espionage agent attached 
to the UN Information Section with a long record of 
"Communist ^associations and of indicated espionage 
services for the Soviet Union in southeastern Europe." 
"Despite this record," Senator McCarran said, "the State 
Department has consented, time and again, to her ac- 
creditization as a press correspondent by the United Na- 
tions and has evaded a reguest of the Immigration Service 
to order her deported." 10 * 

State Department Breaks Promise and 

Forces Deportation of Anti-Communist 

Who Worked for V. S. 

While those known agents of the Soviet were being 
allowed to enter and leave the United States freely under 
Acheson's administration of the State Department, in 1947 
Acheson refused entry to Dr. Karl von Kleczkowski. Klecz- 
kewski had been recruited in the Balkans for anti-Com- 
munist counter-espionage work for the U. S. by Governor 
George H. Earle of Pennsylvania, wartime undercover rep- 
resentative of the President. Earle .promised Kleczkowski 
and his wife asylum in the U. S. in return for their anti- 
Communist work. However, when the Kleczkowskis ar- 
rived in the U. S. aboard an army plane, the State De- 
partment denied them entrance. Governor Earle charged 
that Communist influences in the State Department sought 
their deportation. Acheson accused them of being "dan- 
gerous aliens," and the Kleczkowskis were deported to 
South America. 108 

You have said that Acheson followed the Commu- 
nist Party line "in Asia. What was the major aim of 
Communism in Asia? 

The major aim of international Communism in Asia 
was stated by Lenin decades ago. It has been restated at 
Comintern meetings year after year. That aim was the 
creation of a Red China as a necessary prelude to the cre- 
tion of a Red Asia and then a Red Pacific prior to the 
assault upon America. As Lenin said, "He who controls 
China can control the world." 

Who were Acheson's advisers on China? 

Acheson, who said he preferred "to be guided by ex- 
perts who think . . . along my point of view," 109 selected 
the following men as his advisers and policy-makers on 
China : 

(1) Alger Hiss, on whom Acheson declared he "would 



™ American Mercury,, April, 1952, p. 3. 

101 Congressional Record (Unbound), Deo. 6, 1950, p. 18338. 

ms p r e S s Release of Senator Herbert O'Conor, Nov. 8, 1951; Testimony taken In 

Executive Session, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Nov 7 1951 

mi Press Release ol Senator Herbert O'Conor, Nov. 8, 1951; Testimony taken in 

Executive Session, -Senate, Subcommittee on internal Security Nov 7 1951 

io» Press Release of Senator Pat McCarran, Nov. 21, 1951; Testimony taken in 

Executive Session, Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, Nov '19 1951 

108 Congressional Record (Unbound), Dec. 6, 1950, p. 16336. 

ioo McCarran Committee Hearings on IPE, Pt. 3, Sept. 14, 1951, p. 723. 



32 



not turn his back" even after Hiss was convicted of per- 
jury in connection with Soviet espionage; 

(2) Owen Laltimore, who has been named under 
oath as a member of the Communist Party and as a Soviet 
agent ; 

(3) Lauchlin Currie, who has been named under 
oath as a "full-fledged member" of the Silvermaster spy 
ring; 

(4) John Stewart Service, who was arrested in 
connection with the Amerasia espionage case, then cleared 
of disloyalty charges by Acheson, but finally dismissed on 
orders of the Loyalty Review Board; 

(5) John Carter Vincent, who has been named 
under oath as a member of the Communist Party, but 
who was recently cleared of disloyalty charges by Ache- 
son; 

(6) John P. Davies, who was accused by General 
Hurley of operating behind his back to support the Com- 
munists and who, in his official reports to the State De- 
apartment, adopted the thinking of Agnes Smedley, a 

known Communist agent, whom he described as one of the 
"pure in heart" in China; and 

(7) Edmund Oliver Clubh, who was ordered dis- 
charged by the State Department loyalty board which 
decision was reversed by Acheson. 

The names of all of the "experts" chosen by Acheson 
to form our policy toward China are too numerous to 
list in this book. Many of them were supplied to the 
State Department by the Institute of Pacific Relations, 
which has been labeled by Senator Pat McCarran as an 
organization "taken over by Communist design and made 
a vehicle for attempted control and conditioning of Amer- 
ican thinking and American policy with regard to the 
Far East." 110 

What part did the Yalta Agreement play in the 
Communist conquest of China? 

The Yalta Agreement contained two major provisions 
insofar as China was concerned: (1) surrender of Man- 
churia to Russia, (2) arrangements for the United States 
to arm and equip a Russian army. At the time of the 
Yalta Agreement Chiang Kai-shek was not informed that 
we were offering control of Chinese territory to Stalin. 
The loss of Manchuria meant that the Chinese Commu- 
nists were given a gateway to Russian arms and supplies 
in their war against him. 

In return for those concessions, Stalin "promised" to 
enter the Pacific War at some undetermined time. 

The Yalta Agreement was confirmed at Potsdam by 
Truman against the urgent advice of fifty of the Army's 
top intelligence officers. On April 31, 1945, three months 
before the Potsdam Conference, those fifty high-ranking 
Army officers reported to General Marshall, who was the 
military adviser at both Yalta and Potsdam, as follows : 

"The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war 
would be a political event of world-shaking import- 
ance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades 
to come . . . [it] would destroy America's position 
in Asia quite as effectively as our position is now de- 
stroyed in Europe cast of the Elbe and beyond the 
Adriatic. 



"If Russia enters the Asiatic war, China will cer- 
tainly lose her independence, to become the Poland 
of Asia; Korea, the Asiatic Rumania; Manchukuo, 
the Soviet Bulgaria. Whether more than a nominal 
China will exist after the impact of the Russian 
armies is felt is very doubtful. Chiang may well have 
to depart and a Chinese Soviet government may be 
installed in Nanking which we would have to recog- 
nize. 

"To take a line of action which would save few 
lives now, and only a little time — at an unpredictable 
cost in lives, treasure, and honor in the future — and 
simultaneously destroy our ally China, would be an 
act of treachery that would make the Atlantic Char- 
ter and our hopes for world peace a tragic farce. 

"Under no circumstances should we pay the Soviet 
Union to destroy China. This would certainly injure 
the material and moral position of the United States 
in Asia." (Emphasis Mine.) 111 

Thus the treason which Hiss advised at Yalta was con*f 
firmed and brought to full bloom at Potsdam against the 
advice of Army Intelligence. 

While the State Department was trying to sell the 
idea that the Chinese Communists were "agrarian 
reformers" and not really Communists, were Chi- 
nese Communist leaders denying that they were 
Communists ? 

This is perhaps best answered by Mao Tse-tung, the 
leader of the Chinese Communists, in his book The New 
Democracy, published in 1940 and sold in the Daily 
Worker bookshop in New York City. Mao said: 

"We cannot separate ourselves from the assistance 
of the Soviet Union." 

"No matter who you follow so long as you are 
anti-Communist, you are traitors." 

What part did General Stilwell play in the Com- 
munist conquest of China, and who were his ad- 



In China, Stilwell was surrounded by a group of foreign 
service officers supplied by the State Department, includ- 
ing John Stewart Service, since ordered discharged under 
the loyalty program, and headed by John Paton Davies, 
whose case has been referred to the Attorney General. 

The ground for Communist conquest was cultivated 
from 1942 to 1944 by General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell (a 
close friend and protege of General George C. Marshall. ) 
Stilwell's bitter hatred of Chiang, the leader of the anti- 
Communist forces of China, is well-known and seems 
matched only by his infatuation with the Chinese Com- 
munists. 

Agnes Smedley, although not a State Department em- 
ployee, was part of that tightly knit group which was so 
close to Stilwell. For example, Davies who was referred 
to as "Stilwell's Secretary of State," referred to Smedley 
as "one of the pure in heart." Writers, such as Freda 
Utley, who visited China reported the mutual admiration 
between Smedley and Stilwell. Smedley has been ex- 
posed by General Mac Arthur's Intelligence Headquar- 
ters as an important cog in a Communist international 



n" Interview with Senator Pat McCarran, U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 16. 

1961, p. 27. 

ai Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 4, June 21, 1951, p. 2916. 



33 



spy ring which was headed by Richard Sorge who was 
later convicted of being a Communist spy and hanged by 
the Japanese. 

A letter which Stilwell wrote a friend while in China 
casts much light on his attitude toward the Communists. 
The letter reads in part as follows : 

"It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and 
get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh." 112 

Chu Teh, with whom Stilwell, the American Com- 
mander in China, wanted to "shoulder a rifle" was then 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red Armies. He 
is now Commander-in-Chief of the Red Armies warring 
with us in Korea. 

General Claire Chennault, of Flying Tiger fame, has 
told part of the story of StilwelPs activities in China in 
his book, Way of a Fighter. On page 317 Chennault, in 
describing hew Stilwell in the spring of 1944 sent a mis- 
sion to Communist headquarters in Yenan, had this to 
say: 

"The American mission to Yenan was hardly estab- 
lished before Stilwell's Chungking staff began to pro- 
claim loudly the superiority of the Communist regime 
over the Chungking government. No secret was made 
of their admiration for the Communists, whom, they 
said, were really only 'agrarian reformers,' and more 
like New Dealers than Communists. The hue and cry 
charging the Generalissimo with 'hoarding lend-lease 
arms' to fight the Communists was raised with re- 
newed vigor . . . 

"Then Yenan Communists shrewdly tickled Stil- 
well's vanity with many flattering appreciations of his 
military prowess and clinched him as an ally by 
shrewdly letting it be known that they would be de- 
lighted to have him command their armies. Stilwell 
never gave up his hopes of commanding the Chinese 
Red armies . . . Since it was still official American 
policy in the summer of 1944 to support the Chung- 
king government, it was a common joke (in Chung- 
king) that Stilwell's headquarters were developing 
a private foreign policy with John Davies as secretary 
of state. 

"During this period there was a strong group of 
left wingers in the Far Eastern Division of the State 
Department who used Stilwell's sympathy for the Chi- 
nese Communists and his violent antipathy to the 
generalissimo as a lever to shift American policy in 
favor of the Communists . . ." 113 

The tremendous hatred which Stilwell had for Chiang 
Kai-shek, the anti-Communist' leader, is described in 
John T. Flynn's book, While You Slept. On page 164 he 
quotes what Stilwell entered in his diary after he had 
personally delivered a message apparently instigated by 
Marshall and sent by Roosevelt to Chiang. The message 
was understoed by both Chiang and Stilwell as an ulti- 
matum demanding Stilwell be put in "unrestricted com- 
mand" of all Chinese forces. Stilwell describes Chiang's 
reaction to the message in the following language: 

"At long last . . . FDR has spoken plain words 
. . . with a firecracker in every sentence ... I handed 
this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and then sank 
back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger 
right in the solar plexus and went right through him. 
It was a clear hit. But beyond turning green and los- 
ing the power of speech, he did not bat an eye." 



General Patrick Hurley, who was present when Stilwell 
delivered Roosevelt's ultimatum to Chiang, gave a detailed 
account of the incident in his testimony before the Rus- 
sell Committee. Hurley stated that after Stilwell's tem- 
porary victory he expressed his feelings in a poem. 

Hurley stated, ". . . that night, when I saw Stilwell, 
... he read it to me with great glee, it was supposed to 
be humorous." 

"I've waited long for vengeance — 

At last I've had my chance. 
I've looked the Peanut in the eye 

And kicked him in the pants. 
The old harpoon was ready 

With aim and timing true, 
I sank it to the handle 

And stung him through and through. 
The little bastard shivered, 

And lost his power of speech. 
His face turned green and quivered 

As he struggled not to screech. 
For all my weary battles, 

For all my hours of woe, "-^._ 

At last I've had my innings 

And laid the Peanut low. 
I know I've still to suffer, 

And run a weary race, 
But Oh ; the blessed pleasure ! 

I've wrecked the Peanut's face." 114 

The contents of the message which Stilwell delivered 
have been inserted in the record of the Russell Committee 
on Pages 2867 and 2868. -They ordered Chiang to ap- 
point Stilwell Commander-in-Chief of all the Chinese 
armies. But Stilwell's gloating was premature. On this 
point John T. Flynn quotes Admiral Leahy as follows: 

"The Generalissimo 'was willing and anxious to 
meet Roosevelt's wishes' that an American officer 
command all Chinese forces. But he insisted that 'it 
must be one in whom I can repose confidence . . . 
The officer must be capable of frank and sincere co- 
operation, and General Stilwell has shown himself 
conspicuously lacking in these indispensable quali- 
fications.' " 

Flynn then goes on to say: 

"Admiral Leahy writes that Marshall even after 
this made an effort to dissuade Roosevelt but without 
success. Stilwell himself committed his sentiments to 
another poem about his downfall in unprintable Eng- 
lish (though it appears in his posthumous papers) 
and disappeared from the scene." 115 

After Stilwell left China, those whom the State Depart- 
ment had selected as his advisers remained on to continue 
the job. 

Thus was the soil carefully cultivated by Stilwell and 
his staff for the disastrous Marshall Mission to China 
which finally ripened into the Communist conquest of 
China and eventually into the Korean war. 



us Daily Worker, Jan. 26, 1947, p. 7. 

ns General Claire Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 317. 

■« Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 4, June 21, 1951, p. 2872; Joseph W. Stilwell, 

The Stilwell Papers (William Sloan Associates, 1948), p. 334. 

115 John T. Flynn, While You Slept (The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1951), 

p. 165. 



34 




Service and Davies were both named fey y©u before 
the Tydings Committee. Yen claimed they helped 
to betray China. Will you give the facts? 

Since I gave the cases of Service and Davies to the 
Typings Committee, Service has been discharged from the 
State Department upon orders of the Loyalty Beard; 
Davies' case has been referred to the Justice Department 
by the McCarran Committee. 

Both Service and Davies spent considerable time in 
China as State Department officials. In their recommenda- 
tions to Washington both followed the Communist Party 
line. 

For example, on November 7, 1944, Davies submitted 
a memorandum to the State Department stating that the 
Communist Party in China was "a modern dynamic pop- 
ular government." At the same time he referred to the 
anti-Communists as "feudal." "The Communists are in 
China to stay. And China's destiny is not Chiang's but 
theirs," said Davies. 118 As if predicting the argument to 
be used seven years later in the Korean debate, Davies 
warned that the United States might become involved in 
a war with Russia if we continued to support the anti- 
Communist government of China. 117 On December 12, 
1944 he urged that we supply the Chinese Communists 
with arms — a proposal which Dean Acheson two years 
later requested Congress to approve. 118 

Service Labels Communists "Democratic" 

Acheson's protege, John Stewart Service, reported from 
China that the Chinese Communists were "moderate and 
democratic." 119 The anti-Communist government he de- 
scribed as "... a decadent regime which by its existing 
composition and program is incapable of solving China's 
problems." 12 " 

In describing the Communist movement in China, 
Service, on October 9, 1944, reported: 

"It has improved the economic condition of the 
peasants by rent and interest reduction, tax reform 
and good government. It has given them democratic 
self-government, political consciousness and a sense 
of their rights. It has freed them from feudalistic 
bonds and given them self-respect, self-reliance, and 
a strong feeling of cooperative group interest. The 
common people, for the first time, have been given 
something to fight for." 121 

Service made no mention of the fact that more Chinese 
starved and were beheaded under Communist control 
than under any comparable period in China's ageless 
history. 

In his dispatches, Service argued against aid to the 
anti-Communists. But he was not blind to the fact that 
the life of the anti-Communists depended upon our assist- 
ance. "The Kuomintang," he reported on October 10, 
1944, "is dependent on American support fer surviv- 
al." 122 

Both Service and Davies, were charged by Ambassa- 
dor-to-China Hurley with supporting the Communists and 
sabotaging his anti-Communist policies in China. Hurley 
stated that Davies had one day flown off to Yenan 



to tell "Ma© Tse Tung, the Communist leader, that Hurley, 
our Ambassador (an anti-Communist) , did not repre- 
sent the American viewpoint. 123 Hurley had John Service 
recalled from China because, according to Hurley, his 
pro-Communist activities were disrupting Hurley's anti- 
Communist program in China. Later Hurley objected 
because men like Service whom he had asked to have 
recalled fr®m Asia were returned to Washington and 
promoted. 124 

In 1945 Service was arrested in the Arnerasia case 
which involved the theft of hundreds of secret and other 
classified documents found in the office of the magazine, 
Arnerasia. Service admitted giving secret government 
documents to Philip Jaffe, 125 the editor of the magazine, 
who has been named by a government witness as a Soviet 
agent. 126 

Did Hiss play a part in the betrayal of China? 

In 1944 Hiss was Special Assistant to the Director 
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. He later was director 
of the Office of Special Political Affairs, which office was 
responsible for the development and coordination of 
American foreign policy. 

Thereafter Hiss was sent to Yalta where he, Gromyko 
of Russia, and Jebb of England drafted major portions 
of the Yalta Agreement which so greatly contributed to 
the betrayal of China. 

Two years ago you named Vincent as one of those 

whom yon considered bad for America and good 
for Communist Russia. What, if any, part did he 
play in the China picture? 

John Carter Vincent worked with Hiss on the China 
phase of our foreign- policy. In 1947 Vincent was under 
such heavy Congressional attack for his pro-Communist 
views and activities that Acheson removed him from 
the Washington scene by sending him to Switzerland. 
In 1950 when Vincent was again under fire, Acheson 
sent him to Tangiers. 

Back in 1943 Vincent was appointed Assistant in 
the Far Eastern Division of the State Department and 
at the same time Special Assistant to the President's 
Administrative Assistant, Lauchlin Currie, who has been 
named under oath as a member of a Communist spy 
ring. 127 

The following year he and Owen Lattimore accompa- 
nied Henry Wallace to China and assisted in drawing up 
the Wallace Report which recommended that we withdraw 
any support we had been giving the anti-Communists 
and give our support to the Chinese Communists. During 
this visit to China, Vincent and Lattimore were toasted 
at a dinner by Sergei Godlize, high Soviet official, as 



no White Paper on United States Relations With China (The Department of 

State, 1849), p. 573. 

m Utley, The China Story, p. 112. 

lis White Paper on China, pp. 574, 575. 

uo White Paper on China, p. 566. 

J2o white Paper on China, p. 578. 

i2i White Paper on China, p. 566. 

122 White Paper on China, p. 574. 

123 Utley, The China Story, p. 110. 

i 2 ^ (Released names of Service and Atcheson in Oct., 1945); White Paper on 

China, p. 582. 

125 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, June 22, 1950, p. 1283. 

120 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 491. 

i2i McCarran Committee Hearings on IPB, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423. 



35 



the men "on whom rests great responsibility for China's 

future."^ 

in 1945 Vincent was made head of the Far Eastern 
Division of the State Department. Together with Service 
and Davies, Vincent contended Chiang should be forced 
to stop -fighting the Communists and take them into his 
government. This was. the basis of the Marshall Mission 
to China and of State Department policy toward China 
which General MacArthur has described as 'tone of the 
greatest blunders in American diplomatic history for 
which the free world is now paying in blood and disaster 
and will in all probability continue to do so indefi- 
nitely."! 2 9 

In September, 1946, when General MacArthur issued 
a warning against the danger of Communism in Japan, 
Vincent publicly rebuked MacArthur and was quoted 
in the New York Herald-Tribune as accusing MacArthur 
of initiating an anti-Communist campaign. 

When in December of 1946 Russia violated a provi- 
sion of the Yalta agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty 
of 1945 by ordering an American Naval vessel out of 
the port of Darien, Vincent authorized a statement that 
Russia was acting within her rights. 130 

Lauchlin Currie has been described as a member 
of a Communist spy ring. What if any influence did 
he exert on State Department policy in China? 

Lauchlin Currie, another member of the Acheson China 
group, has been named under oath by Elizabeth Bentley, 
(a former Communist who has been of great value to 
the government) as a member of the Silvermaster spy 
ring. Asked under oath if Currie was a full-fledged 
member of the Silvermaster spy ring, Miss Bentley re- 
plied, "Definitely."! si The House Committee on Un- 
American Activities in a pamphlet entitled The Shameful 
Years, states that "Miss Bentley has stated that all indi- 
viduals working in the apparatus were under the direction 
of the NKVD- [the Russian Secret Police]." 1 32 

Miss Bentley, who was formerly a courier for a Soviet 
spy ring in Washington, testified as follows about Cur- 
rie's assistance to the ring: 

_ SENATOR FERGUSON: "Can you give us any 
information on what you received through Currie?" 
MISS BENTLEY: "Most of it was Far Eastern. 
There was the time when he relayed the information 
that the Soviet code was about to be broken." 
MR. MORRIS: "Broken by whom?" 
MISS BENTLEY: "The United States authorities." 
MR. MORRIS: "He discovered that the United 
States authorities had broken the code, and he re- 
layed it to you?" 1 3 3 

Miss Bentley explained that Currie had advised her 
the Soviet code was about to be broken and that she 
relayed this information to her "Russian head." 

MR. MORRIS: "Was that a highly classified fact 
at the time?" 

MISS BENTLEY: '.'Definitely. I don't know 
enough about Government labelings, but it was cer- 
tainly something you wouldn't pass around." 13 * 

According to her sworn testimony, Currie was always 
willing to help members of the spy ring— "bailing them 



out when they were in trouble, when they were being 
fired for disloyalty, or when they needed help to get a 
job." 1 35 

In addition, Currie was able to exert considerable 
influence on our Far Eastern policy through his friend- 
ship with Acheson and Hiss and through Vincent, who 
was assigned to Currie's White House office. It was 
through Currie's office that the Acheson group reached 
the White House with the pro-Communist reports and 
dispatches from China which anti-Communist Joseph 
Grew tried to pigeonhole in the State Department. The 
testimony before the McCarran Committee showed that 
Currie has worked closely with the Communist-front In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations. 

Following is a letter written by E. C. Carter, head of 
the Communist-front IPR, to Joe Barnes, one-time head of 
the New York office of OWI, who has been named under 
oath as a Soviet agent: 

"New York, N.Y., October 27, 1942, 
"JOSEPH BARNES, Esq. 

New York, N.Y. 

"DEAR JOE: Recently in Washington Lauchlin ~- 
Currie expressed to me the hope that some day soon 
when you are in Washington you would give him 
the privilege of a private talk. As you know, he is an 
intimate friend and admirer of Owen Lattimore and 
has himself made two visits to Chungking. You and 
he would find a great deal in common, not only in 
matters Chinese, but in affairs elsewhere. I do hope 
that you can see him soon. 

"His office is in the State Department Building, 
but you reach him through the White House ex- 
change. 

"Sincerely yours, 
"EDWARD C. CARTER." 1 36 

Has the Communist Party admitted that the State 
Department was following the Communist line on 

China? 

Yes. For example, Earl Browder, General Secretary 
of the Communist Party until 1945, testified before the 
Tydings Committee as follows: 

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "Now then, you 
have testified here, as I understand your testimony, 
. . . that you worked ceaselessly over a period of 
years, perhaps beginning in the thirties and contin- 
uing up until at least 1942, for the adoption of a 
definite policy on the part of the United States to- 
ward China, and the Chinese Communists." 

MR. BROWDER: "That is correct." 

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "And you were 
working on that policy as a Communist policy, were 
you not? That was the policy of the Communists that 
you were working on." 

MR. BROWDER: "That was the policy of the 
Communist Party." 

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "Then I believe 
that you said that in 1942, that policy upon which 



us Henry Wallace, Soviet-Asia Mission (Cornwall Press, Inc., 1946), p. 172. 

i» General Douglas MacArthur by Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, (Henry Holt 

& Co., 1962), p. 127. 

130 utley, The China Story, p. 119. 

131 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1961, p. 423. 

"a The Shametul Years, Thirty Years of Soviet Espionage in the United States, 

House Committee on Un-American Activities, Deo. 30, 1951, p. 59. 

"3 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423. 

184 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423. 

iso McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 423. 

138 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 14, 1951, p. 425. 



36 



you had been working was adopted as the policy of 
the United States toward China." 

MR. BROWDER: ". . . I would say that the cen- 
tral points of that policy . . . were identical with the 
policy of the Communist Party." 

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: ". . . the substance 
of the important views advocated by the Communist 
Party up to 1942, were in fact adopted by the State 
Department, toward the Communists in China at 
about 1942 — is that correct?" 

MR. BROWDER: "In October 1942." 

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: "So, to that ex- 
tent, regardless of the necessities of the situation or 
the explanations, you were successful or success met 
your efforts in getting that policy established?" 

MR. BROWDER: "The policy which we had advo- 
cated was substantially incorporated into the policy 
of the United States Government." 137 

This statement of Browder's was confirmed by Louis 
Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker and member 
of the Communist national committee. 

Asked whether the Communist Party tried to influence 
the Far Eastern policy of the United States, Budenz re- 
plied: 

"Yes, sir; that was one of our main assignments 
from the international Communist organization . . . 
Successes were reported on a number of occa- 
sions." 138 

Do you think Acheson realized he was following the 
Communist Party line in Asia? 

Either he knew what he was doing or he was incom- 
petent beyond words. As late as November, 1945, William 
Z. Foster, head of the Communist Party of the United 
States, notified the world that China was the prime 
target of the Soviet Union. He said: 

"On the international scale, the key task ... is to 
stop American intervention in China . . . The war 
in China is the key of all problems on the interna- 
tional front." 

Less than a month after this Communist proclamation, 
Marshall embarked upon the "Marshall Mission to 
China." The testimony before the Russell Committee was 
that this mission was an Acheson-Marshall- Vincent proj- 
ect. Before Marshall went to China the Communists occu- 
pied a very small portion of China. Their Army num- 
bered less than 300,000 badly equipped troops. When 
Marshall returned from China to be rewarded by Truman 
with an appointment as Secretary of State, the Commu- 
nist-controlled area had greatly increased and the Com- 
munist Army had grown from, 300,000 badly equipped 
troops to an Army of over 2,000,000 relatively well- 
equipped soldiers. 

What about the State Department's excuse that we 
withdrew aid from Chiang Kai-shek because his 
government was corrupt? 

Chiang Kai-Shek had been engaged in conflict and 
warfare since 1927 — first with the Communists, then 
with Japan, then simultaneously with the Communists 
and Japan, and after Japan's defeat, again with the Com- 
munists. During that time, all the disruption of war 



beset Chiang's Government. Under the circumstances it 
would be a miracle if there were no corruption or incom- 
petence in his government. 

But if corruption and incompetence are grounds for 
turning an administration over to the Communists, then 
Earl Browder should be President of the United States, 
Harry Bridges should be Secretary of Labor, and Alger 
Hiss should be Secretary of Defense. 

What about Acheson's claim that we gave Chiang 
Kai-shek every help which he could utilize, includ- 
ing $2 billion worth of aid since the end of World 
War II? 

That is untrue. Acheson made this claim in a letter 
to Senator Pat McCarran on March 14, 1949, in arguing 
against any further aid to anti-Communist China, which 
according to Acheson, "would almost surely be catas- 
trophic." 

Of the phony $2 billion figure, $335,800,000 was for 
repatriating Japanese soldiers in China and transporting 
Chinese Nationalist armed forces to accept the surrender 
of the Japanese. Even President Truman declared that 
those expenditures should properly have been charged to 
World War II. The $2 billion also included UNRRA pay- 
ments, part of which went to Red China. 140 

Nationalist China was also charged for war materials 
never received — no one will ever know how much. For 
example, 120,000 tons of ammunition were dumped in 
the Bay of Bengal shortly after Japan's surrender, and 
China's Lend-Lease account was charged at the rate of 
$1,000 per ton for this ammunition. (See pages 39, 40.) 

China was charged unreasonably high prices for the 
material we did deliver. Some slight idea of the fantastic 
prices we charged China can be obtained from the fol- 
lowing figures quoted on page 47 of Freda Utley's book, 
The China Story: 

"Surplus" 
price 
to other List Price 

nations Price to China 

Bazookas $3.65 $36.25 $162.00 

Rifles, .30-caliber 5.10 51.00 51.00 

Rifle ammunition (per 

1,000 rounds) 4.55 45.55 85.00 

Machine-gun ammunition 

(per 100 rounds) 4.85 45.85 95.00 

And so runs the sordid story of the dishonest book- 
keeping which is the basis for Acheson's claim that China 
fell to the Communists despite our "two-billion-dollar" 
generosity. Left-wing radio commentators and newspaper 
columnists have parroted this attempted deception. 

The year 1949 marked the Communist conquest of 
China. Will you list a few of the events which might 
help explain that victory? 

Certainly. Following are a series of a few of the events 
which took place in 1949. They illustrate how Acheson 

137 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 27, 1950, p. 688, 687. 
Ms McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt, 2, Aug. 23, 1951, p. 593. 
i» utley, The China Story, pp. 32-49. 



37 



made it impossible for the anti-Communists in China to 
withstand the determined drive of the Communists. 

Event No. 1 

Senator Pat McCarran, an intelligently courageous 
anti-Communist fighter, introduced a bill on February 
25, 1949, to provide aid to our anti-Communist friends 
in China. 

Event No. 2 

On March 1, 1949, the Communist Party of New 
York State directed all of its members to write their 
Congressmen and Senators and demand: 

". . . an end to all forms of American intervention 
in China and of plans to aid elements and remnants 
of the Kuomintang." 

Continued aid to the anti-Communists, the Communist 
directive stated, would cause "frictions and misunder- 
standings." 141 

Event No. 3 

On the same day the Communist directive was issued, 
Drew Pearson reported , that the Secretary of State 
thought the anti-Communist leaders of China were cheap 
petty crooks and thieves. Acheson, according to Pearson, 
said that much of the past aid which America had given 
the anti-Communists "wasn't used to fight Communism, 
but went into the pockets of Chiang Kai-shek's lieu- 
tenants." The Chinese embassy patiently replied to this 
attack by saying that they could not believe the Secretary 
had actually said this because the great bulk of American 
aid to China had been spent and distributed under direct 
American supervision. li2 

Event No. 4 

On March 13, 1949, Acheson wrote Senator Tom Con- 
nally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, that McCarran's Aid to China Bill: 

". . . would only prolong hostilities and the suffer- 
ing of the Chinese people and would arouse in them 
deep resentment against the United States." 148 

In arguing against aid to the anti-Communists, Ache- 
son said, "the outcome . . . would almost surely be 
catastrophic." 

The anti-Communist government, Acheson wrote, "does 
not have the military capability of maintaining a foothold 
in South China against a determined Communist ad- 
vance." 

Acheson then went on to state that aid to China since 
V-J Day had reached a point "over $2 billion." 144 

Event No. 5 

After making an analysis of all aid to China since V-J 
Day, Senator McCarran released a statement to the 
press on April 17, 1949, declaring that Acheson's letter 
was both "inaccurate and misleading." McCarran went 
on to state: "The State Department Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs is definitely soft to Communist Russia." 
Senator McCarran pointed out that "realistic analysis 



shows that post V-J Day effective military aid has totaled 
only $110 million — not the $2 billion implied in the Sec- 
retary's letter." 1 4 5 

Event No. 6 

On May 10, 1949, General Claire Chennault, a military 
man of many years experience in China, set forth his 
views in his "Summary of Present Communist Crisis in 
Asia." They were far different from those of Mr. Ache- 
son's in Washington. While Acheson felt that the anti- 
Communists did not have the "military capability of 
maintaining a foothold in South China," General Chen- 
nault stated that some 150 million people in southern and 
western China — described by Chennault as "hardy moun- 
taineers with a tradition of warlike defense of their native 
provinces against all invaders" — could supply "effective 
resistance to the Communist advance." Chennault wrote : 

"Both the people and their leaders are prepared 
to resist the Communists anfl will in any case resist 
whether we help them or not. But what we give in 
aid will make the difference between a hopeless and 
an effective resistance." x ~- 

A few months later Acheson was to claim in his letter 
of transmittal of the White Paper that the anti-Commu- 
nists had lost because "its troops had lost the will to 
fight, and its government had lost popular support." 146 

Event No. 7 

On December 23, 1949, the State Department an- 
nounced it had refused a permit for a New York firm, the 
Driggs Engineering Company, to ship 100,000 Spring- 
field rifles "for the defense of Formosa." The company 
was acting as an agent for the Chinese Nationalists. 

This was not a request for money. Chiang had the funds 
to pay for the rifles. It merely involved the granting of a 
permit by the State Department so the rifles could be 
shipped. 

Did Acheson and Marshall recommend that we aid 
the Chinese Communist army? 

Yes. This was recommended after the war with Japan 
had ended. 

On June 19, 1946, Acheson appeared before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and requested that the United 
States Government arm 10 Chinese Communist divi- 
sions. 147 

At that time, Acheson reported that General Marshall 
had agreed to assign 69 U. S. officers and 400 tons of 
American equipment to train the Chinese Communist 
armies. 

Ten months previously the war with Japan had ended. 
Acheson did not say who was to be fought by this Amer- 
ican-equipped Communist army. 

Is it true that Marshall, under State Department 
instructions, signed an order cutting off not only 



m McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 25, 1951, pp. 55-57. 

"2 Congressional Record (Unbound), March 5, 1949, p. 1937. 

i« Congressional Record (Unbound), April 22, 1949, p. 5005. 

l« Congressional Record (Unbound), April 22, 1949, p. 5005. 

lis press Release or Senator Pat McCarran, April 17, 1949; New York Times, 

April 17, 1949, p. 25. 

lie white Paper on China, p. XIV. 

i« House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings on H.R. 8795, June 19, 1946. 



38 



arms to our friends In China, but also all ammu- 
nition so that the arms they had would be useless? 

Yes. The embargo on all arms and ammunition to 
China began in 1946 and continued into 1947. 

Those were crucial years, and China's plight was so bad 
that even the New York Times reported on June 22, 1947, 
that the guns of the anti-Communists were so worn and 
burned out that "bullets fell through them to the ground." 

The Communists, on the other hand, were kept well 
supplied by the Russians. Admiral Cooke has so testified 
before the McCarran Committee. 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "What effect would the 
arming of the Nationalists have had as far as the 
Communists were concerned?" 

ADMIRAL COOKE: "Of course, the Communists 
were being very well supplied in Manchuria by the 
Russians from arsenals and from captured Japanese 
guns and ammunition. We were practically certain 
that was going on, and, of course, in our White 
Paper reported from our diplomatic representatives 
in Moscow that it was going on." 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "So we knew that the 

. Communists were getting arms and ammunition and 

also it was our policy ... to put an embargo on the 

Nationalists?" 

ADMIRAL COOKE: "That is right." 148 

During the time that arms were completely denied the 
anti-Communists, as above stated, Acheson urged the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs that we arm and 
train Communist divisions. 149 

Did the truces between the anti-Communist Chinese 
and the Chinese Communists which were arranged 
by Marshall help the Communists or our friendg, 
the anti-Communists ? 

After Marshall arrived in China he succeeded in ar- 
ranging four truces — four cease-fire orders. In each case, 
as I have documented in my book, The Story of General 
George Marshall — America's Retreat From Victory, the 
truce played into the hands of the Communists. It gave 
them time to rebuild their forces, and in each case de- 
nied the anti-Communists a military victory which was 
within their grasp. This same truce technique, inciden- 
tally, is now being used in Korea against us. 

To illustrate the significance of those truces demanded 
by Marshall: When Chiang's anti-Communists were about 
to take Kalgan Mountain pass, which lead into Russian- 
controlled Manchuria, Marshall, on the request of the 
Communists, demanded a truce. Chiang Kai-shek in reply 
to Marshall's demand said that: 

"It was absolutely essential to the national welfare 
that the government gain control of Kalgan and that 
the occupation of that city by the government would 
do much to prevent further military action by the 

Communists." x 5 ° 

When Chiang refused to leave Kalgan to the Reds, 
Marshall threatened to have himself recalled from China 
— which carried the threat of United States abandonment 
of China. Chiang thereupon yielded to Marshall's de- 
mands. 



The fact that the Marshall-arranged truces helped de- 
liver China into Communist hands was testified to by 
Admiral Cooke before the McCarran Committee. 151 Ad- 
miral Cooke was chief of staff to Admiral Ernest King 
during World War II. He served as chief strategic 
and policy adviser to Admiral King during the entire 
war, and later participated in the formulation of U. S. 
policy on the Far East when the war was brought to an 
end. Cooke commanded the 7th Fleet stationed in Chinese 
waters and then commanded all U. S. combat forces in 
China when General Wedemeyer returned to the U. S. 
His testimony that the Marshall truces helped deliver 
China into Communist hands is, therefore, the opinion 
of a real expert both on the Far East and on military 
matters. 

Do you claim that General Marshall, who has long 
worked with Acheson, was knowingly working for 
the Communist cause in China? 

As I stated in my book, The Story of General George 
Marshall — America's Retreat from Victory, I cannot 
delve into the mind of Marshall. I can only present the 
facts to the American people. Whether Marshall know- 
ingly betrayed China or whether he honestly thought that 
he was helping China, the results are equally disastrous 
for America. 

What about your charge that the United States 
dumped into the ocean 120,000 tons of ammuni- 
tion which had been earmarked for China?- 

This is true. It is documented. 

Following is the story of the attempt of the State De- 
partment and the left-wing press to keep those facts from 
the American people. First let me quote my speech of 
October 10, 1950, in San Diego, California: 

"When the war with Japan ended, there was stored 
in India — as a way station to China — hundreds of 
millions of dollars' worth of lend-lease arms and am- 
munition. 

"For months, Liberty ships were being loaded with 
those mountains of ammunition. Loaded they left the 
port and returned empty, time after time, to be re- 
loaded and leave again. 120,000 tons of ammunition 
those ships took from the ports of India, yet every 
day during this period the artillery of Chiang Kai- 
shek remained silent for lack of ammunition.. 

"Why? Because under State Department expert 
planning, the orders were — dump this ammunition 
200 miles at sea, dump it in the Bay of Bengal. 

"All of the vast amount of ammunition which was 
destroyed by us is still carried on the Administra- 
tion's books as aid which we gave China. 

"When I heard this story of 120,000 tons of am- 
munition being dumped in the sea, I could not be- 
lieve it. We sent investigators over to check and we 
found that it was true. Finally, we got a letter from 
Major General Edward F. Witsell. General Witsell 
admitted that this ammunition actually was dumped 
in the Bay of Bengal. But, of course, there was the 
usual double-talk, and the claim that the ammuni- 



M8 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Ft. 5, Oct. 19, 1951, p. 1496. 

n° House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings on H.R. 6795, June 19, 1946. 

150 white Paper on China, p. 190." 

in McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR. Pt. 5 Oct. IS, 1051, p. 1502. 



- - - 



tion was corroded— as though a rusty bomb wouldn't 
kill a Communist as dead as a shiny bomb." 

Milwaukee Journal Lies to ^Readers in an Attempt 
to Discredit Anti-Communist Fight 

Several months later the left-wing Milwaukee Journal 
ran an editorial entitled, "How Big Can a Lie Get?" That 
editorial is reproduced herewith: 



Milwaukee Journal Editorial 
How Big Can a Lie Get? 

Nobody is much surprised any more at 
Senator McCarthy's careless use of what 
he calls "facts," but he can still startle you' 
with his ability to multiply misinforma- 
tion. 

How big can a lie get? There's a good 
answer in a story about a statement by Mc- 
Carthy on page 42 in today's Journal. 

/Just before election McCarthy hysteri- 
cally told a Washington audience f and Wis- 
consin audiences as well.) that 120,000 tons 
of ammunition the United States had ear- 
marked for the Nationalist regime in China 
had, under "state department planning," 
been deliberately dumped by our army into 
the Indian ocean— a waste of billions of 
dollars. 

Peter Edson, highly reputable Washing- 
ton correspondent, was flabbergasted and 
looked up the record. Ammunition was 
dumped, all right, back in 1945—120 tons' 
of it, not 120,000 tons. It was dumped 
after the Chinese Nationalists had author- 
ized its destruction because it had been 
damaged and corroded and was dangerous 
to have around. 

How big can a lie get? McCarthy can 
multiply It 1,000 times and assess it as 
"billions of dollars" without the bat of an 
eyelash. Read Mr. Edson's story and see 
Senator McCarthy's method in action— in- 
venting untruths and multiplying them to 
infinity. 



Senate Investigating Committee Report 

I already had a letter from General Witsell admitting 
that the ammunition which had been earmarked for 
Chiang Kai-shek was dumped in the ocean. Nevertheless, 
in order to nail down the lie I wrote to the Chief Counsel 
of the Senate Special Investigating Committee and asked 
him to check into this matter for me. His answer to my 
request is reproduced on the opposite page. 

Did not the United States send a sizable military 
mission to "aid Chiang Kai-shek? 

Yes, but, as Ambassador Bullitt said: "Nearly half of 
the 1,500-man military 'mission' was composed of fellow 
travelers and Communist sympathizers." 152 



Since the fall of China has Acheson ever admitted 
that his China policy was a failure? 

No. There is no indication that Acheson considers the 
loss :of China to Communism a "failure." Instead, he 
hailed it as "a new day which has dawned in Asia." 

About a month after the Communist conquest of China 
had been completed, Acheson declared in a speech before 
the National Press Club in Washington: 

". . . what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a 
new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in 
which the Asian peoples are on their own and know 
it and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in 
which the old relationships between East and West 
are gone, relationships which at their worst were ex- 
ploitation and which at their best were paternalism." 

Nine months after the Communist conquest of China, 
Acheson, on September 10th, during an interview over 
a CBS television program, said: 

"We do not think that any part of Asia is lost to 
the free world." 

Owen Lattimore, who has been referred to as the State- 
Department's Architect of Far Eastern Policy, had this 
to say after the Communist victories in -China: 

^ "Through Asia today there prevails an atmosphere 
of hope, not despair ... 

"What they see opening out before them is a limit- 
less horizon of hope— the hope of peaceful, construc- 
tive activities in free countries and peaceful coopera- 
tion among free people." 153 



On December 7, 1949, less than a month before Ache- 
son described the Communist conquest of China as the 
dawning of a new day, Radio Moscow had this to say 
about the Communist victory: 

"The Chinese people have dumped Chiang Kai- 
shek into the garbage can of history. The same fate 
awaits the United States puppets in other countries. 
Inspired by the grand historical victory of the Chi- 
nese people, the people of Indonesia and Viet Nam, 
the Philippines, Southern Korea and Burma, are in- 
tensifying their national liberation struggle. The 
democratic movement is gaining ground and strength 
in Japan where people refuse to be tools in implemen- 
tation of the plan cooked up by Wall Street." 

A report to the State Department, stamped secret, dated 
March 8, 1950, and entitled "Current Soviet Tactics," 
contains the following: 

"Recent Soviet press and official statements have 
been marked by a new note of confidence in the ad- 
vance of world-wide Communist revolution, empha- 
sizing the theme that Communism is now moving at 
an accelerated pace for a final victory over capitalism 
everywhere . . . 

"While Soviet propaganda has consistently echoed 
the classical Marxist-Leninist dogma that capitalism 
, is doomed to destruction, the line Is now being fol- 
lowed that the end of the capitalist world is 'ap- 
proaching with unprecedented rapidity.' The heavy 




152 Utley, The China Story, pp. 41, 42. 

153 owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 
1949), p. 238. 



40 



JOHN U MCCLELLAN, ARK., CHAIRMAN 

IAMBS O. EASTLAND, MISS. JOSEPH R. MS 6AKTHY, WIS. 

M.YDE 'R. HOEY, N. C. IRVINS M. IVES, N. Y. 

5LEN H. TAYLOR, IDAHO KARL, E.-.MUNDT, S. DAK. 

HERBERT R, O'CONQR, MO. MARSARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE 

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY. MINN. AWD«EW F. SCHQEPPEL, KAN5. 

A, WILLIS ROBERTSON, VA. 'ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG, MICH. 



WALTER L. REYNOLDS, CLERK 



^MtntUb JSAcs&t* Senate 

COMMITTEE OH 
EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE 

DEPARTMENTS 

SENATE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

(PURSUANT TO 8. RU, tt, 8IST CONGRESS) 

January 16, 1951 



SUBCOMMlTTEHs 

CUVOB R. HOEY. CHAIRMAN 
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, MD. JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, WIS. 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS. KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK. 
JOHN U. MCCLELLAN, ARK. MARGARET CHASE SMITH, 

FRANCIS D. FLANAOAN, CHIEF COUNSEL 
HOWELL 1. HATCHER, CHIEF ASSISTANT COUNSEL, 



Honorable Joseph R. McCarthy 
United States Senate 

. Dear -Senator McCarthys 

In accordance with your previous oral request, the staff of this Sub- 
committee has made preliminary inquiries of the Army concerning the alleged dump- 
ing of United States and Chinese Lend-Lease ammunition in the India Burma Theatre 
shortly after the end of World War II. In response to your letter of January 9, 
wherein you asked to be specifically adYised as to the amount, type, and 'condi- 
tion .of the ammunition which was destroyed, please be advised that the following 
l!nf ormation was furnished to us by the Army. 

An unspecified amount of ammunition. was .on hand in the India Burma 
Theatre after the cessation of hostilities at the 'end of World far II. Some of this 
material was Chinese Lend-Lease .ammunition, some was United States stock, and the 
remainder was American ammunition earmarked for Lend-Lease to China. It iras 
stated that- soke of the .ammunition had deteriorated, although no specific informa- 
tion as to the amount or extent of deterioration was furnished to the Subcommittee, 
nor has the Subcommittee made any inquiries concerning the amount of deteriorated 
ammunition on hand at that time. 

Some of the above.. mentioned ammunition stocks were demilitarized on 
land s However, due to the lack of experienced personnel and the danger involved 
in demilitarizing. ammunition It was found that this was s formidable task. 
Furthermore, while demilitarising ammunition at the Kanchrapara Ammunition Depot 
an explosion occurred which took the lives of nine Americans and fifty-five 
Indians* Under these circumstances, it was decided .to dump the remainder at sea. 

In response to your specific - inquiry the Subcommittee has not been' In- 
formed as to the amount of ammunition which was demilitarized prior to the decision 
to dump the material at sea, nor have we been advised as to the specific types 
of ammunition involved. However, the Aray has stated that approximately 120^000 
short tons of this ammunition at an estimated value of '120. million dollars was 
dumped in the Bay of Bengal under the supervision of the Army. 

The above information was furnished to us by the Department of the Army 
and no independent Inquiry has been made by the Subcommittee staff in, connection 
with 'this matter. 




Chief Counsel 



41 



play being given by Soviet propaganda to the 'peace 
front' suggests that it is serving as the chief propa- 
ganda facade for the program of world revolu- 
tion ... 

"The Communist conquest of the mainland of China 
and the conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of alli- 
ance constitute the greatest advance which Soviet im- 
perialist expansion has achieved since the war, and 
this advance is no doubt a major factor behind the 
attitude of confidence which appears to characterize 
the current Soviet outlook." 155 

The above report was made to Acheson. However, he 
was subsequently to state, at the height of the UN debate 
over Korea, that: 

". . . the Soviet Government may not be inherently 
and unalterably committed to standing in the way of 
peace, and that it may some day accept a live-and-let- 

live philosophy." . 

How did Acheson explain the sell-out of China? 

He attempted to explain it in the White Paper, which 
was edited by Ambassador-at-large, Philip Jessup. 

The White Paper obviously misstates the facts. Pro- 
fessor Kenneth Colegrove of the Political Science depart- 
ment at Northwestern University testified before the Mc- 
Carran committee that the White Paper "was one of the 
most false documents ever published by any country." 158 
Even that was an understatement. 

In regard to Acheson's letter of transmittal of the 
White Paper, Professor Colegrove said: 

"That letter of transmittal was thoroughly dishon- 
est, especially the paragraph of the letter that says 
that . . . the United States had left nothing undone 
that might have saved him [Chiang Kai-shek] and 
kept the Communists from winning the victory ... 
That obviously was a lie." 157 

Senator McCarthy, why do you concern yourself so 
much with the betrayal of 400 million Chinese who 

have been sold behind the Iron Curtain? In what 
way does that concern your people of Wisconsin 

said the people of the United States? 

The Communist conquest of China concerns the people 
of Wisconsin because, for one thing, it means that the 
Communists were able to send thousands upon thousands 
of Chinese soldiers into Korea to kill American boys — 
some of them were Wisconsin boys. This not only con- 
cerns the mothers, fathers, and the wives of Wisconsin, 
but the mothers and fathers from every state in the union. 
The war in Korea is only one of the stepping stones to 
Communist world conquest. Another stepping stone will 
be Indo-China. And after Indo-China, the Philippines. 

In this connection, it should be remembered that Amer- 
ica has had a consistent over-all year to year, decade to 
decade foreign policy— a sound, long-time foreign policy 
— starting with Secretary of State John Hay's "open 
door" policy in China and followed by every Democrat 
and Republican President up to the time that Dean Ache- 
son assumed command of our foreign policy. 

Simply stated, that long-time foreign policy was to 
maintain a free, friendly China which completely pro- 
tected our Pacific backdoor. Neither the Democrats nor 



Republicans of this nation ever voted a change in that 
long-time successful foreign policy. No Democrat or Re- 
publican convention ever went on record for a change in 
that policy. 

The abandonment of that foreign policy has already 
had a disastrous effect on America. The Korean war 
has cost us over 107,000 casualties. As to the future effect 
of the loss of China, let me quote General Douglas Mac- 
Arthur, America's No. 1 expert on the Far East: 

"It is my own personal opinion that the greatest 
political mistake we made in a hundred years in the 
Pacific was in allowing the Communists to grow in 
power in China ... I believe we will pay for it for 

a century." 158 

Perhaps the best answer to the question : "In what way 
does the betrayal of China concern the people of Wis- 
consin," was given by Lenin when he said: "He who 
controls China will control the world." 

Most Americans know the significance of Formosa. 
I don't. Will you tell me about it? 

Formosa is an island about 250 miles long and 70 miles 
wide. It is located about 100 miles off the coast of Com- 
munist-held China. Prior to World War II the Japanese 
spent vast amounts of money and effort to make Formosa 
the most important air and naval base in the western 
Pacific. From it was launched the air attacks upon the 
Philippines at the beginning of World War II. It served 
as a Japanese submarine and surface ship base for years. 

When the anti-Communist forces were defeated in 
China in 1949 they retired to Formosa. As of today there 
are roughly 600,000 friendly anti-Communist Chinese 
soldiers on the island of Formosa. Those soldiers repre- 
sent the only sizable anti-Communist Asiatic military 
force in all of the Pacific area. The significance of For- 
mosa is well covered by the quotation from General Mac- 
Arthur in answer to the next question. 

You have said that Acheson represents the pro- 
Communist point of view and that MacArthur rep- 
resents the American point of view. In what way 
and to what extent do they differ about Formosa? 

I shall let General MacArthur and Secretary Acheson 
answer that question. 

On December 23, 1949, Acheson sent the following 
secret memorandum to all overseas State Department offi- 
cials telling them to prepare for the fall of Formosa and 
to pass the word that no aid would be sent to the anti- 
Communists on Formosa. When the memorandum was 
made public, Acheson admitted he was responsible for it. 

The message said: 

"American criticism of American policy over For- 
mosa has come largely because of a mistaken popu- 
lar conception of its strategic importance to the 
United States defense in the Pacific. The loss of the 
Island is widely anticipated, and the manner in which 
civil and military conditions there have deteriorated 
under the Nationalists adds weight to the expecta- 



155 Author has photostatic copy. 

158 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 25, 1951, p. 922. 
15' McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 3, Sept. 25, 1951, p. 923. 
Ms Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 32. 



42 



tion. All available material should be used to counter 
false impressions that the retention of Formosa would 
save the Chinese N-ationalist Government, or that its ' 
loss would seriously damage American interests. For- 
mosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese 
government. Formosa has no special military signifi- 
cance." (Emphasis Mine.) 159 

General MacArthur discussed the military significance 
of Formosa in a message to the National Encampment of 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars. After first outlining our 
chain of Pacific Island defenses, he had this to say: 

"Our line of defense is a natural one and can be 
maintained with a minimum of military effort and 
expense. 

"'It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it 
provide the bastions essential for offensive opera- 
tions, but properly maintained would be an invincible 
defense against aggression. // we hold this line we 
may have peace — lose it and war is inevitable. 

"The geographic location of Formosa is such that 
^ in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United 
States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very cen- 
ter of this defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles 
closer to the adjacent friendly segments — Okinawa 
and the Philippines — than any point in continental 
Asia. 

"At the present time there is on Formosa a concen- 
tration of operational air and naval bases which is 
potentially greater than any similar concentration of 
the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and 
the Straits of Malacca. Additional bases can be de- 
veloped in a relatively short time by an aggressive 
exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities. 

"An enemy force utilizing those installations cur- 
rently available could increase by 100 percent the air 
effort which could be directed against Okinawa as 
compared to operations based on the mainland and 
at the same time could direct damaging air attacks 
with fighter-type aircraft against friendly installa- 
tions in the Philippines, which are currently beyond 
the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air 
supremacy at once would become doubtful. 

"As a result of its geographic location and base 
potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power 
hostile to the United States may either counterbalance 
or overshadow the strategic importance of the central 
and southern flank of the United States frontline posi- 
tion. 

"Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power 
could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier 
and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish 
offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate 
defensive or counter-offensive operations by friendly 
forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines. 

"This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity 
to operate from ten to twenty air groups of types 
ranging from jet fighters to B-29 type bombers as 
well as to provide forward operating facilities for 
short-range .coastal submarines. 

"In acquiring this forward submarine base, the 
efficacy of the short-range submarine would be so 
enormously increased by the additional radius of 
activity as to threaten completely sea traffic from the 
south and interdict all set lanes in the Western Pa- 
cific. Submarine blockade by the enemy, with all its 
destructive ramifications, would thereby become a 
virtual certainty. 

"Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come 
into the hands of a potential enemy of the United 
States, the latter will have acquired an additional 



'fleet' which will have been obtained and can be main- 
tained at an incomparably lower cost than could its 
equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tend- 
ers. 

"Current estimates of air and submarine resources 
in the Far East indicate the capability of such a po- 
tential enemy to extend his forces southward and still 
maintain an imposing degree of military strength for 
employment elsewhere in the Pacific area. 

"Historically, Formosa has been used as a spring- 
board for just such military aggression directed 
against areas to the south. The most notable and re- 
cent example was the utilization of it by the Japanese 
in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War 
in 1941 it played an important part as a staging area 
and supporting base for the various Japanese inva- 
sion convoys. The supporting air forces of Japan's 
Army and Navy were based on fields situated along 
southern Formosa." (Emphasis Mine.) 160 

In testifying before the Russell Committee on May 3, 
1951, MacArthur as usual was consistent. He said: 

"I believe that from our standpoint we practically 
lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa 
. . . Formosa should not be allowed to fall into Red 
hands.""! 

Acheson, who on December 23, 1950, instructed State 
Department personnel that "Formosa has no special 
military significance," testified on June 2, 1951 under 
oath before the Russell Committee that: 

"I never had the slightest doubt about the fact 
that it [Formosa] was of strategic importance." 162 

You have stated that Acheson practically invited the 
Communists to take over South Korea and For- 
mosa. What is the basis of that statement? 

On January 20, 1950, a month after Chiang was driven 
off the mainland of China and onto Formosa, Acheson 
made a very significant speech before the National Press 
Club in Washington. He first hailed the Communist vic- 
tory in China as "a new day which has dawned in Asia." 
Acheson then went on to outline those areas of the Pa- 
cific which if attacked would be defended by the United 
States. He made it clear that the United States would not 
come to the defense of either Formosa or Korea — an en- 
graved invitation to the Communists to move on South 
Korea and Formosa. This invitation was accepted by the 
Communists six months later when they invaded South 
Korea. 

On April 3, 1950, three months after Acheson's Press 
Club speech, he threatened to withdraw all economic aid 
from South Korea if its budget were not balanced. 163 
South Korea's budget was unbalanced because of the 
money being spent on the military. Acheson's ultimatum, 
in effect was that unless South Korea ceased preparing to 
defend herself from the imminent Communist invasion, all 
U. S. economic aid would be withdrawn. 

The aid which Acheson was going to withdraw was the 
balance of the $150 million of economic aid which had 
been requested by the State Department to "contain Com- 
munism." Lattimore had approved of the economic aid in 



159 Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 1, 1951, pp. 1667-1669. 

mo Russell Committee Hearings, Appendix, Pt. 5, Aug. 17, 1951, pp. 3477-3480. 

ioi Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 53. 

162 Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 2, 1951, p. 1805. 

183 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 563, April 17, 1950, p, 602. 



43 



an article in the Compass of July 17, 1949, as a means of 
allowing the South Koreans to fall without having it ap- 
pearing that we pushed them. A sizable number of Con- 
gressmen voted against the economic aid on the ground 
that it would be useless unless military aid were also 
granted to South Korea. It will be recalled that without 
State Department approval the sum of $10,300,000 mili- 
tary aid was voted for South Korea. As set forth on page 
62, the State Department saw to it that none of the mili- 
tary aid was granted except the sura of $200 which was 
spent to load some wire on a ship on the West Coast. 164 
Acheson's threat to cut off economic aid to South 
Korea unless she balanced her budget by reducing mili- 
tary expenditures becomes doubly significant when 
viewed in relation to the sabotage of the Congressional 
military aid plan. Acheson, of course, did not order the 
South Koreans in so many words to reduce their military 
spending. However, as Acheson was fully informed, the 
major part of the budget was for military spending. 
Therefore, if the budget was to be balanced, South Korea 
had to greatly impair her defense program. 

How can you intimate that Acheson invited the 
Communists to take over South Korea in view 
of the fact that the State Department approved 
sending American troops into Korea to fight the 
Communists? 

If we were trying to win the war in Korea, this ques- 
tion could not be answered. However, the Administration 
spokesmen testifying before the MacArthur Ouster Hear- 
ings agreed that we could not risk winning the war or 
Russia might enter the war. When questioned as to our 
objective in Korea, the answer was: To kill enough Chi- 
nese Communists so that they will get sick of the war and 
call it off. 

The Acheson-directed Administration has taken steps 
which make it difficult, if not impossible, to win that war. 
For example, when the United Nations called upon its 
members to supply fighting forces in Korea, the only 
member other than the United States which offered a sub- 
stantial number of soldiers was China, whose troops are 
located on Formosa just a stone's throw from Korea. 
Acheson rejected that offer of troops. 
. General MacArthur, testifying at the investigation into 
his firing, gave an example of an unbelievable assist 
which Washington gave the Chinese Communists during 
the war. MacArthur told how, when the Chinese Com- 
munists started to pour men and weapons across the 
Yalu River bridges to kill American men, he ordered our 
air force to bomb those bridges. MacArthur stated that 
his order was countermanded from Washington. 165 It is 
impossible to even guess how many Americans died as a 
result of Washington's insistence that the Yalu River 
bridges be kept intact so the Chinese Communists could 
swarm into North Korea. Only after MacArthur "pro- 
tested violently" was he allowed finally to bomb the 
bridges. 

The Racin story is another example of shooting 
American soldiers in the back from Washington. Racin 
is a city in North Korea which was used as a staging 



point and supply depot for the Communist armies. Mac- 
Arthur testified that he and the head of the air force in 
Korea agreed that Racin was an important military ob- 
jective and should be bombed. Again the State Depart- 
ment said "No!" 166 No one can possibly estimate how 
many Americans died because of that "fantastic favor- 
itism of war" to the enemy. 

MacArthur also urged that he be allowed to bomb the 
enemy's air bases from whence came their planes to kill 
our men in Korea. He also asked permission to destroy the 
enemy's supply lines in Manchuria — the bridges, the 
railroad tunnels, the rail lines — in order to keep the Chi- 
nese Communists and their military supplies out of 
Korea. The State Department refused to allow him to do 
this on the theory that if we fought back effectively we 
might make the enemy angry and he would exert more 
effort against us. This reasoning would be difficult to ex- 
plain to the families of the 107,371 United States casual- 
ties* of the Korean war. It would be difficult to convince 
the mothers of the dead, that their boys were killed by - 
friendly bullets. 

In discussing this situation MacArthur said: 

"Now that China is using the maximum of her 
force against us is quite evident; and we are not 
using the maxium of ours against her in reply. 

"The result is — we do not even use, to the maxi- 
mum, the forces at our disposal, the scientific meth- 
ods, and the result is that for every percentage you 
take away in the use of the Air and the Navy, you 
add a percentage to the dead American infantrymen. 
"It may seem emotional for me to say that, but I 
happen to be the man that had to send them into it. 
The blood, to some extent, would rest on me; and 
with the objectives, I believe I could stop them. It 
seems terrific to me that we should not attempt some- 
thing. 

"The inertia that exists! There is no policy. There 
is nothing. I tell you, no plan or anything. 

"When you say merely, 'we are going to continue 
to fight aggression,' that is not what the enemy is 
fighting for. 

"The enemy is fighting for a very definite purpose 
— to destroy our forces in Korea." 167 
When our troops were ordered into Korea, the anti- 
Communist Chinese air force located on Formosa had 
200 to 250 planes. That air force was doing a fairly good 
job of blockading the Communist ports of China. Chiang's 
anti-Communist army numbered about 600,000. The 
military forces on Formosa had immobilized the 3rd and 
4th Chinese Communist field armies on the mainland of 
China opposite Formosa. Whether they could have moved 
across the 100 miles of water against Formosa was ques- 
tionable in view of the fact that Chiang's air force had 
prevented their assembling any sizable amount of ship- 
ping in the area. 

This situation was certainly a favorable one for us and 
an unfavorable one for the Communists. Rut the United 
States 7th Fleet was ordered to change the situation. It 
was ordered (1) to break Chiang's blockade of the Com- 
munist ports of China, (2) to prevent any assault by 

*As of this writing. 

'« Congressional Record (Bound), August 16, 1950, p. 12600. 

»= Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 20. 

'« Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1851, pp. 17, 18. 

i« Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1651, p. 68 



44 



Chiang's ^anti-Communist forces on Jhe mainland of 
China, and (3) to prevent any attack on Communist 
shipping by Chiang's Navy. The 'fleet was also ordered to 
prevent any attack on Formosa by the Communist troops. 

According to General MacArthur's testimony at the 
MacArthur Hearings, the fact that our 7th Fleet was 
ordered to protect the Communist mainland from any 
attacks by Chiang's forces released the 3rd and 4th Chi- 
nese Communist Field Armies for action in Korea. 

Testimony before the MacArthur hearings was to the 
effect that this order to the 7th Fleet to break the block- 
ade of the Communist ports resulted in huge amounts of 
war material flowing into Communist China. The testi- 
mony was that $40 million worth of material moved 
through one Communist port in one month after our 7th 
Fleet broke Chiang's blockade. 168 

Another result of the order to the 7th Fleet was de- 
scribed by former Ambassador William Bullitt on April 
8, 1952, when testifying before the McCarran Committee. 
-He was asked about Chiang's Navy. 

SENATOR WATKINS: "They do have a Navy?" 

MR. BULLITT: "ph, yes. As a matter of fact, it 
has been quite an efficient force, although it is for- 
bidden to act in any way by fiat of our government 
which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it from 
stopping the Communist supply ships going up to 
Korea. They sail right by Formosa, equipped with 
Soviet munitions put in the Polish Communist ships 
in Gydnia. They come all the way around and go 
right by Formosa and sail past there taking those 
weapons up to be used to "kill American soldiers in 
Korea, and by order of our government the Chinese 
Navy is flatly forbidden to stop them on their wav up 
there." 

SENATOR WATKINS: "Would the Chinese Navy 
have the power, except for that order, to intercept 
them and capture them?" 

MR. BULLITT: "Certainly, without question, 
without question." 169 

Have any American boys been killed because the 
7th Fleet is protecting the Communist coastline of 
China? 

In answer to that question let me quote a statement 
made by General MacArthur during his testimony at 
the MacArthur hearings. MacArthur stated that after the 
7th Fleet began to protect the Communist coastline, the 
3rd and 4th Red Field Armies were released from coast- 
line duty and then "showed up in North Korea" where 
they fought and killed American soldiers. MacArthur 
testified : 

"As soon as it became know these troops had 
moved up north and were attacking me — the Third 
and Fourth Field Armies— I recommended to Wash- 
ington that the wraps be taken off the generalissimo, 
that he be furnished such logistical support as would 
put these troops in fighting trim, and that he be per- 
mitted to use his own judgment as to their use. The 
slightest use that was made of those troops would 
have taken the pressure off my troops. It would have 
saved me thousands of lives up there — even a threat 
of that. 

"We were at that time with the 7th Fleet support- 
ing my fighting line and doing everything else in 
Korea that was possible, bombarding and everything 



else, at the same time with the other hand they were 
holding back these troops, which, if they had been 
used, or even threatened to be used, would have 
taken pressure off my front. 

"It was at that time .that I made the recommenda- 
tion that the generalissimo's troops be brought into 
play against the common enemy." 170 

Could Russia as a member of the United Nations 
have vetoed the use of UN troops in Korea? 

Yes. 

Is there any logical explanation of why Russia 
didn't veto the use of UN forces in Korea? 

The only explanation I can think of is that Russia 
knew that her friends in our government would not 
let us win that war. 

Russia has gained much in the Korean war up to this 
time. There has been siphoned from America billions of 
our wealth and the Mood of over 100,000 of our young 
men. Much of our air force has been destroyed. Our 
economy has been disrupted, and we have been forced 
nearer to a semi-socialistic state. 

In addition, every other nation within the path of 
Communist conquest has been taught a bitter lesson — 
the lesson that if she resists Communist aggression, her 
fate will be the same as that of Korea; namely, destruc- 
tion. General MacArthur witnessed that destruction. This 
is what he had to say when he testified before the Senate 
Committee investigating his ouster: 

"The war in Korea has already almost destroyed 
that nation of 20 million people. 

"I have never seen such devastation. 

"I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster 
as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach, 
the last time I was there. After I looked at that 
wreckage and those thousands of women and chil- 
dren and everything, I vomited. 

"Now are you going to let that go on, by any 
sophistry of reasoning or possibilities? They may be 
there, but this is a certainty. 

"What are you going to do? Once more, I repeat 
the question: What is the policy in Korea? 

"If you go on indefinitely, you are perpetuating a 
slaughter such as I have never heard of in the history 
of mankind." 171 

There is nothing new about this pattern of conquest 
by terror. Genghis Khan was a past master at it. Early 
in the 13th century when his Mongolian hordes swept 
through the mountain passes out upon the eastern plains, 
his orders were to cut down every living thing that 
stood higher than the hub of a wagon wheel in any 
city or village which dared to resist him. This was done 
as a lesson and a warning to other lands in his path 
of conquest. Hitler, likewise, attempted to destroy the 
entire Jewish race and the Polish nation because they 
dared to resist him. This time, however, the United States 
is aiding Communist Russia in a campaign of conquest 
by terror, by insisting that the war be fought only in 
the country which we are allegedly helping. Not a single 



isa Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 52. 

lea McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, April 8, 1952 (now being printed). 

170 Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1951, p. 22. 

171 Russell Committee Hearings, Pt, 1, May 3, 1951, p. 82. 



45 



bomb must be dropped upon the land of the enemy. In 
Korea, according to the Administration, we dare not 
win but will continue a killing contest with two vast 
armies rolling back and forth across that unhappy land 
and destroying every city and village — destroying, a whole 
race ©f pe©ple. 

Thus we are doing much to convince any other nation 
which might be inclined to resist Communism that the 
cost of United States-UN "protection" is too high — that 
Russian conquest is far less painful than Acheson's 
brand of "liberation." 

You state that we have aided Communism in Asia. 
How could this be done without the American 

people knowing it? 

The best answer is perhaps contained in an article 
written by Owen Lattimore for the Sunday Compass on 
July 17, 1949. This, in my opinion, is the most revealing 
and sinister picture of the State Department's modus 
operandi that I have ever seen. 

In it he points out that the State Department's big 
problem in China was how to allow China to fall to the 
Communists without having it appear that we pushed her. 

In discussing South Korea, he said: 

"The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea 
fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it. 
Hence the recommendation for a parting grant of 
$150,000,000." . 

It will be noted that there was no recommendation 
for military aid — merely economic aid. It was, in effect, 
the Marshall Plan for South Korea — no military aid but 
unlimited economic aid in order to fatten the goose before 
the Communists took over. 

Acheson Asks Economic Aid Only for Korea 

Acheson had very dutifully come before a Congres- 
sional committee and made a glowing speech on how 
$150,000,000 of economic aid should be given if we were 
to "contain" Communism in Korea. This was done, 
knowing, of course, that Communist Russia was supply- 
ing the North Koreans from the arsenals of Manchuria 
and that economic aid would, as Lattimore said, let 
them fall but keep the American people from knowing 
we pushed them. 

Congress Earmarks Military Aid for Korea 

Some Republican House members pointed out the 
ridiculousness of giving only economic aid to South 
Korea and no military aid while the North Koreans were 
building up their military forces. They were castigated 
and pilloried by the left-wing press as "opposing the 
fight against Communism." 

The Congress — not upon the recommendation of the 
State Departmeiit— then appropriated and earmarked 
$10,300,000 for military aid for South Korea. This was 
months before the North Koreans moved. Whenever any 
Congressman or Senator tried to find out how the $10,- 
300,000 was being spent and what military equipment 
was being sent to Korea, he was told that the informa- 



tion must be . withheld "in the interest of national se- 
curity." 

Sabotage 

Finally, however, months later, after the North Kore- 
ans invaded South Korea, it was discovered that of the 
$10,360,000 only $200 had been spent— for wire which 
had been loaded aboard a ship on the west coast but 
which never arrived in Korea. 172 

Communist Line on China Applied to Korea 

When the North Koreans started to cut through the 
South Korean army, the same cabal of Communist camp- 
following news and radio commentators who had sold 
the American people on the idea that the anti-Communist 
Chinese had not been willing to fight, took up the hue 
and cry that the South Koreans were well-armed and 
well-equipped but did not have the will to fight. 

They would have gotten away with this, except that 
when American troops moved into Korea, American 
newspapermen also moved in with them. Honest re- 
porting showed that the South Koreans had only a police 
force equipped to keep order in South Korea. For ex- 
ample, while they had American bazookas, they had no 
bazooka ammunition. The South Korean "air force," 
which left-wing writers talked about, consisted of five 
planes. None of them were combat planes. 

Thus the stage had been set, but the Communist plan? 
were disrupted by Truman's last-minute decision that he 
had to prove to the American people before the election 
that he was truly anti-Communist — the first apparent, 
but not real, doublecross of Stalin. Acheson and the rest 
of Hiss' friends in the State Department promptly set 
about the task of nullifying Truman's decision by pre- 
paring the infamous order to the 7th Fleet, by tying 
MacArthur's hands, and by the decision that was to 
control so many of our actions in the war — namely, that 
we could not risk a victory in Korea or we might make 
Russia mad. 

Do the facts prove that Acheson followed Latti- 
more's _ advice of "let them fall but not to let the 

American people know we pushed them?" 

According to Ambassador Patrick Hurley, "secret 
diplomacy enabled pro-Communists ... in the American 
State Department to distort the truth and mislead the 
people." 173 

Acheson withheld from the American people and the 
Congress the warnings and advice of real American ex- 
perts on China whom he ignored, such as General Hurley 
and General Wedemeyer. He also falsely denied he was 
following the advice of men such as Henry Wallace 174 ■ 
Owen Lattimore. 173 

At the very time he was withholding from the Con- 
gress and the American people the reports of anti-Com- 
munist experts, and either denying or withholding the 



ra Congressional Record, (Bound), August 16, 1950, p. 12660. 

i*» Washington Times-Herald, Feb. 18, 1947. 

i7i press Conference of Dean Acheson, Aug. 24, 1945; White Paper on China, 

p. 56. 

176 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 2, Appendix, pp. 1839-1840. 



46 



fact that Tie was following the advice of pro-Communists, 
Acheson, on March 20, 1947, was assuring Congress: 

"The Chinese government ... is not approaching 
collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Com- 
munists. The war is going on much as it has for the 
last twenty years." 176 

On February 24, 1949, in answer to fifty-one Republi- 
can members of the House who asked, "What is our 
policy for China?", Acheson said we would have to 
"wait until the dust settles" before deciding upon a 
policy. Acheson did not mention that his policies had 
already determined exactly how the dust would settle. 

After a Red dust had settled over China, Acheson, on 
August 5, 1949, released the White Paper, and declared 
in the letter of transmittal: 

"Nothing that this country did or could have done 
within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could 
have changed that result [the Communist victory in 
China]." 

Acheson, who in 1947 declared there was no danger 
of Communist conquest of China and in 1949 said it was 
too late to fight Communism in China, has never ex- 
plained when it was — between March 20, 1947, and 
August 5, 1949 — that he discovered Communism was a 
serious threat to China. 

Do you feel that Acheson is knowingly working 
toward the triumph of Communism? In other 

words, do you feel that he is a traitor? 

I cannot plumb Acheson's mind to discover what 
prompts him, but his actions have resulted in great dam- 
age to America. 

I do not know whether he is in the same category as 
his great friend, Alger Hiss, or whether all his blunders 
were honest , v mistakes. The thought occurs, however, 
that if Acheson were honestly mistaken, at some time 
he would make a mistake in America's favor. 

What about Europe? Do you think that Acheson 
has aided Communism in Europe as well as in the 
Far East? 

I do not think Acheson aided Communism in Europe, 
I know he did. The record is clear on that point. 

While Alger Hiss and other State Department officials 
played important roles in the sell-out of Poland, it was 
Acheson who played the leading role. It was Acheson 
who helped secure for Alger Hiss his appointment as 
an adviser to the President at Yalta. The Yalta agreement 
has been described by former Ambassador to Poland 
Arthur J31iss Lane as "the deathblow to Poland's hopes 
for independence and for a democratic form of govern- 
ment." 1 " 

It was Acheson who, over the protests of his own am- 
bassador to Poland, granted a $90 million United States 
loan to the Communist-controlled government of Poland, 
thus supplying the Communist Secret Police with the 
weapons to control Poland. 

It was Acheson who, over the protests of China and 
Britain, agreed to the Soviet aim of making the United 



Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, an 
innocent-looking relief organization (known as UNRRA), 
into a tool for Soviet conquest. 

At the time each of those acts took place, urgent 
objections were made by both Americans and Poles who 
recognized in each the pattern of Communist conquest. 

Arthur Bliss Lane, who was present when the Yalta 
Agreement was signed, spoke out and said: 

"As I glanced over it, I could not believe my eyes. 
To me, almost every line spoke of a surrender to 
Stalin." 178 

After Yalta came Potsdam, when Truman met with 
Stalin and agreed to the Yalta betrayal of Poland. Jan 
Ciechanowski, ambassador of the anti-communist gov- 
ernment of Poland, has told of his last days in Washing- 
ton just before the die was cast. 

"During this last stage of my official mission in 
Washington, -I did my utmost to persuade the State 
Department that it was clearly in the interest of the 
United States at least not to grant full de jure recog- 
nition to the so-called Polish provisional government 
[the Communist-controlled government] . . . Despite 
all my insistent efforts, I found it impossible to get 
any consideration at the State Department for this 
suggestion." 179 

Even before Yalta our State Department was doing, its 
part to Communize Poland. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, prime 
minister of the anti-communist Polish government and 
leader of the Polish Peasant Party, tells of his vain pleas 
to the State Department to stop pro-Communist broad- 
casts into Poland by the Office of War Information, which 
was headed by Elmer Davis. 

"We finally protested to the United States State 
Department about the tone of the OWI broadcasts 
to Poland. Such broadcasts, which we carefully moni- 
tored in London, might well have emanated from 
Moscow itself. The Polish underground wanted to 
hear what was going on in the United States to whom 
it turned responsive ears and hopeful eyes. It was 
not interested in hearing pro-Soviet propaganda from 
the United States, since that duplicated the broad- 
casts sent from Moscow . . . 

"I mentioned . . . the tone of OWI broadcasts to 
Poland. They had been following the Communist 
line consistently, which made our j ob more difficult. 

" 'It's unwise to adopt this approach to the Polish 
people,' I told the Under Secretary. 'If you continue 
to call Russia a "democracy," you may eventually 
regret that statement, and your people will condemn 
you. 

*' 'Your government once called Poland "the inspira- 
tion of the nations," but now the OWI calls the Com- 
munist forces just that.'" [Emphasis mine.] 180 

The Polish Prime Minister concluded his appeal to the 
State Department by saying, "Poland just does not want 
to become another Red satellite." 181 

The question naturally arises as to whether the State 
Department was aware of the Communist rule of terror 



170 House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 20, 1947. 

177 Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, p. 306. 

178 Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, p. 80. 

170 Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 

1947), p. 383. 

i 80 Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, pp. 25, 58. 

i8i Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, p. 59. 



47 



at the time it was initiating Communist propaganda in 
Poland and acceding to Communist demands. 

This is best answered by considering the situation in 
Poland when Acheson granted the Communist-controlled 
government a $90 million United States loan. In March, 
1946, U. S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane 
learned that the State Department planned to grant a 
$50 million loan to the Communist-controlled govern- 
ment. He cabled his protests, but on Easter morning he 
learned that the loan was to be increased to $90 million. 
Lane immediately cabled again, urging that United 
States funds not be granted until ". . . the terroristic 
activities of the Security Police come to an end, and 
freedom of the press is restored, and American citizens 
are released from Polish prisons." 182 

But, as Lane has said, "My advice was in vain." 183 

Much of the $90 million U. S. loan was to be used 
to equip the UB, the Communist Secret Police — or "Se- 
curity" police as they called themselves — in Poland. The 
activities of the Secret Police and the conditions in 
Poland when the loan was granted by Acheson are de- 
scribed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the Polish 
Peasant Party, who was in Poland at that time. He 
describes the Communist "campaign of terror" at that 
time as follows: 

"On January 26 [1946], in the village of Gorniki 
Nowe, near Zamosc, twenty-five Security Police ap- 
peared at the farm of Jan Senderek, a Peasant Party 
member. His brother Stanislaw opened the door at 
their knock and was promptly annihilated by gun- 
fire. When their hysterical mother kept crying, 'What 
have you done to my son?' the police answered, 'Be 
satisfied your other son is still alive.' Jan was taken 
from the house, mauled for two weeks in a Security 
Police station, then released, a physical wreck. 

"Shortly thereafter in Grojec, near Warsaw, the 
Security Police seized five citizens, including a local 
judge, took them outside the town, shot them and 
shoveled them into a single grave. 

"One man, however, lived. Knowing the butchering 
methods of the NKVD [the Communist Secret Po- 
lice], this man dropped at the first rifle fire, pretend- 
ing to be dead. He was buried alive in the pit with 
the others. Terribly wounded, he clawed his way up 
through the dirt and out of his tomb. He made his 
way to Warsaw, where he gave me a firsthand ac- 
count of the shooting and named several of the assas- 
sins. 

"I took these horrifyingly macabre facts to the 
next cabinet meeting, confronted the Communists 
with them, and demanded that the investigating com- 
mission be put to work immediately. The only result 
I obtained was this: the Peasant Party [anti-Com- 
munist] in the Grojec district was one of the first of 
thirty-six district organizations later dissolved by 
official decree." 184 

And what about the government to which Acheson gave 
a $90 million United States loan? 
Mikolajczyk writes: 

"The government [to which Acheson granted the 
loan in April, 1946] took no official notice of our 
congress [anti-communist] or its resolutions for sev- 
eral days. Then it acted. Through its controlled So^ 



cialist Party it sent word to the party that either we 
must join the government bloc by March 1, 1946, or 
face political annihilation." 185 

Less than two months later the $90 million loan was 
granted to this terroristic Communist government in 
Poland. 

While the Russian-trained "Security" Police in Poland 
shot down private citizens on their doorsteps, imprisoned 
American citizens and carried on a rule of terror through- 
out Poland, Dean Acheson agreed to have Communist 
Russia and one other representative control the distribu- 
tion of UNRRA food and relief in Poland and the entire 
European region. 186 

The power to control the distribution of food at that 
time was the power to control and direct hungry people. 
Arthur Bliss Lane in his book, / Saw Poland Betrayed, 
has told how this food, which was so desperately needed 
by the war-torn, starving areas of Poland, was used by 
the Communists as a political weapon. He tells how 
American-supplied food was withheld from all those who 
opposed Communism. 187 

In his book, Defeat in Victory, Jan Ciechanowski, 
former Polish ambassador to the U. S., tells the part 
Acheson played in this picture. About the time that Stalin 
defeated Hitler at Stalingrad and began to turn his atten- 
tion away from the war at hand and toward his plans for 
world conquest, Acheson together with the representatives 
of Russia, Britain, and China, held a series of "top 
secret" meetings to plan the creation of the United Na- 
tions Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, known as 
UNRRA. Since the United States was to pay the major 
portion of the bill for UNRRA food and relief, Acheson 
held the position of greatest power in those meetings. 

"The story as it unfolded at those five fateful meetings 
at the State Department," writes Ciechanowski, "has too 
great bearing on the present world setup to be left un- 
told." 

Here is the story of how UNRRA was turned into a tool 
for Soviet conquest and how it was used to subjugate the 
people of Poland. 

At the first of those five meetings at the State Depart- 
ment, Acheson proposed that UNRRA be controlled by 
only four powers — Communist Russia, the United States, 
China, and Great Britain. China and Britain both pro- 
tested, saying that all countries contributing to and re- 
ceiving aid from UNRRA should have a voice in its 
affairs. Russia, however, agreed with the Acheson pro- 
posal. Russia then added a new twist. The veto of any one 
of the four powers could block any proposal made by the 
other three. China strongly protested and urged that the 
democratic rule of the majority be used. "Mr. Acheson," 
Ciechanowski writes, "then declared his support of the 
Soviet suggestion, while Lord Halifax [the British repre- 
sentative] did not appear to oppose it." 

On March 24 Acheson finally secured the agreement of 
China and Britain for both Soviet proposals. Next the 
Soviet demanded that no outsider be permitted to enter 

isa Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, p. 237. 
1K3 Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, p. 237. 

184 Mikolajczyk, The Rape oi Poland, pp. 153, 151. 

185 Mikolajczyk, The Rape ol Poland, p. 153. 
iM Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory, p. 256. 

is' Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, pp. 214-215, 224. 



Russia to handle UNRRA aid .to the Soviet or be per- 
mitted, in any .way to regulate food and relief sent to 
Russia. When China and ■ Britain finally agreed with 
Acheson on this point, "Litvinoff's triumph was com-, 
plete," writes Ciechanowski. 

But even this was not enough. Russia then demanded 
that ..of the two officials who »were to control UNRRA in 
the European region, one should be a Soviet official. 
Britain asked why Russia should be concerned with hav- 
ing a Soviet official distribute food for the entire Euro- 
pean region since, unlike any other nation, it would have 
exclusive control over the aid going to its own country, 
Russia. The Communists replied that Russia "had a real 
interest in the measures to be undertaken elsewhere in 
Europe." 

And what was Acheson's reaction when the Russians 
thus put their cards on the table? Acheson was represent- 
ing the country which was to pay practically the entire 
cost of UNRRA. Ciechanowski reports: "Mr. Acheson 
curtly expressed the hope that the British government 
would be able to accept the Soviet proposal." Throughout 
the five meetings Ciechanowski states that "the Soviet de- 
mands were steadily supported by Mr. Acheson on behalf 
of the United 'States." 188 

Arthur Bliss Lane, who was in Poland as our ambassa- 
dor at this time, tells how the Soviet used the power given 
them at those meetings : in Acheson's office to distribute 
food in Poland "for their own political advantage':" 
Schools, orphanages, and churches opposed to the Com- 
munist rule of terror, received no UNRRA aid. -It was 
little wonder, for Acheson had made the rules and the 
director of the first UNRRA mission to Poland— ap- 
pointed, despite the strong protests of Ambassador Lane, 
by UNRRA Director General Herbert H. Lehman, now 
Senator from New York — was a Soviet official. 189 

How do you explain your statement that Acheson 
is aiding Communism in Europe when he has made 
so many speeches urging that we fight Communism 
in Europe and that we send American troops to 
Europe? ■ 

Hiss also publicly proclaimed his love for the American 
flag.. I can perhaps best answer this question by quoting 
from a speech which I made in the Senate on this subject 
on March 14, 1951. 

"I realize that some of my good friends feel that 
the problem in Europe can be settled merely by the 
decision of whether we shall send an additional six or 
eight or ten American divisions to Western Europe. 
Would that it were that simple. Keep in mind that 
the group which is doing the planning for Western 
Europe is the identical group which has been doing 
the disastrous planning for Asia— the same group 
that did the planning for the sellout of Poland and 
China. Again without concerning ourselves over 
whether their actions are the result of treachery or 
incompetence, let's look at the unquestioned facts. 
Those facts speak for themselves. 

Eisenhower's Hands Tied 

"Those -who have confidence in General Eisen- 
hower as a great soldier should realize that Eisen- 



hower's hands are also jtied b>y the same crowd that 
has vtied-the hands of MacArthurin the East, anii if 
good-natured Ike , isn't ..careful, he is going to be 
taken for an awful ride. You know a good soldier 
does not have time to learn the ways of crooked, 
backroom diplomacy, and if he has spent enough time 
soldiering to be the good soldier that Eisenhower is, 
he cannot cope with unprincipled, crooked, clever 
diplomats. It is difficult for a soldier of integrity who 
has not. had time off to study the ways of traitors to 
bring himself to believe that people in high positions 
could be actually disloyal to this nation. 

Failure to Make West German Troops Available 
For Defense of Western Europe 

"The Senate will recall that when the General ap- 
peared before the Joint Session of the Congress, he 
said he was unable to discuss the use of German 
manpower until the policies of the situation were 
cleared up by the diplomats. And for five years those 
diplomats have done nothing to clear up the situa- 
tion. Periodically our State Department talks of re- 
arming Western Germany to counter the army built 
up by the Russians in East Germany. But it is noth- 
ing but talk — words apparently planted to lull the 
American people into a sense of security that we are 
going to do something in West Germany to counter 
the threat of what Russia has been doing in East Ger- 
many. Clever administration of sleeping tablets, if 
you please! 

Two Wells of Manpower for Defense of Europe 

"When Eisenhower went to Europe to plan the de- 
fense of Western Europe, he wasn't even allowed to 
visit one of the greatest potential sources of manpower 
for a Western European Army — a country that has 
long been dedicated to fighting Communism — 
namely, Spain. I am not going to argue that Spain 
has or has not the kind of government of which we 
should approve. The point is we cannot make over 
that Spanish government. I am not going to argue 
that we should or should not love the 48 million peo- 
ple of Western Germany. But it takes no argument, 
it follows as the night follows the day, that there is 
no way on God's earth to defend the richest prize 
for which Communist Russia is aiming— the indus- 
trial heart of Europe — unless we use those two great 
wells of tough anti-Communist -manpower, Western 
Germany and Spain. The talk of doing otherwise is 
either the talk of those who" know not what they say 
or the talk of traitors planning a phony defense. 

'Let Them Fall, but Don't Let American People 

Know We Pushed "Them." 

"When I hear Administration spokesmen urging 
that the solution to the whole problem lies in drafting 
and sending to Europe another six, eight or ten 
American divisions, there is called vividly to my 
mind an article which appeared in the Compass on 
July 17, 1949. The Compass, incidentally, is not ex- 
actly a conservative paper. It contains an article by 
that great expert on the Far East, the adviser to two 
Presidents and the man long referred to as the 
Architect of our Far Eastern Policy, the man who 
was called upon to give secret advice to our Roving 
Ambassador Philip Jessup before he started to rove. 

"Let me read it to you and see if it doesn't give you 
an idea of what may be happening insofar as West- 



M8 Ciechanowski. Defeat in Victory, pp. 251-257. 
18" Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed, p. 143. 



49 



ern Europe, as. well as Asia, is concerned. 

"Here Mr. Lattimore, the State Department's ad- 
viser, praises the State Department for having suc- 
ceeded in allowing China to fall to the Communists 
without letting it appear to the world that we have 
shoved her. He then goes on to state and I quote: 
'The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall 
but net to let it look as though we pushed it. Hence 
the recommendation of a parting grant of $150 mil- 
lion.' 

"The picture in Western Europe, gentlemen, is 
much the same. We are preparing to allow Western 
Europe to fall without having it appear that we 
pushed her. It matters not whether we send one Amer- 
ican division or ten. It matters not whether Eisen- 
hower is the most brilliant military genius the world 
has ever produced. He cannot defend Western Eu- 
rope without the manpower of Spain and Western 
Germany. It just is not in the cards. 

Communist Victory Inevitable Unless 
Immediate Reversal. 

"If we continue with the same type of planning, 
and argue over whether six divisions or ten or twenty 
American divisions should be sent to Europe and 
neglect the important question of utilizing the man- 
power of our allies, then Communist victory in 
Western Europe is just as certain as Communist vic- 
tory was in China. 

Amount of Time Left to Rearm Western Europe 

"There are those who say if we start to rearm 
Western Europe that the Russians will promptly 
move in. This may well be. However, there is one 
condition which exists today which discourages that 
— a condition which may not exist a few years hence. 
As of today our long-range bombers using the atomic 
bomb could wipe Russian industry off the face of the 
earth. I do not believe Russia will move while that 
condition continues. 

"We also know, of course, that Russia with a vast 
number of captured German scientists, is working 
feverishly to perfect that guided missile of the air, a 
missile which will track and destroy planes in the 
air. If and when this is accomplished — and it is only 
a matter of time — our atom-carrying bombers will act 
as no deterrent to Soviet Russia. They will be useless. 

"My estimate of the situation is that we have a lim- 
ited time to rearm Western Europe — the time during 
which it will take the Russian scientists to perfect a 
defense to our atom-carrying bombers. When that 
they have, they will be able to move on the ground 
unless in the meantime we have built up in Europe 
ground forces of sufficient power to deter them. 

Armies of Western Europe Potentially Stronger 
Than Soviet Russia 

"Now there are those who say that it is impossible 
for Western Europe to compete with the land armies 
of Russia. Gentlemen, this just is not true. Remem- 
ber that German armies nearly destroyed Russia in 
the last war and now, with the exception of the 10 
million Germans under Russian domination, we have 
not only Germany, but also Spain, France, the other 
small European nations and England. 

"It seems that the time is long past due to build up 
in Western Europe, not an American Army, but a 
Western-European Army for peace. If this is done, 
peace may well be prolonged for another 15 or 20 
years. In the meantime, Communism may rot from 



the inside out to the end that a peaceful world will 
then be possible. 

"With the manpower of our friends in Asia and 
the manpower of our friends in Europe and the in- 
dustrial capacity of this Nation, we are far more 
powerful still than the Communist countries. But we 
may not be more powerful tomorrow or the next day. 
If they take over Western Europe, if they take over 
Japan, then they will be far stronger in productive 
capacity, raw materials and manpower. 

Aggression in Cause of Freedom and Justice 

"There are those who say we should do nothing 
aggressive. This just does not make sense. There is 
no reason why free men should not be aggressive in 
the cause of freedom and justice. 

Necessity of Recreating 
A Free Democratic China 

"We should be aggressive in giving all-out aid to 
Chiang Kai-shek, to the end that China may again / 
be a free, friendly, and a neutral China, that the-'' 
peace of the Pacific may be assured. 

Necessity of Recreating 
A Free Democratic Poland 

"Aid should be given to anti-Communist forces in 
the Russian satellite nations^ — especially the anti- 
Communist forces in Poland when the opportunity 
presents itself, to the end that there may again be 
in Europe, the stabilizing influence of a free, inde- 
pendent, democratic Poland. Now I do not propose 
to send American troops into China or Poland. But 
I do propose that we give the anti-Communist forces 
in those countries necessary aid when the oppor- 
tunity presents itself, so that they themselves can 
strike the chains from the wrists and ankles that 
should never have borne them except for the actions 
of our planners. 

SUMMARY 

Phony Planning 'for Phony Defense 

"In summary, I propose that we stop the phony 
planning for a phony defense of Western Europe 
and American interests. I propose that we restate our 
aims and then follow through with policies that will 
achieve those aims rather than what we have been 
doing in the past — namely, stating great and de- 
sirable aims and then putting into effect policies de- 
signed to accomplish the direct opposite result of 
those aims.. . . 

Must Make Use of Four Great 

Untouched Wells of Manpower 

"Regardless of whether we send two or six or ten 
or twenty divisions to Europe, we are doomed to fail 
unless we promptly make use of the four great wells 
of manpower which we are now deliberately ignoring 
— namely, the manpower of Japan, the manpower of 
the anti-Communist Chinese, the Spanish, and the 
48 million West Germans. 

Use of American Troops 

"In closing let me make it clear that I do not object 
to using American divisions in Europe. America has 
a heavy interest in keeping Western Europe from fall- 
ing under Communist control. I do not object, that 



is, if we plan a real defense of Western Europe and If you could replace Acheson, what would you most 

not a phony defense under which those American want in a Secretary of State? 

troops will be condemned to death or permanent . _ 
slavery in some Siberian prison camp. Intelligent concern for America. Our State Depart- 
"Before we send more American troops into West- ment must be led by a man who thinks as an American, 
ern Europe, we must reverse the Administration's w ho represents America, and who will not allow himself, 
virtual ban upon the use of Western German and either through ignorance or design, to further the Corn- 
Spanish soldiers in the defense of Western Europe. mU nist cause 
Then and only then can we hope for a real and not 

a phony defense of Western Europe." 190 *<*> Congressional Record (Unbound), March 14, 1951, pp. 2461-2475. 



51 






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■■..:■ 



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MtSSi 



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: > : 



1—1111 



to 







Ambassador-at-Large Pliilip Jessup and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. 



CHAPTER VI 



Ambassador Philip C. Jessup 



^%7"ou have stated that Philip Jessup is unfit to hold 
■*■ his job as Ambassador-at-Large and delegate to 
the United Nations because of his "affinity for Com- 
munist causes." What evidence did you present to 
the Senate subcommittee on Jessup? 

Following are highlights of the evidence that was sub- 
mitted in the Jessup case: 

1. Photostats showing his connection with six organi- 
zations officially cited as fronts for and doing the work 
of the Communist Party. The citations were either by the 
Attorney General or by legislative committees. 

2. Photostats of some of the checks totaling §60,000 
of Communist money contributed to the Institute of 
Pacific Relations, which was headed by Jessup for a num- 
ber of years. The uncontradicted evidence before the 
McCarran committee shows that the institute was largely 
run by Jessup, Owen Lattimore, and Communist Fred- 
erick V. Field. 

3. Sworn testimony before various Congressional com- 
mittees identifying as members of the Communist Parly 
and as espionage agents a sizable number of individuals 
on Jessup's staff and writers hired by the IPR while Jessup 
was chairman of the Pacific and American councils of 
the IPR. 

4. Excerpts from Jessup's writings showing he followed 
the Communist Party line in taking the inconsistent posi- 
tion of urging that we send arms to the Communist ele- 
ments in Spain and later that we _ .withhold arms from 
England and France during the Hitler-Stalin pact. 

5. Testimony given under oath by Jessup in the second 
Hiss trial showing his continued support of Hiss after 
the facts on -Hiss' Communist activities were made known 
in the first trial, together with Jessup's sworn testimony 
before the Tydings committee in which he continued to 
support Alger Hiss after his conviction. 

6. Reproduction of a petition signed by Jessup in which 
Jessup followed the Communist Party 'line and recom- 
mended that the United States stop manufacturing atomic 
bombs, and destroy atomic-bomb material by dumping 
it into the ocean. This was at a time when atomic spies, 
such as Fuchs, were stealing our atomic secrets and pass- 
ing them on to Russia who was even then manufacturing 
atomic bombs. 

7. Reproduction of letters from IPR files and excerpts 
from sworn testimony showing Jessup's close relationship 
with Communist Frederick V. Field and his support of 
Field in his Communist activities. 

8. Reproduction of a letter showing that an Amerada 
defendant, Andrew Roth, who was named as a Commu- 
nist, was "rated very highly by Jessup." 



9. Reproduction of sworn testimony showing that Jes- 
sup urged that Red China be recognized. 191 

After hearing your evidence on Jessup, what action 
did the Senate Committee take? 

After hearing my evidence and a considerable amount 
of additional evidence, the Senate subcommittee recom- 
mended against Jessup's confirmation as delegate to the 
United Nations. The Senate did not confirm Jessup. 

What did the President do after the Senate sub- 
committee found that Jessup was unfit to serve as 
the United States delegate to the United Nations? 

After the Senate left Washington, the President reap- 
pointed Jessup as delegate to the United Nations, where 
he served during the entire conference, 12 weeks and 5 
days, without Senate confirmation. 

You stated that the Senate did not confirm Jessup 
for his United Nations job. Was this because the 
Senate did not have time to vote on Jessup, as Jes- 
sup has claimed? 

No. Jessup was one of 10 individuals nominated by the 
President as delegates to the United Nations conference 
in Paris. Nine of the 10 were confirmed by a vote of the 
Senate. The Democratic leaders, however, refused to bring 
Jessup's name to the Floor for a vote because after an in- 
formal poll they found that Jessup could not secure enough 
votes for confirmation. 

On January 17, 1952, Russian Foreign Minister Vishin- 
sky speaking at the UN meeting in Paris had this to say 
about Jessup: "I learned the other day with some dismay 
that 37 Senators had asked the United States Government 
if it would dismiss Mr. Jessup from here because he was 
rather sympathetically inclined toward an un-American 
way of thought ... I must express my sympathy for 
Mr! Jessup." 192 

Of what significance was Ambassador Jessup's De- 
fense of Alger Hiss ? 

Jessup testified in Hiss' behalf at both the Hiss trials. 
In 1950 when Jessup was questioned on this by Sen- 
ator Hickenlooper before the Tydings Committee, he 
stated he saw no reason to change his testimony as to 
Hiss' reputation for integrity, truthfulness, honesty and 
loyalty. 193 

This tied in closely with Acheson's action in calling a 
press conference after Hiss was convicted and announcing 
to the press and the country that he would never turn 
his back on Alger Hiss, even after Hiss was convicted 
of perjury in connection with the treason which may well 



1 91 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on Nomination of Philip 

Jessup, Kept. 27, 1331, pp. 1-39; Oct. 2, 1951, pp. 41-102, 103-142, 

l»2 New York Times, January 18, 1952, p. C-5, 

va Tydings CommiUse Hearings, Pt. 1, March 20, 1950, P. %Q1, 



have signed the death warrant of a vast number of Amer- 
ican boys. 

Official Approval Given Hiss is Signal to Others 

If Acheson and jessup as private individuals were 
merely proclaiming their friendship for and loyalty to 
a convicted traitor, it would not be too disturbing. Un- 
fortunately, however, the picture is much more sinister. 
Here we have the Secretary of State and the State De- 
partment's No. 2 man publicly proclaiming, in effect, 
that they would never desert and turn their backs upon 
any other Hisses in the State Department. 

In my opinion, this was giving a green light to every 
Red in our government. 

It is of more than passing significance that as late as 
Sunday, October 21, 1951, Jessup under constant ques- 
tioning over the television program "Meet the Press," 
refused to repudiate Alger Hiss. 

Does the fact that a person was affiliated with a 
Communist front organization prove that he is dis- 
loyal or in sympathy with the Communist cause? 

No. One of the principal and rather successful aims 
of the Communist Party has been to trick loyal and well- 
known Americans into believing that various Communist 
fronts were good American organizations and to induce 
them to loan their names unknowingly to the Communist 
cause. 

As one of our top intelligence officers testified: "While 
membership in one Communist front does not prove dis- 
loyalty, the conditions of his membership should be care- 
fully checked to make sure that the individual in question 
unknowingly joined." But as he said, "If you find a man 
in our State Department whose task it is to fight Com- 
munism and to know all the workings of the Communist 
Party — if you find that he joins and sponsors or is af- 
filiated with a number of Communist fronts, then you 
can assume that he is either so naive that he should be 
removed from his job or that he is loyal to the Commu- 
nist cause." 



Anc 



Congressional witness said: 



"Let's put it this way, if you find that a young man 
belongs to a Lutheran Young Men's Society, you can 
assume that he believes in -the principles of the Lu- 
theran Church. If a young lady belongs to a Methodist 
Young Women's group, you can assume that she be- 
lieves in the principles of the Methodist Church. Or 
if a young man belongs to the Knights of Columbus 
or the Holy Name Society it is safe to assume he 
believes in the teachings of the Catholic Church. 
Likewise, if it is found that a government employee 
is affiliated with a number of organizations which aie 
doing the work of the Communist Party, it can safely 
be assumed that he believes in the teachings of the 
Communist Party, or is so stupid as to be dangerous 
handling secret material." 

You showed Ambassador Jeesisp's affiliation with 6 
different organizations that had been officially 
named as fronts for and doing the work ©f the 
Communist Party. Who named them as Communist 
fronts? 

Either the Attorney General or legislative committees. 
Citations were given in each case. The Attorney General 
cites an organization as a Communist front only after a 
thorough investigation by the FBI. 

How can you blame a State Department official for 
joining a Communist front before it was cited as a 
Communist front? 

The legislation providing for the public labeling of 
organizations doing the work of and serving as fronts 
for the Communist Party was for the benefit of the un- 
informed and not for men like Jessup who claim to lead 
the fight against Communism and who either know or 
should know the workings of the Communist Party. 

In this connection it should be remembered that the 
Communist Party itself was not officially cited as a sub- 
versive organization until 1947. But certainly this should 
not be used by State Department officials as an excuse 
for having been active in the Communist Party prior 
to 1947. 



54 



You have stated that a sizable number of peop!e ( 
employed on the staff of Ambassador Jessup, or 
hired as writers, while he was head of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations have been named as Commu- 
nists or Soviet agents. Can you give the facts on 
this? 

Throughout the time that Philip Jessup was chairman 
of the Pacific and the American Councils of the Institute 
of Pacific Relations, this organization was not only 



accepting Communist money to support its projects but 
also was employing Communist writers, Communist re- 
search workers, etc. Sixty officials and writers of the IPR 
have been named under oath as members of the Com- 
munist Party. 

Following are a few of the 60 officials and writers of 
the IPR who have been named as Communists or espio- 
nage agents in sworn testimony before various Congres- 
sional committees: 



INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE NAMED UNDER OATH AS COMMUNISTS AND WHO WORKED WITH 

JESSUP IN IPR 
NAMED BY DATE 

Karl Wittfogel Aug. 7, 1951 



1. Chen Han Seng 
Writer and staff member under Jessup 

2. T. A. Bisson 

Writer and member with Jessup 

3. Chao Ting Chi 

Served on board under Jessup and staff 

member under Jessup 
"4. Hilda Austern 

Writer and staff member under Jessup 
5. Harriet Lucy Moore 

Writer and staff member under Jessup 



6. Owen Lattimore 

Writer, editor of Amerasia and Pacific 
Affairs. Served under Jessup. 

7. Anthony Jenkinson 

Writer and representative of news service 
with IPR while Jessup exercised control 
in IPR 

8. Michael Greenberg 

Writer and staff member under Jessup 

9. Maxwell S. Stewart 

Writer of publications of IPR and served 
under Jessup's supervision. 
10. Lawrence K. Rosinger 

Writer and staff member under Jessup's 
supervision 



BEFORE THE 
McCarran Committee 



Louis Budenz 
Louis Budenz 
Karl Wittfogel 
Elizabeth Bentley 

Louis Budenz 

Hede Massing 
Karl Wittfogel 
Elizabeth Bentley 
Louis Budenz 
Louis Budenz 
Louis Budenz 
Alexander Barmine 
Louis Budenz 
Louis Budenz 



Louis Budenz 
Elizabeth Bentley 
Karl Wittfogel 



Aug. 22, 1951 
Apr. 25, 1950 
7, 1951 
14, 1951 



Aug. 

Aug. 



McCarran Committee 
Tydings Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 



Aug. 23, 1951 McCarran Committee 



Louis Budenz 



Aug. 2, 1951 
Aug. 7, 1951 
Aug. 14, 1951 
Aug. 22, 1951 
Apr. 25, 1950 
Aug. 22, 1951 
July 31, 1951 
Apr. 20, 1950 
Aug. 23, 1951 



Aug. 22, 1951 
Aug. 14, 1951 
Aug. 7, 1951 
Aug. 22, 23, 1951 



McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
Tydings Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
Tydings Committee 
McCarran Committee 



McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 



McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
Tydings Committee 



William Canning Aug. 16, 1951 

Karl Wittfogel Aug. 7, 1951 

Louis Budenz Apr. 25, 1950 

INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE NAMED UNDER OATH AS SOVIET AGENTS AND WHO WORKED WITH 

JESSUP IN IPR 

NAMED BY DATE 

Louis Budenz Aug. 22, 1951 

Louis Budenz April 20, 1950 



1. Frederick V. Field 
Writer and Executive Secy, of IPR 
serving under Jessup 

2. Owen Lattimore 

Writer, editor of Amerasia and Pacific 
Affairs. Served under Jessup 

3. Gunther Stein 

Writer and paid employee of IPR when 
Jessup was Chairman 

4. Chao Ting Chi 

Served on board under j essup and staff 
member under Jessup 

5. Michael Greenberg 

Writer and staff member under Jessup 



BEFORE THE 

McCarran Committee 
Tydings Committee 



Alexander Barmine 



Louis Budenz 

Maj. Gen. Willoughby 

Karl Wittfogel 
Elizabeth Bentley 

Louis Budenz 
Elizabeth Bentley 
Karl Wittfogel 



July 31, 1951 McCarran Committee 



Aug. 22, 1951 
Aug. 9, 1951 

Aug. 7, 1951 
Aug. 14, 1951 

Aug. 22, 1951 
Aug. 14, 1951 
Aug. 7, 1951 



McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 

McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 

McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 
McCarran Committee 



55 



IDENTITY OF WITNESSES TESTIFYING TO 

COMMUNIST AFFILIATIONS OF JESSUP'S 
ASSOCIATES AND STAFF MEMBERS IN IPR 

Dr. Karl Wittfogel — Professor at Columbia University; 
former member of Communist Party. 

Elizabeth Bentley — Headed Communist Espionage Ap- 
paratus; has been used repeatedly as a Government 
witness in the trial and deporation proceedings of Com- 
munists. 

Louis Budenz — Former member of national committee of 
Communist Party; served as editor of Daily Worker, 
official publication of the Communist Party; has testi- 
fied in practically every case in which Communists 
were either convicted or deported over the past 3 
years; one of key witnesses who testified against con- 



victed 11 Communist leaders. 

Gen. Alexander Barmine — Former General in Russian 
Military Intelligence who served as a Soviet Intelligence 
Officer for 14 years; fled the Soviet Union and is now 
under sentence of death by Soviet Military Court. 

Major General Willoughby — Chief of General Douglas 
MacArthur's Intelligence Staff in the Far East for many 
years. 

Hede Massing — Former Soviet Agent and wife of Ger- 
hardt Eisler who fled behind the Iron Curtain and has 
since been active in Soviet-controlled East Germany; 
has testified in the trial of Alger Hiss and in other 
cases for the FBI and Department of Justice. 

Prof. William Canning — Former member of the Commu- 
nist Party who broke with the Party; former professor 
at City College, New York City and Xavier College. 



56 



CHAPTER VII 



The Evidence on Owen Lattiniore 



Cenator McCarthy, during the Ty dings committee 
^ hearings you stated that you were willing to 
stand or fall on the Lattiniore case. What evidence 
has been produced in his case? 

Thirteen different witnesses have testified under oath 
to Lattimore's Communist membership or party line 
activities.* Some of the testimony and evidence follows. 

Used fey Russian Intelligence Agents 

(1) Alexander Barmine, a former Russian General, 
was attached to Soviet Military Intelligence for 14 years. 
He renounced Communism and escaped to the United 
States. As result he is now under sentence of death by 
a Russian court. General Barmine testified under oath 
a& -follows : 

-that Owen Lattimore was a member of Russian 
Military Intelligence. 194 

-that at one time General Berzin, the head of Rus- 
sian Military Intelligence, had agreed to lend Lat- 
timore to General Barmine for a secret Soviet 
project in China, which consisted of shipping to 
China Russian military equipment falsely labeled 
as truck parts for storage in Chinese warehouses 
for later use by the Chinese Communists. x 9 5 

-that it was later decided that Lattimore could not 
be spared for the Chinese project but should be 
kept in his more important position in the Institute 
of Pacific Relations which was being used as a 
"cover shop for Soviet military intelligence work 
in the Pacific area." 196 

Considered Top Member by 
American Communist Party 

(2) "Louis Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker, 
the official publication of the Communist Party, testified 
that Lattimore was considered by the Communist Polit- 
buro in this country as a top functionary of the Commu- 
nist Party. Budenz testified that Jack Stachel told him to 
"consider Owen Lattimore as a Communist." 197 Budenz 
identified Stachel as follows: "Jack Stachel has been for 
years the most important Communist in the U. S. for all- 
around activity. He was one of the small commission of 
five which was in constant touch with Moscow." 198 

"Principal Agent of Stalinism" 

(3) David N. Rowe, professor of Political Science at 
Yale University, a lieutenant colonel in military intelli- 
gence reserve, and consultant to Air Force intelligence, 
has testified under oath that "as of today among Far 
Eastern specialists in the United States, Lattimore is prob- 
ably the principal agent of Stalinism." 199 

American Communist Party Notified of 

Official Party Line Change 

Through Owen Lattimore 

(4) Louis Budenz has further testified that the Amer- 
ican Politburo learned of an important Communist Party 



line change on China in 1943 through Frederick V. Field 
who stated he received those instructions from Lattimore. 
Budenz testified under oath that: 

"Mr. Field just returned from a trip and I get the 
impression that he had talked to Mr. Lattimore per- 
sonally, and Mr. Lattimore stated that information 
coming to him from the international Communist ap- 
paratus where he was located indicated that there 
was to be a change of line very sharply on Chiang 
Kai-shek, that is to say, that the negative opposition 
to Chiang Kai-shek was to change to a positive oppo- 
sition and that more stress was to be put upon attack- 
ing Chiang Kai-shek." 200 

Budenz testified that the Communist Party in this coun- 
try checked the accuracy of this important party line 
change and Moscow confirmed the instructions. 201 

Under Disciplinary Power 
of Communist Party 

(5) Budenz further testified that he received orders 
from Communist Party leaders to treat Lattimore in the 
Daily Worker as a party member under Communist Party 
discipline. 202 After identifying Lattimore as "under Com- 
munist Party discipline," Budenz went on to say: 

"Now in this respect there are Communist Party 
members, those who are smaller people, and out-and- 
out Communists under discipline. 

"These Communists under discipline since 1939 or 
1940, since the Hitler-Stalin Pact, are ordered not 
to have any vestige of membership about them, except 
in exceptional instances where the Politburo decides 
otherwise . . ." 203 

Secret Communist Orders Bore 
Lattimore's Symbol "XL" 

(6) According to sworn testimony before the Ty dings 
Committee, highly secret Communist Party documents, 
including reports to Moscow, often bore Lattimore's Com- 
munist Party identification symbols, which were "L" 
and "XL." 

The testimony was that those reports were written on 
onion-skin paper with orders that they be destroyed after 
reading. People in key or delicate positions were desig- 



*Louis Budenz, Freda Utley, General Alexander Barmine, Igor 
Bogolepov, Newton Steely, Professor Kenneth Colegrove, Dr. Karl 
Wittfogel, Ambassador William Bullitt, Governor Harold Stassen, 
Professor David Rowe, Professor William McGovern, Eugene 
Dooman, Frank Farrell, Harvey Matusow. 



i« McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 31, 1951, p. 201. 

i»s McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 31, 1951, pp. 197-200. 

M« McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 31, 1951, pp. 201-202. 

im McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, pp. 552, 553; 

Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 492. 

Ms McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 555. 

m» McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, March 27, 1952 (now being printed). 

200 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 492; McCarran Com- 
mittee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 529. 

201 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 492; McCarran Com- 
mittee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 529. 

2oa McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, pp. 552, 553. 
203 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 504. 



57 



nated in those reports by special initials or symbols. Lat- 
timore's symbol was "XL" or "L." 204 

Member of Communist Cell in 
Institute of Pacific Relations 

(7) According to testimony before both the McCarran 
and Tydings Committee, Lattimore was a member of a 
Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations. 205 

Recruited Writers to Sell 
Communist Line on China 

(8) Budenz testified under oath that Lattimore "was 
given an assignment by the Politburo" to recruit Com- 
munist writers to sell the American people the Commu- 
nist Party line on China. For seven years, Lattimore was 
editor of Pacific Affairs, a publication of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations which constantly plugged the official 
Communist line on the Far East. 

On this point, part of Budenz' testimony was as follows : 

"At that time [1937] it was stressed by Earl Brow- 
der specifically as leader of the party, that Lattimore 
was performing a very great service for the party in 
Pacific Affairs by more and more bringing in Com- 
munist authors. Browder said: 'We appreciate that 
every writer for Pacific Affairs can't be a Commu- 
nist,' that, however, the number must be increased 
and that Lattimore had shown a willingness and 
readiness to do so . . . so the emphasis on Lattimore 
was that he was getting more and more Commu- 
nists." 206 

Used Soviet Diplomatic Pouch 

(9) Lattimore admitted under oath that he used the 
Soviet diplomatic pouch to send material to Moscow. 207 

Communist Spy Under Sentence of Death 
Sends Secret Message 

(10) W. Rudolf Foerster, who is now living in Switzer- 
land, went to Moscow in 1928 where he was employed 
by the Soviet Heavy Industry Commissariat as an engi- 
neer. From there he went to Japan in 1932 where he 
became close friends with Max Klausen and Richard 
Sorge. Sorge headed the then-secret but now famous 
Sorge Communist Spy Ring. He was convicted by the 
Japanese as a Communist spy and was hanged. Klausen 
was also convicted and given a long prison sentence. The 
State Department ordered his release when our forces 
occupied Japan. Klausen immediately disappeared. 

Foerster gave a sworn affidavit that his wife, who was 
returning to the United States from Japan, delivered a 
letter from Sorge to Owen Lattimore and that the reason 
for this method of delivery was that Sorge was afraid 
to send the letter through the mail. The affidavit states 
that when Foerster asked Sorge the purpose of the letter, 
Sorge got excited and begged him not to inform the 
Japanese police about the letter because it would "en- 
danger my comrade." 208 

Edited "Amerasia" 

(11) Lattimore was a member of the editorial board 
of the magazine, Amerasia, from 1937 to 1941. 



FBI and OSS agents raided the Amerasia office^ in 1945 
and found 1,700 top secret and other classified govern- 
ment papers. Those documents had been stolen from the 
Department of State and other government agencies, in- 
cluding the Army, Navy, OSS, and OWL Six people were 
arrested in connection with the notorious Amerasia case, 
including State Department officials John Stewart Service 
and Emmanuel Larsen. Larsen pleaded guilty and was al- 
lowed to resign from the State Department. Service was 
cleared but later ordered discharged by the Loyalty Re- 
view Board. 

Declassified "Secret Documents" 

(12) A few days before the arrest of John S. Service 
and Andrew Roth in the Amerasia spy case, which in- 
volved the theft of hundreds of secret State Department 
documents, both men were at Lattimore's home. Accord- 
ing to affidavits made by other guests who were at the 
Lattimore home at the same time, they were working 
over papers which Lattimore first claimed had to do with 
a book that Roth was writing. The affidavits state that. 
when Lattimore was later questioned about this after the 
arrest of Service and Roth, he then claimed that they 
had been "declassifying documents — a common Washing- 
ton practice." Neither Lattimore, Roth, nor Service had 
any authority to declassify or pass out secret government 
documents. 2 ° 9 

Louis Budenz has testified that the Communist Party 
was greatly concerned over the Amerasia arrests and 
called on Lattimore for assistance in the matter. Accord- 
ing to Budenz: 

". . . in the Amerasia case in 1945 there were 
many hurried meetings in the Politburo and in that 
connection Lattimore's name was mentioned several 
times; that is, that he should be appealed to for help, 
and, finally, Jack Stachel did report that Lattimore 
had been of considerable assistance in the Amerasia 
case." 210 

Wife Lectured at Communist Labor School 

(13) Lattimore admitted under oath that his wife had 
lectured in the Tom Mooney Labor School in San Fran- 
cisco. 211 The Tom Mooney Labor School has been cited 
as completely dominated by the Communist Party. It is 
recognized as the Communist Party school at which only 
Communist Party functionaries normally act as lecturers 
and instructors. 212 

Sold Property to Communist 
Without Down Payment 

(14) The files of the Recorder of Deeds, Bethel, Ver- 
mont, show that in the summer of 1949 Lattimore bought 
an undivided half -interest in a home near Bethel, Ver- 
mont. Other property owners in that general area include 



so* Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 19S0, p. 495; McCarran Com- 
mittee Hearings on IPE, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 522. 
zo5 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 491. 
«w McCarran Committee Hearings on IPE, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, pp. 550, 551; 
Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 20, 1950, p. 491. 

207 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1950, p. 883. 
206 Congressional Record (Unbound) , August 1, 1950, p. 11620. 

208 Affidavits summarized in Congressional Record (Unbound), March 30, 1950, 
p. 4440. 

210 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1961, p. 555. 

zii Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 3, 1950, p. 882. 

212 Calitornia Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1947, pp. 63, 77-TO. 



58 



John Abt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, and Marian Bach- 
rach — all of whom have been named under oath as Com- 
munists or as members of a Communist spy ring. Latti- 
more's co-owner was Vilhjalmur Stefansson, a man who 
has belonged to a vast number of organizations which 
have been listed by the Attorney General as fronts for 
and doing the work of the Communist Party. 

Very recently Lattimore sold his half of the property 
to Ordway Southard, once a candidate on the Communist 
Party ticket for Governor of Alabama, and Mary South- 
ard, who had run for the State Senate in Alabama on 
the Communist Party ticket and who also wrote for the 
Daily. Worker. 

Lattimore stated, however, that he never met the South- 
ards who bought his half of the property from him. The 
town records show that the buyers made no down pay- 
ment but gave a mortgage for the full amount. This creates 
the unusual situation of Lattimore's selling his half of 
the property to two people who had been well known as 
Communists whom he "had never met" and allowing 
tbem to take possession of the property without making 
even a $1.00 down payment. 213 

When questioned about this transaction by the McCar- 
ran committee, Lattimore stated: 

"I did not sell the property. My wife and I empow- 
ered Mr. Stefansson to sell it on our behalf."- 14 

Later, when confronted with a notary public's certifica- 
tion that Owen Lattimore and Eleanor Lattimore had 
signed the deed and swore to their signatures before the 
notary, Lattimore admitted that he personally had signed 
the deed. The testimony on this follows: 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "Let me read it [the 
notary public's certification] to you . . . 

" 'Personally appeared and acknowledged this in- 
strument [the deed to Communist candidate South- 
ard] by them sealed and subscribed to be their own 
free act and deed.' 

"Did you or did you not do that?" 

LATTIMORE: "Evidently I did." 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "Do you want to put in 
the word 'evidently?' " 

LATTIMORE: "All right, I did." 21 5 

Lectured Troops in Communist China 

(15) Lattimore, in his testimony, admitted that he 
toured and lived at Communist headquarters at Yenan, 
Chinese Communist military stronghold, at a time when 
only "friendly" visitors were allowed through the lines. 
Traveling with Lattimore were Philip Jaffe and T. A. 
Bisson, both of whom have been identified in testimony 
before the McCarran committee as important Communist 
Party members. Lattimore testified before the McCarran 
Committee that he had personally made the arrangements 
with Communist headquarters for the visit to Yenan. 216 

In describing this visit to Yenan in the pages of the 
Communist Party's magazine, New Masses, Jaffe wrote: 
"Our visit to Yenan was climaxed by a huge mass meet- 
ing addressed by Chu Teh, Lattimore, and myself ..." 
Chu Teh was and is Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese 
Communist armies. 

In his testimony before the Tydings committee, Latti- 



more grudgingly admitted he had addressed this Com- 
munist mass meeting, describing his speech by the phrase 
"partial address." 217 

At Yenan the party was joined by Agnes Smedley who 
was exposed by General MacArthur's Intelligence Head- 
quarters as a Communist spy and who has been described 
as Russia's most valuable agent in China. Smedley re- 
cently died and left her estate to the Communist leader, 
Chu Teh. 

After the Lattimore party left Yenan, Smedley wrote 
Lattimore as follows: 

"I want to tell you that you left behind remarkable 
friends. I did not realize the effect of the meeting 
until 2 or 3 days had passed. Then it began to roll in 
. . . The meeting and your speech in particular has 
had a colossal effect upon all the people . . . There 
has never been anything like this here* before." 217 " A 

Incidentally, the Tydings committee found that Latti- 
more "never knowingly associated with Communists." 218 

Wanted to Retain an Important OWI Employee 
"Even if He is a Communist" 

(16) When Lattimore was head of the Pacific Division 
of the Office of War Information, he wrote a letter on 
June 15, 1943, to Joseph Barnes, then head of the New 
York division of the Office of War Information and 
warned Barnes to keep the letter "strictly secret." Barnes 
has been named under oath as a Communist agent. 219 

In this letter, Lattimore advised Barnes to get rid of 
all 'Chinese in the Office of War Information except a Dr. 
Chi and a Mr. Chew Hong, and to recruit a new force 
of Chinese from the New China Daily News. 

At the time I made this letter public, I pointed out that 
this meant Lattimore was directing Barnes to staff the 
Chinese Office of OWI with Chinese Communists or those 
sympathetic to the Communist cause. 

After both the State Department and Lattimore denied 
this, I put into the Congressional Record the secret loyalty 
files on Chi and Chew Hong, which show that the Loyalty 
Board considered Hong to be a Communist and Chi to 
be at least a Communist fellow traveler, if not an actual 
Communist. The files showed that the Loyalty Board had 
rated Hong ineligible for government employment because 
of his membership in the Communist Party and that the 
ineligible rating was cancelled only because of Lattimore's 
strong insistence. 

Those Loyalty files also showed that the New China 
Daily News was an official Communist paper and that 
any people recruited for the OWI from that paper would 
obviously be members of the Communist Party. 

The files further show that Lattimore was advised of 
the fact that Hong was a Communist but that nevertheless 
Lattimore stated he wanted to keep him on "even if he 
were a Communist." 220 

Following are some excerpts from those Loyalty files: 

sis Washington Times Herald, Aug. 3, 1950. 

214 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, March 10, 1952 (now being printed). 

215 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, March 10, 1952 (now being printed). 
2!0 McCarran Committee Hearings on IFR. March 21, 1952, (now being printed). 
2" Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 2, 1950, p. 870. 

217A New Masses, Oct. 12. 1937, inserted in record of McCarran Committee 

Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2. Aug. 23, 1951, p. 658. 

218 Tydings Committee Report, p. 73. 

210 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 31, 1951, p. 200. 

22 o Congressional Record (Unbound), June 2, 1950, pp. 8104-8108. 



59 



"China Daily News — The testimony is to the gen- 
eral effect that the China Daily News is a publica- 
tion by and for Chinese Communists. It is described 
by some individuals as the Chinese equivalent of 
the Daily Worker. 

". . . the OWI representatives were also informed 
of the unfavorable information secured regarding 
Dr. Chi and his son, which included testimony to the 
effect that the young Dr. Chi is or was, until recently, 
a Communist and that he at one time was a delegate. 
to the Third Internationale in Moscow and to the 
effect that the elder Dr. Chi was removed from his 
position as Commissioner of Education in the Shansi 
Province because of Communist activities . . . 

"On the one hand it can be argued that since we 
are reasonably convinced that Hong is pro-Commu- 
nist, it is our responsibility to require his removal 
notwithstanding Mr. Lattimore's representations. On 
the other hand the Commission could, if it wished, 
take the position that since Mr. Lattimore has as- 
sumed responsibility, the Commission can afford to 
permit Hong's retention in the service. If the Com- 
mission takes the latter position it will be tantamount 
to saying that although we believe the individual is 
a Communist, we will be willing to rate him eligible 
provided the employing agency is willing to assume 
the responsibility. I doubt that the Commission can 
afford to avoid the issue in this manner. If we believe 
Hong is a Communist then we should rate him in- 
eligible ... 

"It is concluded that the activities, affiliations^ and 
associations of Hong, as shown by the Commission's 
investigation, are Communistic. A finding of ineligi- 
bility is considered necessary in this case . . . 

"In view of the testimony obtained during the sub- 
sequent investigation of Mr. Hong in San Francisco 
and the evidence secured in the investigation of Dr. 
Chi regarding Communist activities on the part of 
him and his son, I can see no reason why the Com- 
mission should disturb its previous rating of ineligi- 
bility in Mr. Hong's case. 

"During my interview with Mr. Marsh, Mr. Latti- 
more and Admiral McCullough, the evidence secured 
during investigation of Mr. Hong was discussed and 
they were advised fully regarding the substance of 
the derogatory information." 

The Loyalty files quote Lattimore as having said: 

"I know there is a law preventing the hiring of 
Communists. Personally and frankly I would not be 
too worried if an individual Communist were in 
Hong's position." 221 

The Loyalty files also quoted the following from a 
letter which Lattimore wrote to Joseph Barnes, former 
foreign editor of the New York Herald Tribune, who was 
then in the OWI and who has been named under oath 
by four witnesses as a member of the Communist Party. 
Lattimore was discussing the two Chinese named in the 
above Loyalty files. His letter, as quoted by the Loyalty 
Board, stated: 

"I urge you not to be high-pressured into getting 

rid of either man." 

In his letter to Barnes urging that a new force of 
Chinese be recruited for OWI from the New China Daily 
News, Lattimore described this newspaper as "unaffili- 
ated." He has denied my statement that since the New 



China Daily News was a Communist paper any people 
recruited from it, as he recommended, would necessarily 
be Communist. While the Loyalty files referred to above 
thoroughly established the fact that this newspaper was 
an official Communist paper, a recent development cast 
even more light on this subject. 

On April 28, 1952, the president and the former man- 
aging editor of the New China Daily News were named 
by a Federal Grand Jury in a 53-count indictment as 
part of an "international racket entailing murder, ex- 
tortion, torture and in general, commerce in human mis- 
ery ... a racket which is designed to further the aims 
of the Chinese Communist government." The Assistant 
United States Attorney stated that part of the scheme 
carried on by the New China Daily News was the printing 
of "editorials and news releases that urged American 
Chinese to send money in support ef Mao Tse tung, head 
of the Red China government." 222 

Advised IPR to Back the Chinese Communists 
and Russia's International Policy 

(17) For many years Lattimore was active in the In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations which has exerted a powerful 
influence on State Department policy, according to evi- 
dence uncovered by the Senate Internal Security Sub- 
committee. Several years ago the IPR was cited as a 
Communist front. 223 

Senator McCarran in U. S. News of November 16, 1951, 
had this to say about the IPR: 

"The IPR originally was an organization with 
laudable motives. It was taken over by Communist 
design and made a vehicle for attempted control and 
conditioning of American thinking and American 
policy with regard to the Far East. It was also used 
for espionage purposes to collect and channel infor- 
mation of interest or value to the Russian Commu- 
nists." 

This year the McCarran committee began its investiga- 
tion of the Institute of Pacific Relations and took posses- 
sion of a vast number of Institute of Pacific Relations 
files which were hidden in a barn near Lee, Massachusetts. 
By carefully sifting those -files and calling before them a 
large number of witnesses, the McCarran committee pro- 
duced a mass of evidence about the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. That evidence was to the following effect: 

1. That it was Communist-dominated. 22i 

2. That it served as an "umbrella for Communist 
operations" and as "a covershop for [Russian] 
military intelligence." 225 

3. That the real leaders of IPR were Owen Lattimore, 
Philip Jessup, E. C. Carter, 226 and Frederick V. 
Field. 

4. That it strongly influenced the United States Far 
Eastern policy. 227 

221 Congressional Record (Unbound), June 2, 1950, pp. 8101-8108. 

222 New York Times, April 29, 1952. „,,»,.« w.nnvt 

223 California State Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities Report, 

S*McCarr 8 an Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 31, 1951, pp. 202, 203, 205, 

208- Aug. 22, 1951, pp. 517, 518; Aug. 14, 1951, p. 412. 

225 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 31, 1951, PP. 202-204; 

Si'McCar g ran 3 bommittefHearings on IPR, Pt. 4, September 26, 1951, P. 1003 and 
March 27, 1952 (now being printed). ' . 

22T McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 517, Aug. 23. 
1951, P. 593; Sept. 25, 1951, Pt. 3, PP. 920-924. 



60 



Following are excerpts from a letter which Lattimore 
wrote E. C. Carter, head of IPR, on July 10, 1938: 

". . . I think that you are pretty cagey in turning 
over so much of the China section of the enquiry to 
Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi.* They will bring out 
the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be 
depended on to do it with the right touch . . ." 

"For the general purposes of this enquiry, it seems 
to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, 
differs with different countries. For China, my hunch 
is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese 
Communist position — far enough not to he covered 
by the same label — but enough ahead of the active 
Chinese liberals to be noticeable . . . For the USSR — 
back their international policy in general, but with- 
out using their slogans . . ." (Emphasis mine.) 228 

While Lattimore swears that he was never a Communist, 
it would perhaps be impossible to find any member of 
the Communist Party, including Stalin, who would differ 
one iota from Lattimore's recommendations contained in 
the foregoing letter. 

Conference with Russian Ambassador 

(18) Documentary evidence presented to the McCar- 
ran committee showed that before leaving for China, 
Lattimore spent an "illuminating two hours" with Rus- 
sian Ambassador Oumansky on June 18, 1941. At the 
time of this conversation, Russia was allied with Ger- 
many in a non-aggression pact, known at the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact. 229 

Disrupted Peace Talks with Japan 
12 Days Before Pearl Harbor 

(19) Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Japanese repre- 
sentatives were attempting to work out a modus vivendi 
which would stave off war. At that time, Lattimore was in 
China, having been sent there by President Roosevelt as 
advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. 

On November 25, 1941, twelve days before Japanese 
bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, Lattimore sent an urgent 
cable to the White House advising against peace with 
Japan. 230 

The Pearl Harbor hearings and the testimony before 
the McCarran committee show that Lattimore, with the 
aid of Lauchlin Currie, an administrative assistant to the 
President, and Harry Dexter White, a top official in the 
Treasury Department (both of whom have been named 
under oath as having aided a Communist spy ring), 
worked frantically to prevent a peaceful settlement be- 
tween the Japanese and the United States. 231 

Keep in mind that at this particular time, 1941, Com- 
munist Russia was extremely eager to have the United 
States come into the war and destroy Japan, which had 
long been a bulwark against Communism in Asia. The offi- 
cial Communist Party line at that time was to give all-out 
support to Chiang Kai-shek in his fight against Japan. It 
was obviously in the interest of Communist Russia for 
the war between anti-Communist . China and anti-Com- 
munist Japan to continue. At the Comintern meetings it 
had been decided that first priority be given to the de- 



struction of the highly industrialized Japanese empire 
which stood in the way of Communist conquest of China. 
The next step after the destruction of Japan would be to 
turn upon Chiang and communize China. 

Advised Ambassador Jessup, in Line with Official 
Party Line, on Far Eastern Mission 

(20) At the request of Dean Acheson, Lattimore sub- 
mitted a secret memorandum in August, 1949, entitled 
"For the Guidance of Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jes- 
sup." This was prepared for Jessup prior to his departure 
on a special mission to the Far East to study its problems 
and work out a State Department policy for Asia and the 
Pacific. 

Lattimore's recommendations in his memorandum for 
Ambassador Jessup's "guidance" are identical in all 
major aspects to the officially adopted program of the 
Communist Party insofar as Asia is concerned. For ex- 
ample, he recommends: 

1. that the United States withdraw all support from 
Korea; 

2. that we give no support whatsoever to the anti- 
Communist forces on Formosa; 

3. that we refuse to support any league of Asiatic 
countries against Communism; 

4. that the United States "accept a list of countries 
recommended for admission to the United Na- 
tions by Trygve Lie," (Trygve Lie had recom- 
mended that Communist China be admitted to 
the UN) ; and 

5. that the United States withdraw its forces from 
Japan. 232 

When I first revealed the fact that Lattimore had been 
called upon for this secret memorandum, Acheson called 
a press conference and denied the existence of such a 
memorandum. I then notified the State Department that 
if they did not make the document public, I would. With- 
in hours, Lattimore's advice to Ambassador Jessup was 
"found" by the State Department and made public. 

Dominated State Department Conference 

(21) Harold Stassen, former Governor of Minnesota, 
testified before the McCarran committee that he attended 
a State Department conference in October, 1949, which 
Lattimore also attended. General George C. Marshall and 
other members of the Board of the IPR were also there. 
The meeting was called for the purpose of determining a 
foreign policy for Asia and for advising Ambassador 
Jessup on a policy before he left for his tour of the Far 
East. Ambassador Jessup presided at the meeting. 

Stassen testified under oath (1) that Owen Lattimore 
consistently argued for the adoption of a ten-point pro- 
gram on Asia which followed the official Communist line; 
(2) that the group led by Lattimore dominated the meet- 
ing; and (3) that Ambassador Jessup, for whose benefit 

* These men have been repeatedly named under oath as Commu- 
nists and are publicly recognized as members of the Communist 
Party. 



22s McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 22, 1951, p. 525. 

229 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 26, 1951, p. 150. 

230 pearl Harbor Hearings, Dec. 1945, p. 1160. 

231 Washington Times-Herald, November 26, 1951, p. 1. 

232 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 6, 1950, pp. 459-462. 



61 









"Wl*** 



this meeting \vas called, told him he agreed with Latti- 
more's ideas because they "were the greater logic." 233 

Toasted by Communist Leader As 
"Responsible for Future of China" 

(22) In 1944 Lattimore and John Carter Vincent 
(named by a government witness under oath as a Com- 
munist), upon the recommendation of Lauchlin Currie 
(named under oath as a member of a Communist spy 
ring), accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on a 
tour of China. Upon his return Wallace wrote a book 
entitled, Soviet Asia Mission. 

In the book, Wallace states that while he and Lattimore 
were travelling through China, Sergei Godlize, a high 
Soviet official — President of the Executive Committee of 
Siberian territory— and an intimate friend of Stalin, 
toasted Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent at a 
dinner as the men "on whom rests great responsibility for 
China's future." 234 

"Let Them Fall But Do Not Let It 
Look As Though We Pushed Them" 

(23) On July 17, 1949, shortly before Lattimore pre- 
pared his secret advice (August, 1949) to Jessup, he 
wrote an article in the Sunday Compass, a left-wing New 
York publication, in which he stated, referring to the 
Marshall Mission: 

"The problem was how to allow them [China] to 
fall without making it look as if the United States 
had pushed them." 

In the same article, Lattimore suggests that what had 
been done in China should now be done in Korea also. 
This was before the Korean war. He stated: 

"The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea 
fall — but not to let it look as though we pushed it. 
Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of 
$150 million." (Economic aid.) 

In this connection, it should be noted that nearly a 
year before the Korean war started, Congress voted 
$10,300,000 military aid for South Korea. This was not 
done upon the recommendation of the State Department. 
The Congress was entitled to believe that this 110,300,000 
was being spent rapidly for airplanes, tanks and guns for 
South Korea. However, whenever a member of Congress ' 
asked the State and Defense Departments how the $10,- 
300,000 was being spent, the answer was, "We cannot 
tell you for security reasons." 

After the war in Korea began, Senator Knowland put 
into the Congressional Record the facts which showed 
that the State Department had succeeded in keeping the 
expenditures for the arming of South Korea down to 
$200, which was spent for loading some wire aboard a 
West Coast ship which never reached Korea. 235 

Thus did the State Department plan to "let South Korea 
fall" into the Communist hands without letting the Con- 
gress or the American people know that "we pushed it." 

Writings Follow Communist Line 



oughly identify him. The following excerpts from his 
writings give some idea of the extent to which he followed 
the Communist Party line. More complete documenta- 
tion of his writings is contained in my speech reported in 
the Congressional Record of March 30, 1950. 

The general line of Communistic propaganda put across 
by Lattimore in his writings is clearly shown by the fol- 
lowing blurb in his book, Solution in Asia. 

This is what the editor says about the book: 

"He shows that all the Asiatic people are more 
interested in actual democratic practices such as the 
ones they can see in action across the Russian border, 
than they are in the fine theories of Anglo-Saxon 
democracies which come coupled with ruthless im- 
perialism ... He inclines to support American news- 
papermen who report that the only real democracy 
in China is found in Communist areas." 

Lattimore's admiration for Russian "democracy" is 
characterized by the following passage in the same book: 

"To all of these peoples the Russians and the Soviet"'" 
Union have a great power of attraction. In their eyes 
—rather doubtfully in the eyes of the older genera- 
tion, more and more clearly in the eyes of the 
younger generation— the • Soviet Union stands for 
strategic security, economic prosperity, technologi- 
cal progress, miraculous medicine, free education, 
equality of opportunity, and democracy— a powerful 
combination." 238 

In another book, Lattimore writes: 

"Throughout Asia today there prevails an atmos- 
phere of hope, not of despair. There is not a single 
country in Asia in which people feel that we are 
entering on an age of chaos. What they see opening 
out before them is a limitless horizon of hope — the 
hope of peaceful constructive activity in free countries 
and peaceful cooperation among free peoples." 237 

The Communist New Masses on May 8, 1945, had this 
to say about one of Lattimore's books: 

"Solution in Asia is a must book not only for our 
San Francisco delegates but for every one of us." 

Lattimore Book "Required Reading" 
At Official Communist School 

(25) According to sworn testimony given to the Mc- 
Carran Committee by Harvey Matusow, an undercover 
FBI agent, Lattimore's book Solution in Asia was recom- 
mended by the New York State Educational Department 
of the Communist Party to all Communist Party members. 

Matusow, a former member of the Communist Party, 
worked in three Communist Party bookstores. He testi- 
fied that Lattimore's book and four others "were basically 
the books that the Party stated carried out Party line on 
China." 

Matusow further testified that Lattimore's Solution in 
Asia was required reading for students at the Jefferson 
School of Social' Science, a school run by the Communist 



(24) Lattimore's writings, coupled with his acts, thor- 



2S3 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 4, Oct. 1, 1951, pp. 1035-1074 

Oct. 6, 1951, pp. 1111-1138, Pt. 5, Oct. 12, 1951, pp. 1251-1277. 

2ai Henry Wallace, Soviet Asia Mission, p. 172. 

2*s Congressional Record (Bound), Aug. 16, 1950, p. 12600. 

2W Owen Lattimore, Solution In Asia, (Little, Brown & Co., 1945), p. 139 

23' Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, p. 238. 



62 



Party in New York City for the purpose of teaching 
Marxism and Leninism. 238 

It should perhaps be noted in passing that the Com- 
munist newspaper, The People's Daily World, which is 
the Daily Worker of the West Coast, ran an advertise- 
ment on June 8, 1945, urging their Communist readers 
to buy the books of Owen Lattimore, Communist Fred- 
erick Vanderbilt Field (who recently served a prison 
term in connection with the Communist trials in New 
York), and Communist William Z. Foster (convicted for- 
mer head of the American Communist Party), 

The books of these three individuals were being fea- 
tured by the International Book Store in San Francisco 
which has been officially cited by the California Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities as "the Communist 
Party book center in the Bay area for the distribution 
of its literature." 2 ^® 

Incidentally, when President Truman announced the 
surrender of Japan in 1945, according to newstories only 
t^o books appeared on the President's desk — one was 
Lattimore's Solution in Asia. 

Lattimore's writing can perhaps be best summed up in 
the words of Freda Utley, well-known anti-Communist 
writer and lecturer who was formerly a member of the 
British Communist Party: 

"Soviet Russia, in all of Lattimore's writings, is 
always sinned against and is always represented by 
Lattimore as standing like a beacon of hope for the 
peoples of Asia, even when she is collaborating with 
the Nazis or aggressing on her own account. Russia 
is never in the wrong and if he is forced to take 
cognizance of a few slight misdemeanors on her part, 
he excuses them as only a reaction to American im- 
perialism or some other country's misdeeds." 240 

Favorably Reviews 
Party Line Writings 

(26) The Communist cause benefited greatly by Lat- 
timore's book reviews for the New York Times and the 
New York Herald Tribune, in which he consistently en- 
dorsed and praised such books on China as those of 
Edgar Snow, Israel Epstein, Gunther Stein, and Laurence 
Rosinger.* Those books which received Lattimore's praise 
gave the Communist line on China, including the idea 
that the Chinese Communists represented the party of 
land reform, free and improved education, better sani- 
tary conditions, and agrarian reform. In turn, of course, 
pro-Communists reviewed Lattimore's books in glowing 
terms. 2 4 2 

Part of Lattimore's New York Times review of Israel 
Epstein's book The Unfinished Revolution in China, fol- 
lows: 

"In the last ten years, American writers have taken 
the lead over all others in raising the level of descrip- 
tion and analysis in writing about China. From Edgar 
Snow's Red Star Over China to Theodore White and 
Annalee Jacoby's Thunder Out of China, the list of 
names is distinguished — and most of these writers 
won their distinction solely or primarily by what 
they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has with- 
out question established a place for himself in that 



distinguished company ... It is noteworthy that the 
recent and current trend of good books about China, 
well-documented and well-written, has been well to 
the left of center . . ." 24 3 

Following is some recent sworn testimony on Latti- 
more given to the McCarran Committee. 

Lattimore's Character Witness Refuses To 

Answer Whether He Was Member of Communist 

Party On Day He Defended Lattimore 

Daniel Thorner, Assistant Professor of Economic His- 
tory, University of Pennsylvania, testified on March 25, 
1952, as follows: 

MR. MORRIS: "Mr. Thorner, did you hold a fel- 
lowship at the Walter Hines Page School at Johns 
Hopkins University?" 

MR. THORNER: "I did, Mr. Morris, in the year 
1947-48." 

MR. MORRIS: "Who arranged for you to have 
that fellowship at Walter Hines Page School?" 

MR. THORNER: "Mr. Owen Lattimore invited me 
to accept an appointment as a Page School fel- 
low . . ." 

MR. MORRIS: "Mr. Thorner, were you a contrib- 
utor or a Co-Author with Owen Lattimore to Pivot 
in Asia?" 

MR. THORNER: "Yes . . ." 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "Who asked you to help 
on that volume?" 

MR. THORNER: "Mr. Lattimore asked me . . ." 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "At the time that you 
wrote that, I ask you the question as to whether or 
not you were a member of the Communist Party?" 

MR. THORNER: "I must respectfully decline, 
Senator, on the grounds of the First and Fifth 
Amendments and all other Constitutional rights and 
privileges [on the grounds of self-incrimination] 

MR. MORRIS: "Mr. Thorner, several years ago, 
Owen Lattimore appeared before the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee." 

MR. THORNER: "Yes, sir." 

MR. MORRIS: "Do you know whether or not he 
sent in your name as a person who wrote in a letter 
on his behalf, expressing respect and admiration for 
his writings at that time?" 

MR.. THORNER: ". . . I wrote Mr. Lattimore a let- 
ter at that time expressing my support of him . . ." 

MR. MORRIS: "At that time, were you a member 
of the Communist Party, Mr. Thorner?" 

MR. THORNER: "I must respectfully decline to 
answer that question [on the grounds of self-incrimi- 
nation]." 244 



* All four named under oath by government witnesses as Com- 
munists. 

£38 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, March 13, 1952 (now being printed). 

239 California Committee on Un-American Activities Report, 1S47, p. 100. 

«*> Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, May 1, 1950, p. 146. 

242 See Speech of Senator Owen Brewster, Congressional Record, June 5, 1951, 

p. 6301. 

£M New York Times, June 22, 1947. 

244 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, March 25, 1952 (now being printed). 



63 



IPR "Double-Way Track" to Russia 



SENATOR EASTLAND: "Litvinoff said 'Latti- 



Igor Bogolepov, former Red Army officer, testified on 
April 7, 1952, before the McCarran Committee on Lat- 
timore's record. Bogolepov, a graduate of Russia's Uni- 
versity of Petrograd, has held a variety of positions in 
the Red Army and in the Russian government. He testified 
as follows about the Institute of Pacific Relations, which 
according to the evidence was dominated by Jessup, Field, 
Carter, and Lattimore: 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "I got the impression from 
talks with my comrades working in the Soviet In- 
stitute of Pacific Relations, in the foreign office, that 
they considered this institute as a very valuable or- 
ganization from two points of view. As one of my 
former comrades expressed it, it is like a double- 
way track. On one line you got information from 
America through this Institute. On the other hand, 
you send information, which you would like to im- 
plant in American brains through the same channel 
of the Institute." , . 

THE CHAIRMAN: "What was the double-way 
track that you refer to?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "I mean two channels. One 
was the ingoing channel, the second outgoing chan- 
nel." 

THE CHAIRMAN: "What was that?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "The ingoing channel was 
military intelligence. We extracted military informa- 
tion." 

MR. MORRIS: "When you talk about two-way 
track, do you mean that military intelligence was 
extracted from outside the Soviet Union through the 
medium of the Institute of Pacific Relations?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "That is right." 

MR. MORRIS: "And on the other hand, by the 
outway track you mean information that you wanted 
to impart to the outside world was transmitted 
through that medium?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Yes." 

Lattimore Selected for Important Job 
By Litvinoff, Former Russian Ambassador 

On page 7534 of the transcript of the Hearings, Bogole- 
pov first discusses a conversation held between himself 
and Litvinoff, one-time Russian Ambassador to the United 
States, about the necessity of propagandizing the Amer- 
ican people along certain lines. Bogolepov first explains 
that he and Litvinoff decided they had to pick a man 
who could "mobilize public sentiment in the West." His 
testimony thereafter follows: 

SENATOR EASTLAND: "Who was that man who 
was decided upon?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Litvinoff asked the officer of 
Mongolian Desk of the Foreign Office, who was 
present — " 

MR. MORRIS: "What was his name?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Parnoch, P-a-r-n-o-c-h— 
whom he would recommend, and before Parnoch 
could give his answer he asked 'Lattimore, per- 
haps?' " 



MR. BOGOLEPOV: '"Lattimore, perhaps,' yes. 
And Parnoch answered, 'Yes, we will try to do 
that.' " 

MR. MORRIS: "Was there a formal decision made 
by that body?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "There was a formal decision 
which was obliging for the corresponding bodies of 
the Soviet foreign group to take measures in order 
to fulfill the decision." 

Bogolepov, the former Russian Red Army officer, tes 
fied as follows about Frederick Schuman, a universi 
professor and part-time State Department lecturer who 
case I gave to the Tydings Committee: 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "Do you know of any 
other example of an American coming to Russia and 
getting materials and coming back and its being 
published?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: ". . . Frederick Schuman 
[who wrote], 'Soviet Politics Abroad and at Home.' " 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "What did he write 
on?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "He wrote a book which in 
my opinion is full of nonsense." 

MR. FERGUSON: "Outside of its being non- 
sense, what was it on?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "It was very important non- 
sense because if you learned the wrong things about 
the Soviet Union, your thoughts are also wrong. 
That was the idea, to sell nonsense to the foreign 
newspapers." 

SENATOR WATKINS: "Can you give us an ex- 
ample?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Yes." 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "Give us an example of 
what was in the book." 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "All right, for example, the 
book by Frederick Schuman stated that' the un- 
friendly attitude of the Soviet Union toward the 
Western world was not caused by Communist doc- 
trine or any other consideration on the part of the 
Soviet leaders themselves, but it was caused by West- 
ern intervention during the civil war [in Russia]. 
Mr. Schuman lets the American readers of his book 
believe that it is only because the American, Japa- 
nese, French and English people made their so-called 
intervention on the side of the Russian national 
against the Communist that the Communist Soviet 
Union is now reluctant to have good relations with 
.the British. If you compare Schuman's book with 
the corresponding page of the official History of the 
Communist Party of Soviet Union you will very eas- 
ily recognize that they say the same things. Freder- 
ick Schuman got his ideas from the Soviet propa- 
ganda." 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "Do you know of any 
others?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "I recall Mr. Joseph Davies 
[Father-in-law and law partner of former Senator 
Tydings], the former American Ambassador to Mos- 



64 



cow; Mr. Davies was in very good relations to For- 
eign Commissar LitvinofE, in such good relations — " 

THE CHAIRMAN: "Joseph Davies?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Davies!— in such good rela- 
tions that some of the instructions which this Ameri- 
can Ambassador received from the State Depart- 
ment — " 

SENATOR FERGUSON: "You mean the Ameri- 
can State Department?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "That is right— along confix 
dential lines were simply read by the American Am- 
bassador to Foreign Commissar Litvinoff. He re- 
ceived a cable from Washington. He came to the 
office of Litvinoff and he consulted Litvinoff on what 
to do with this cable." 

On page 7528 of the hearings Bogolepov testified: 

MR.. BOGOLEPOV: "As I told you, besides my 
work for the foreign office, I was also a member of 
the Institute [IPR], a research worker, and I used 
to work two or three times a week in the library 
of this institute. In this library, by the way, worked 
also Mrs. Freda Utley, which name I remember 
having seen during your investigations. And when 
I was working in this library one of these mornings, 
a group of people entered the room, the library 
headed by Eugene Varga, who was director of the 
Institute." 

THE CHAIRMAN: "How do you spell that?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Varga, V-a-r-g-a. Eugene 
Varga. There were in this group of people some of 
them which were known to me and some which were 
unknown to me. Among the people known to me, I 
remember Mr. Abramson, Mr. Kantorovich, and Mr. 
Kara-Murza." 

MR. MORRIS: "Let me ask you to pause there. 
Varga was a Comintern man?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Varga was a member of the 
Executive Committee of the Comintern, the highest 
body." 

MR. MORRIS: "What was Kara-Murza?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Kara-Murza was intelligence 
officer in charge of Mongolian Relations." 

MR. MORRIS: "Abramson?" 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Abramson, as I told you, 
was a member of the Pacific group of this Institute, 
and at the same time also intelligence officer." 

MR. MORRIS: "And then you say among them 
was Owen Lattimore? . . ." 

MR. BOGOLEPOV: "Was two or more foreigners, 
and among them was Mr. Lattimore." 

Bogolepov then goes on to describe how the three above 
named Russian Communists discussed with Lattimore the 
Communist aims in Mongolia, including the job they 
were doing of "purging the Mongolian population from 
the parasitic class of clergymen." According to Bogolepov 
they also pointed out on a map the road followed by the 
Russians through Mongolia to Manchuria. Bogolepov 
tells how, after Lattimore and the others left, he asked 
Kara-Murza, the above-mentioned Communist intelligence 
officer, to remain and suggested that he spoke too freely 



before foreign visitors and was assured that it was "quite 
all right" to discuss such secret matters before them. 245 

In what official capacity has Lattimore represented 
the United States Government? 

V. S. Aide to Chiang Kai-shek 

(1) In 1941 Lattimore was appointed by the Presi- 
dent as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek in China. 246 
As previously pointed out, the official Communist position 
at that time was to aid Chiang because, while Chiang was 
an enemy of Communism at that time, he was fighting 
Japan who was a more powerful enemy to world Com- 
munism than China. 

Pacific Head of OWl 

(2) From 1942 to 1945, Lattimore was first deputy 
director of Pacific Operations of the Office of War In- 
formation and then a consultant to the OWL 247 

Member of Japanese Reparations Mission 

(3) In October, 1945, Lattimore was appointed by the 
President as a member of the Pauley Reparations Mission 
to Japan. According to Lattimore's book, he was paid for 
his "services" by the State Department. 248 

Accompanied Vice President Wallace on 
China Mission 

(4) In 1945 Lattimore, together with John Carter Vin- 
cent, accompanied Vice President Henry Wallace on his 
trip to China. As a result of this trip, Wallace prepared 
a report outlining a policy toward China for the United 
States. Wallace in the book he wrote on his return, Soviet 
Asia Mission, pays tribute to Lattimore for his invaluable 
assistance on this project of recommending a China policy 
to the State Department. He further states that President 
Roosevelt "urged me to take Owen Lattimore with me, 
who, he said, was one of the world's great experts on the 
problems involving Chinese Russian relationships." 2 ^ 9 

Lectured at State Department 

(5) In 1946 Lattimore lectured and indoctrinated State 
Department foreign service officials during a State De- 
partment training course. 250 

Advised Truman Before Potsdam 

(6) Two days before President Truman left for Pots- 
dam where surrender terms with Japan were to be 
decided upon, Acheson, according to the following news- 
story, in a left-wing Washington newspaper, used Latti- 
more in an attempt to get President Truman to go along 
with the Communist plans for Japan: 

"Finally, in order to convince Truman [to follow 
what was then the Communist line] Acheson asked 
him to discuss the matter with Owen Lattimore, one 
of the foremost American authorities on China and 
former adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. 



245 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, April 7, 1952 (now being printed). 

248 Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 67. 

247 Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 87. 

24S Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 66. 

24» Wallace, Soviet Asia Mission, p. 17. 

250 Washington Times-Herald, June 6, 1946. 



65 



"Lattimore talked to Truman for 30 minutes just 
two days before he departed for Potsdam. The Pres- 
ident listened most carefully but made no com- 
ment." 2 5 1 

The fact that this meeting between Lattimore and 
Truman actually occurred was confirmed by former 
State Department official Eugene Dooman in his testi- 
mony before the McCarran Committee. 252 

Lattimore admitted, under cross-examination by the 
McCarran Committee, that he had a conference with the 
President and gave the President a written memorandum 
of his recommended postwar foreign policy for the 
United States. 253 One of the committee members pointed 
out that the memorandum served almost as a blueprint 
for America's postwar pro-Communist foreign policy in 
China. 

What was the President's attitude toward Owen 
Lattimore after you presented the evidence on him ? 

I will let the President answer that. 

The following is the New York Times account of the 
President's press conference at Key West on March 31, 
1950: 

"The President paid a glowing tribute to Senator 
McCarthy's three major targets: Dean Acheson, Sec- 
retary of State; Philip C. Jessup, senior adviser to 
Mr. Acheson; and Owen Lattimore, one-time con- 
sultant to the State Department on Far Eastern 
Affairs ... 

" 'You don't believe he is a spy?' asked a reporter, 
referring to Mr. Carthy's charge that Mr. Latti- 
more was Russia's leading agent in this country. 

"Of course, he did not believe that, Mr. Truman 
replied with asperity. It was silly on the face of it and 
people recognized it, he said." 

Shades of Red Herring 

This praise of Lattimore was given by Truman despite 
the fact that a sizable number of government witnesses 



gave the following testimony under oath about Latti- 
more: (1) that he was trusted and relied upon by the 
Russian Communists, (2) that he was assigned by the 
Communists the task of shaping our foreign policy to 
serve the Communist cause, (3) that he was trusted 
and relied upon by the American Communists, (4) that 
he was trusted, relied upon, and his advice followed by 
the State Department in determining foreign policy. 

What about your statement that Lattimore had a 
desk in the State Department? 

In 1950 Lattimore denied this under oath, and the State 
Department ridiculed it. However, some light is shed on 
Lattimore's truthfulness as a result of his cross-exami- 
nation by the McCarran committee on this subject. 

In his book, Ordeal by Slander, advertised on its jacket 
as "completely honest," Lattimore wrote: 

"I told the newspapermen that Senator McCarthy 
was crazy if he had got me mixed up with the State 
Department. I had never been in the State Depart- 
ment." 254 

In 1950, in his sworn testimony before the Tydings 
Committee, Lattimore said: 

"I do not have a desk in the State Department. I 
do not have a telephone there." 255 

In 1952, however, when Lattimore was testifying be- 
fore the McCarran Committee, letters were produced, 
signed by Lattimore, which showed he had regular hours 
in the office of Lauchlin Currie [named under oath as a 
member of a Communist spy ring] in the State Depart- 
ment building. 256 Only then did Lattimore admit under 
cross-examination that he did have a desk in the State 
Department Building. 



»i Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1945. 

«« McCarran Committee Hearings on IPB, Pt. 3, Sept. 14, 1951, pp. 730, 7.31. 

208 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR,, March 10, 1952 (now being printed). 

^ Lattimore, Ordeal by Slander, p. 5. 

«* Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 6, 1950, p. 421. 

2t» McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Feb. 29, 1952 (now being printed). 



CHAPTER VIII 



General George G. Marshal! 



hy did you spend so much time preparing tlie 
Marshall speech — especially in view of the fact 
thai you knew it would be an unpopular speech? 

A number of things contributed to my decision to write 
the history of General George Marshall. 

Some of the reasons are set forth in the following 
passages of my book, "America's Retreat from Victory" : 

"My discussion of General Marshall's career arose 
naturally and inevitably out ef a long and anxious 
study of the retreat from victory, which this Admin- 
istration has been beating since 1945. In company 
with so many of my fellow citizens I have become 
alarmed and dismayed over our moral and material 
enfeeblement. 

"The fact that 152 million American people are 
officially asked by the party in power to adopt Mar- 
shall's global strategy during a period of time when 
the life of our civilization hangs in the balance would 
seem to make it imperative that his complete record 
be subjected to the searching light of public scrutiny. 

"As a backdrop for the history of Marshall which I 
gave on June 14th, there is the raw, harsh fact that 
since World War II the free world has been losing 
100 million people per year to international Commu- 
nism. If I had named the men responsible for our 
tremendous loss, all of the Administration apolo- 
gists and the camp-following elements of press and 
radio led by the Daily Worker would have screamed 
'the Big Lie,' 'irresponsible,' 'smear,' 'Congressional 
immunity,' etc., etc., etc. 

"However, it was the Truman branch of the Demo- 
crat Party meeting at Denver, Colorado, which 
named the men responsible for the disaster which 
they called a 'great victory' — Dean Gooderham 
Acheson 'and George Catlett Marshall. By what tor- 
tured reasoning they arrived at the conclusion that 
the loss of 100 million people a year to Communism 
was a 'great victory,' was unexplained. 

"The general picture of our steady, constant retreat 
from victory, with the same men always found at the 
time and place where disaster strikes America and 
success comes to Soviet Russia, would inevitably have 
caused me, or someone else deeply concerned with the 
history of this time, to document the acts of those 
molding and shaping the history of the world over the 
past decade. However, an occurrence during the Mac- 
Arthur investigation was the immediate cause of my 
decision to give the Senate and the country the his- 
tory of Marshall. 

"A deeply disturbed Senator from the Russell 
Committee came to my office for information. 
'McCarthy,' he said, T have always considered Mar- 
shall as one of our great heroes and I am sure that he 
would knowingly do no wrong. But, McCarthy,' he 
said, 'tell me who prejudiced the thinking of this 
great man? Why, for example, did he keep from 
Roosevelt the complete and correct intelligence re- 
ports at Yalta? Why did he, as Roosevelt's military 
adviser, approve that Yalta agreement which was 
drafted by Hiss, Gromyko and Jebb? Who per- 
suaded him at Yalta to disregard the intelligence re- 
port of 50 of his own officers, all with the rank of 
colonel or above — an intelligence report which urged 



a course directly contra to what was done at Yalta 
and confirmed at Potsdam?' 

"He handed a copy of that report to me and asked : 
'Why did a man of Marshall's intelligence ignore 
such a report as this compiled by 50 of his own top 
intelligence officers?' 

"The Senator went on. 'McCarthy,' he said, 'who of 
evil allegiance to the Kremlin sold him on the disas- 
trous Marshall Mission to China, where Marshall de- 
scribed one of his own acts as follows: "As Chief-of- 
Staff I armed 39 anti-Communist divisions. How with 
a stroke of a pen I disarm them." 

" 'When that was done,' he asked, 'who then per- 
suaded Marshall to open Kalgan Mountain Pass, with 
the result that the Chinese Communists could make 
contact with the Russians and receive the necessary 
arms and ammunition to overrun all of China ? ' 

" 'McCarthy, who on earth could have persuaded 
Marshall to side with Acheson and against American 
interests on the question of Formosa and the use of 
the Chinese Nationalist troops?' 

"Upon searching for the answers for the Senator, 
I found to my surprise that no one had ever written 
the history of Marshall — Marshall, who, by the 
alchemy of propaganda became the 'greatest living 
American' and the recently proclaimed 'master of 
global strategy' by and for the party in power. In 
view of the fact that the committee, the Congress, and 
the American people were being called upon either to 
endorse or reject Marshall's 'global strategy,' I felt it 
was urgent that such a study be made and submitted 
to the Congress and the people." 

Marshall's First Attempt to Make General 

Another thing which particularly interested me in Mar- 
shall's history was the unusual story of his promotions 
and rise to power. For example, General Pershing unsuc- 
cessfully attempted to have Marshall given a generalship 
15 years after World War I. According to Walter Trohan's 
article, "The Tragedy of George Marshall," Marshall 
grew impatient over slow promotion and sought the inter- 
cession of General Pershing with General Douglas Mac- 
Arthur who was Chief of Staff. As Trohan puts it: 

"MacArthur was ready to oblige, but insisted that 
the promotion go through regular channels. Pershing 
agreed, confident Marshall could clear the hurdles. 
Friendly examination of the Marshall record showed 
what his superiors regarded as insufficient time with 
troops. MacArthur proposed to remedy this, giving 
him command of the Eighth Regiment at Fort 
Screven, Georgia, one of the finest regiments in the 
Army. 

Army Inspector General Rejected 
Promotion for Marshall 

"Marshall was moved up from Lieutenant Colonel, 
but his way to a General's stars appeared to be 
blocked forever when the Inspector General reported 
that under one year "of Marshall's command the 
Eighth Regiment had dropped from one of the best 
regiments in the Army to one of the worst. Mac- 
Arthur regretfully informed Pershing that the report 



67 



made promotion impossible. To this day Marshall is 
uneasy in the presence of MacArthur." 257 

Six Years Later Became Top Army Man 

This interested me particularly because only six years 
later Roosevelt put Marshall in command of the entire 
United States Army. I wondered what happened to change 
the unsuccessful regimental Commander into the first 
choice of the President for the highest Army post in the 
country. 

During the depression years Marshall became interested 
in the Civilian Conservation Corps, known as the CCC, 
and it was because of this that he came to the attention 
of those persons in Washington interested in this com- 
mendable project — among them Mrs. Roosevelt and 
Harry Hopkins. It was at this point that Marshall, whose 
only troop command in the field was reported by the 
Inspector General as a complete failure, suddenly became 
a Brigadier General and then a General. 

Great Memory Fails on December 7, 1941 

Another contributing factor in my decision to conduct 
a searching scrutiny of Marshall's history was the unusual 
testimony of Marshall concerning Pearl Harbor morning. 
Here was a man with a great memory, reportedly the 
greatest memory of any man in Government, but on the 
morning of Pearl Harbor, for some reason or other, the 
Chief of Staff had no idea where he was. 

Most people who read this will remember exactly what 
he or she was doing on December 7, 1941, when the news 
broke of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. But Marshall, 
charged with the safety of those who died at Pearl Harbor, 
first said he was riding horseback, then changed that 
story to say he was with his wife. However, Arthur Upham 
Pope, in his book containing a diary of Litvinoff (who in 
1941 was Russian Ambassador) states that Marshall, on 
the morning of December 7, 1941, was at the airport 
meeting Litvinoff. While it may seem unimportant whether 
Marshall was with a horse, with Litvinoff, or with his 
wife, it does cause one to wonder why this man with the 
great memory, the Chief of Staff, charged with the lives of 
so many men, could not remember where he was when 
the bombs began to fall. 

Sends Pearl Harbor Warning by Commercial Wire 

In connection with Pearl Harbor, there was something 
else that caused me to wonder about Marshall. I wondered 
why it was that when he was finally found and given the 
decoded message that the Japanese were about to attack, 
that instead of picking up the phone on his desk, which 
was a direct, certain, and immediate way to contact his 
Commanders in Hawaii, he yawned and sent the message 
by regular commercial telegraph. Because the warning 
of the Japanese attack reached Hawaii too late, thousands 
of American boys were shot, burned, drowned, suffocated, 
and crushed above and below the Hawaiian waters. 

I have not tried to tell why Marshall acted as he did. 
But I did become deeply disturbed about this man who 
was such a mysterious figure, whose story was never 
written and who with Acheson was again being offered to 



us by the Party in power as the global strategist — the man 
whose strategy was to chart our future. 

Conflicting Reports on Who Wrote 
Instructions for Marshall Mission 

Another reason why I began to wonder about Marshall 
was the mystery which surrounded the question of who 
wrote the instructions which Marshall followed on his 
mission to China— which mission, according to Admiral 
Cooke and others, played such an important part in the 
betrayal of China. The high points of the Marshall Mis- 
sion to China have been previously covered in Chapter V. 

Let us briefly review the conflicting reports about who 
wrote the instructions. 

General Marshall before the Senate Armed Service 
Committee, September 19, 1950, said: 

". . . The policy of the United States was being 
drawn up in the State Department, and that was 
issued while I was on the ocean going over there 
[China]." 258 

Before the Russell Committee, May 10, 1951, he said 
some people were saying: 

". . . that I sat down in the State Department and 
drew up this policy. I did not." 259 

Here is what Acheson, under oath, had to say about this 
same subject before the Russell Committee, June 4, 1951: 

"At the end of November, 1945, Secretary Byrnes 
and General Marshall met. This was after General 
Marshall had been asked to go to China. 

"Secretary Byrnes read him a memorandum sug- 
gesting the outline of instructions for him. General 
Marshall did not approve of it. General Marshall said 
he would wish to try his own hand, assisted by some 
of his associates, in drafting the instructions. This he 
did, and a draft was prepared by him . . ."2 6 

And James Byrnes, who was Secretary of State at the 
time of the Marshall Mission, has stated in his book, 
Speaking Frankly: 

"The President made no change in that policy 
except upon the recommendation of General Marshall 
or with his approval." 261 

Like others, I too wondered who was telling the truth — 
whether Marshall spoke the truth when he said that he was 
on the ocean at the time the instructions were drafted and 
had nothing to do with drafting the secret instructions, or 
whether Secretaries Byrnes and Acheson spoke the truth 
when they said that Marshall drafted his own instructions 
and no changes were made unless he recommended or 
approved them. 

Public Scrutiny Essential 

The thing that is so inconceivable about much of the 
criticism of the Marshall history that I gave, is the type of 
objections which are raised. If a man is — as Marshall's 
friends claim he is — a great man, he should not object to 
having his life scrutinized in great detail. If he made mis- 



257 Walter Trohan, "The Tragedy of George Marshall," American Mercury, 
April, 1951, pp. 267-275. 

258 Senate Armed Services Committee, Nomination ol Gen. George O. Marshall 
to be Secretary of Defense, Sept. 19, 1950, p. 21, 

250 Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 2, May 10, 1851, p. 467. 
2»o Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 4, 1951, p. 1848. 
2oi James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (Harper Brothers, 1947), p. 226. 



68 



takes, that is no disgrace. Only those who do nothing 
make no mistakes. To prove that Marshall made mistakes 
does not indict Marshall of being either incompetent or of 
following the Communist cause. 

One of my vigorous critics, a defender of Marshall, 
wrote the following in defense of Marshall : 

u ' 'The History of George Catlett Marshall' is well 
documented and makes an impressive case that Mar- 
shall's decisions were, on the who\e, disastrously bad 
from the standpoint of American interests and pro- 
moted the interests of the Soviet Union. With this 
thesis I am in complete agreement. But I do not think 
that because Marshall's policy decisions were disas- 
trous, it raises a question as to his patriotism." 262 

If as Marshall's defender admits, "Marshall's decisions 
were, on the whole, disastrously bad from the standpoint 
of American interests and promoted the interests of the 
Soviet Union," then in the name of 152 million Amer- 
icans whose futures are affected by the "global strategist" 
of the party in power, his record should be held up to the 
bright light and coldly and clearly scrutinized in the ab- 
sence of any synthetic flag-waving and hero-worshipping. 

This perhaps answers the question of why I felt it was 
my duty to spend unlimited time and energy to bring his 
story to the attention of the American people. 

Good or bad, I did not make Marshall's history. He did. 
I merely wrote it. 

That I would be misquoted, misunderstood, damned, 
and pilloried if I gave the uncolored facts became obvious 
as I began to delve into the history of Marshall. I knew 
the storm of opposition which awaited any man who 
dared to lay hands upon the laurels of a man who by the 
alchemy of propaganda became a great war hero — an 
unusual war hero, who during 50 years as a soldier spent 
less time within range of enemy bullets than any other 
war hero in recorded history. 

Some of my well-meaning friends were horrified when 
they learned I planned to give a history of Marshall which 
was not completely complimentary of him. As one of my 
good friends in the Senate said, "McCarthy, criticize 
Abraham Lincoln or George Washington, but if you want 
to come back to the Senate, lay off George Marshall." 
Many of my other friends told me how unwise it would 
be from the political standpoint to intimate that Marshall 
actually was not the great hero into which he has been 
built. I gave my answer to them in a speech to the Na- 
tional Convention of Young Republicans at Boston in the 
following language: 

"I recently prepared a documented history of Mar- 
shall — a documented history of his acts over the past 
ten years. Some of my good friends urged that I not 
do that — and they have urged that I not talk about 
Marshall tonight — because, they say, it is politically 
unwise. 

"It reminds me of the advice I got 16 months ago 
when we started to bring out the facts on Dean Good- 
erham Aeheson and some of the others who have 
been so bad for this country. Let me remind those 
well-meaning friends that the reason the world is in 
such a horrible condition today is that so many 
two-bit politicians do only those things they think are 



politically wise — only that which is safe for their own 
puny political futures. 

"You young people here tonight will be running 
this country some day. I ask you in the name of 
Western civilization not to follow the disastrous foot- 
steps of those who say, 'Don't do anything that is 
politically unwise.' If a task — unpleasant as it may 
be — must be done, do it. Otherwise, this nation, this 
civilization will pass from the face of the earth as 
surely as did those great empires of the past which 
were destroyed because of weak leadership which 
tolerated corruption, disloyalty, and dishonesty be- 
cause that was the easier path to follow and perhaps 
to them the 'politically expedient' course. 

"I have been through this nation much in the past 
year— from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from New 
Orleans to St. Paul. The American people are des- 
perately searching, hoping and praying for leader- 
ship. They are not looking for men who only do the 
things that are politically wise or those who measure 
every act in terms of the votes gotten." 268 

Did you accuse Marshall of being a traitor? 

No. I very carefully put together the history of General 
Marshall as it was found piecemeal in the writings of his 
friends and those who were neutral to him. I avoided 
quoting his enemies. I gave for the first time the complete, 
coldly-documented history of General George C. Marshall, 
as drawn by the pens of those who actively participated 
in World War II, or who were writing the story of the 
events as they happened. It was a tedious, disagreeable 
task. But it had to be done. 

Right or wrong, brilliant or stupid, patriot or traitor, 
Marshall is one of the most important figures, if not the 
most important, in the last 10 years. If the history of 
that 10-year period is to be understood, Marshall's record 
must be understood. 

Will you compare the Forrestal Plan, known as the 
Truman Plan for Greece and Turkey, with the 
Marshall Plan for Europe? 

The Forrestal plan — which Truman fortunately adopted 
for Greece and Turkey — provided for all the necessary 
military aid to people who themselves were willing to 
fight Communism. While sufficient economic aid was 
given to make the military aid effective and workable, 
the emphasis at all times was to be on military aid. The 
Forrestal Plan proved very successful. 

The Marshall Plan was directly opposite to the For- 
restal Plan for Greece and Turkey. It consisted of giving 
the maximum economic aid with a minimum of military 
aid. The Marshall Plan fitted perfectly with Communist 
Russia's desire for a. power vacuum in all of Western 
Europe. 

The Forrestal Plan would have included Spain. The 
Marshall Plan excluded Spain, but originally included 
Russia. Russia, however, turned it down. 

I voted for the Marshall Plan because it had some 
good aspects, for example, the feeding of the starving 
people of Europe. I strongly maintained then that the 
food and clothing which we were giving should be on 
the basis of need of the people themselves rather than 



262 Tower Phelan, The Freeman, Feb. 11, 1952, p. 298. 

ass Speech before National Convention of Young Republicans, June 29, 1951, Hotel 

Statler, Boston. 



69 



a gift to the governments involved, which sold it to the 
starving people on the basis of ability to pay. Another 
point which I maintained at that time was that the money 
for the rehabilitation of industry should have been 
loaned directly to the industry in question, taking back 
what security that industry had to offer instead of fun- 
neling the money through tottering, corrupt, and social- 
istic governments as the Marshall Plan proposed to do. 
Nevertheless, in the end I voted for it because it was a 
case of Marshall Plain aid for Europe or nothing. 
What was the general newspaper reaction to your 
speech on Marshall? 

Perhaps the best answer to this question is contained 
in the following columns and editorials: 

George Sokolsky 
"The immediate newspaper reports were based not 
upon the Senator's 60,000-word speech, but on a 
supposition of what he might have said. 
"In current journalism, this is called 'high-lighting' 
and is generally inaccurate and distorted. 
"So I waited until I could get a full copy of the 
speech; read the whole of 60,000 words and realized 
that the Senator had done a decent job of research 
and analysis. 

". . . [His] bibliography is important because it 
shows not a single enemy — personal or political — 
of General Marshall, unless it be Winston Churchill, 
with whom Marshall did not see eye-to-eye during 
phases of the war. 

"The point of this piece is to suggest that the speech 
ought to be read; ought to be taken seriously; and 
should be discussed. 

"It is apparent throughout that Senator McCarthy, 
while not approving of General Marshall, devotes 
most of his long speech not to his own views but to 
quotations from others." (Column of July 1, 1951.) 

Washington Times-Herald 
"Senator Joe McCarthy made a 60,000 word speech 
about General Marshall on June 14. The kept col- 
umnists and newspaper errand boys of the Pender- 
gast mobsters have been screeching the house down 
ever since. 

"They have suggested the Senator is a skunk, traitor, 
mudslinger, faker of facts and all around candidate 
for horse- whipping. Are they right? 
"We don't see how anybody can possibly say unless 
and until after examining the evidence. And right 
here and now, we will place a small bet . . . that 
not one of those who have been calling Joe McCarthy 
names since June 14th has actually done the basic 
homework job of reading the speech itself. . . . 
"The writer of this editorial has read McCarthy's 
speech and finds it is a challenge that will have to 
be met and dealt with, sooner or later." (Editorial 
of June 24, 1951.) 

Polk County Ledger 
Balsam Lake, Wis. 
"We listened and read with growing alarm the com- 
ments of the daily press and radio. We heard Mc- 



Carthy charged with crimes ranging from blasphemy 
to mere political dishonesty. Yet we were impressed, 
as we have been impressed on previous occasions, 
with the studied refusal of the McCarthy critics to 
discuss his basic charges. Nowhere did we read or 
hear direct references to McCarthy's text, or direct 
quotations from it. The critics simply told us that 
McCarthy had engaged in a wholesale slander of 
General Marshall. We began to suspect that there 
might be a vast difference between what McCarthy 
said, and what the critics who disagree with him 
would have us believe he said. 

"So we did the logical thing — the thing the critics 
didn't do. We read the full text of McCarthy's 
speech on 'America's Retreat — The Story of George 
Catlett Marshall.' We read all 48 pages of it (not 
printed at government expense) direct from the 
Congressional Record." 

Time Magazine perhaps best represents the altitude of 
those newspapers and magazines which sacrificed truth 
in reporting the Marshall speech. The reason for such 
complete distortion seems to tie in their continuous 
efforts to discredit McCarthy since the beginning of his 
exposure of Communist infiltration in government. 

Here is how Time Magazine reported the Marshall 
speech : 

". . . an attack on Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall by Wisconsin's poison-tipped Joe McCar- 
thy ... in familiar fashion, McCarthy twisted 
quotes, drew unwarranted conclusions from the facts 
he did get right . . ."2 6 4 

Thereafter I suggested to Henry Luce, Editor of Time, 
Life and Fortune, that if Time knew of a single quota- 
tion that was twisted or a single statement that was untrue, 
they should point it out to me. To this date they have 
found no untruth or misquotation. 

In order to understand the attitude of such publica- 
tions as Time Magazine, it is important to review some 
of the adjectives used by Time during my anti-Commu- 
nist fight. 

"Loud-mouthed . . . irresponsible . . . wretched bur- 
lesque . . . completely without evidence . . . hashed- 
over charges . . . scarehead publicity . . . tired old 
loyalty cases . . . desperate gambler . . . conspira- 
torial secrecy . . . mad man . . weasel-worded 
statements . . . Senatorial immunity . . . noisily 
charging . . . vituperative smear . . . wild charges." 

When one analyzes the camp-following, left-wing 
"news" coverage and comment on a carefully and thor- 
oughly documented speech such as the Marshall speech, 
the question that arises is: Why the deliberate distortion 
and suppression? This question is discussed to some ex- 
tent in the chapter entitled "The Smear." 

The twisted reporting by a combination of Communist 
and left-wing, camp-following elements of press and 
radio, and the government-subsidized elements of the 
same, made it necessary for me to publish the history 
of Marshall in book form so that it would be available 
to the people of this nation. 



mi Time Magazine, June 25, 1951, pp. 20. 21. 



70 




CHAPTER IX 



The Tydings Committee 



hat was the Tydings Committee and why was 
it set up? 

The Tydings Committee was set up as a result of in- 
formation which I gave the Senate about the Communist 
connections of a sizable number of present and past 
State Department employees. I gave the Senate a brief 
review of the files of 81 individuals who were then or 
had been closely connected with the State Department. 
At that time I informed the Senate that I did not have 
the staff, the power of subpoena, or the facilities to 
produce all of the available evidence against those indi- 
viduals, but that the evidence which I had clearly indi- 
cated that many of them were either Communists or 
doing the work of the Communist Party. Others were 
marginal cases who might be able to prove their loyalty. 

The Senate thereupon voted unanimously that the 
Foreign Relations Committee should hold hearings. It 
ordered that committee to subpoena all of the files on 
those named by me. The Tydings Committee was given 
all the money, investigators, and power it needed to do 
the job. 

The Tydings Committee was, of course, carefully se- 
lected to do the job which it finally did. At that time 
there was in existence a Special Senate Investigating 
Committee fully staffed with competent investigators 
which could have done the job. The Judiciary Com- 
mittee, headed by a great American who is anti-Commu- 
nist, Senator Pat McCarran, also could have done the 
job. But the Foreign Relations Committee was selected. 
The reason for choosing that committee can best be 
described in the words of ex-Senator Scott Lucas when he 
said on the Senate floor: 

"All we are trying to do is to give the Committee 
on Foreign Relations jurisdiction of the proposed 
investigation, rather than have the Committee on 
the Judiciary or the Committee on Expenditures in 
the Executive Departments, or some other commit- 
tee immediately take jurisdiction . . ," 265 

Here we have notification from Democrat Leader Lucas 
that the reason for selecting the Tydings Committee 
was to make sure that no other committee would go 
into the matter. It seemed obvious in view of this that 
the committee was not formed to make a complete inves- 
tigation but to prevent a real investigation. Why. the 
Administration feared an investigation has, of course, 
since become obvious. 

The Tydings Committee was ordered to obtain all 
of the files which might contain information on 
those you named. What files were they supposed 
to get? 

State Department files, Civil Service Commission files, 
FBI files, Naval Intelligence files, Army Intelligence 
files, Secret Service files, and Central Intelligence Agency 

files. 



Did the Tydings Committee obey the order of the 
Senate and subpoena all the files? 

No. 

What, if any, files were obtained by the Tydings 
Committee? 

The loose leaf State Department files. 

Why were not the files of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, Civil Service Commission, FBI, Naval Intel- 
ligence, Army Intelligence, and Secret Service sub- 
poenaed by the Committee? 

In this respect Tydings should not take the full 
blame because the President publicly announced that 
he would defy the Senate subpoena for the loyalty files, 
saying he would stand pat on his 1948 order instruct- 
ing all government departments to refuse to let Con- 
gress look at loyalty records of Government employees. 
At the same time President Truman indicated that he 
would make available any files which would disprove 
Senator McCarthy's charges of Communist infiltration. 206 

In other words, if a file would prove that a man was 
guilty of treason or Communist activities, the Committee, 
according to Truman, could not see that file. If the file 
would prove that McCarthy was wrong then the file 
could be seen by the committee. 

You have stated that the loose leaf State Depart- 
ment files which the Tydings Committee obtained 
had been stripped of all information about Com- 
munist activities before they were shown to the 
committee. Tydings claimed this was untrue. What 
evidence do you have to support your claim? 

I gave to the Senate and to the Tydings Committee the 
written statements .of four of the State Department em- 
ployees — one of whom is now an FBI agent — who did the 
actual job of removing from the State Department files 
all evidence of Communist activities. 267 A reproduction 
of one of the four statements appears on the following 
page. 

Tydings denied that the files had been tampered with 
— in spite of those signed statements. He refused to call 
Paul Sullivan or any of the four who stated they were 
willing to testify under oath that they themselves had 
removed material in . State Department files. He an- 
nounced he was calling on the Department of Justice 
to tell him whether the files had been stripped or tam- 
pered with. 

On June 21, Tydings told newspaper reporters that 
"a special inquiry by the FBI has established as false 
McCarthy's accusations that the files had been raped, 
skeletonized, or tampered with in any way." On the 



Ms congressional Record (Unbound), Feb. 21, 1950, pp. 2105, 2106. 
2oo Washington Times-Herald, Feb. 24, 1950, p. 1. 
so' Congressional Record (Unbound) July 12, 1950, pp. 10137-10139; 
Congressional Record (Unbound) July 25, 1950, pp. 11108-11109. 



71 



July 6, 1950 

The following information is given by me freely and voluntarily 
without any promises whatsoever. I furnish this information because it 
is the truth and I feel it is my patriotic duty to furnish the facts 
as I experienced them. 

I am living at 1902 North Fifteenth Street, Arlington, Virginia 
at the present time. 

In August 1946 I was released from the U. S. Navy in California. 
I came to Washington, D. C. and while in Washington, D. C. I was looking 
for a job. I went into the Walker Johnson building of State Department 
at 18th & New York Ave., N.W. I talked to a fellow in the State Depart- 
ment by the name of Holcombe. I got a temporary clerical job in the files 
at the Walker Johnson Bldg. These files were the Departmental personnel 
files located in the Walker Johnson Bldg. I started work on these files 
on Sept. 1946. When I reported for duty I was told that I would be work- 
ing on a project on these files. This project had been going on for some 
time before I started. There were at least 8 persons who were working 
on this project. 

I was not formally and specifically instructed as to what the 
purpose of the project was, but from what I was instructed by the other 
clerks, I and the other clerks were to go through each personnel file 
and pull out all derogatory material from the file. In addition to the 
usual personnel forms, the files contained all kinds of letters, reports, 
memorandum concerning the individual person. As per instructions I 
received, all of the' clerks on this project were to pull out of the files 
all matters considered derogatory either morally or politically. 

The project was very confused but I and the other clerks pulled 
out of each personnel file any material which could be considered de- 
rogatory. This material was removed and some was thrown in wastebaskets 
by us and some was thrown in a cardboard box. I don't know what happened 
to the derogatory material we pulled out from the files but I do know 
of my own knowledge that a good lot of it was destroyed. 

I do not recall details of each personnel file I examined, but 
the material I pulled out of the files pertained to either the morals 
of the person or in some way reflected on his or her loyalty. I re- 
call one thick report on one State Department employee who was accused 
of being a photographer and a member of some subversive organization 
which published some sort of news report. This was removed from the 
file and disposed of. 

I worked from September till the end of December 1946 working 
on this file project pulling out and disposing of the derogatory material 
as per my understanding given me. 

I left on Dec. 31, 1946 and this project on the personnel files 
was still not finished, but my temporary appointment ran out and my 
employment with the State Dept. ended. 

I can't recall who the official in charge of these files was. 
I met him only a very few times, but I could easily recognize him if 
I saw him. 

I have read this statement of three pages and the facts are true 
to the best of my knowledge and belief. 

Signed 

July 6, 1950 

1902 N. 15th Street 

JAckson 4-0369 



Witnessed: 
July 6, 1950 



(Copy) 



72 



1 



OFFICE OF THE OIRECTOH 




SfleSieral Siumttt of luueBtigaiSott 

IStuteh States SSepartmrtit o£ 3uatice 

MlaBliingtmi 25, 33. €. 

July 10, 1950 



Honorable Joseph b. McCarthy 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 



My dear Senator: 

I have received your letter dated June 37, 1950 
inquiring whether this Bureau has examined the 81 loyalty 
files which the members of the Tydings Committee have 
been scrutinising and whether such an examination by. 
the FBI has disclosed that the files are complete and 
that nothing has been removed therefrom. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made no 
such examination and therefore is not in a position to 
make any statement concerning the completeness or in" 
completeness of the State Department filest 

For your information, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation furnished Mr. Ford, at his request, a 
record of all loyalty material furnished the State 
Department in the. 81 cases referred to. For your 
further information, I am enclosing a copy of Mr, Ford's 
letter. to Senator Tydings which I have secured from, the 
Attorney General. 

Sincerely yours, 

oft 3 m - N JMLA^ 

rJ\ ( I 

Enclosure 

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER 




HEW rORK TIMES 
THURSDAY. JUNE 22, 1 



i'CARTHY IS HELD 
REF UTED ON FILES 

i Tydings Says F. B. I. Reports 
I Dossiers Not Tampered With 
I ■ — Croup to End Examination 



By WILLIAM S. WHITE 

ScedAl to THg Ngw Yous Timu. 

WASHINGTON, June 21-»Senate 
investigators will close on Sunday 
night their two-month examination 
of eighty-one confidential State 
Department loyalty files and will 
return them at once to the Admin- 
istration. 

This was disclosed today by Sen- 
ator Millard E. Tydings. Democrat 
of Maryland, chairman of the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations subcommit- 
tee that has been tntermittently 
reading the dossiers in the White 
House in its investigation of Sena- 
tor Joseph R. McCarthy's charges 
of communism in the State De- 
partment. "^ 

At the same .time, Mr. Tydings 
asserted thatagge^alUjgu^jy b: 
the Feder al bu reau otTnves' 
tion 

McCarthyJtaccusations " that The : 
files had Ken^raped" before being 
turned over to the subcommittee. 

A letter Just received from Pey- 
ton Ford, First Assistant Attorney 
General, stated, Senator Tydings 
added, that a special inquiry made 
by the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation produced the following re- 
sults: 

"That the files are Intact, that 

way and that the material turned 
over to the State Department by 
the V. B. IJS4tmjnJj3g4Jte;; 

"Thus," MrTVaings added; "the 
McCarthy charges are not sus- 
tained by the facts." He declared 
himself unable to give out the text 
of Mr. Ford's letter because it 
would disclose the names of some 
of the persons whose files were, 
under study. 



Not Xorie tiefaid Tribune 
Thursday, June 22, 1950 

Tydings Asserts 
E B. I. Cleared 

StateDepi. Files 

Says Check-Up Showed No 
Loyalty Data Tampering 
as Charger] foy McCarthy 

By Raymond J. Blair 
WASHINGTON, June 21. — A 
check by the F. B. I. has fajled to 
substantiate Senator Joseph R. 
McCarthy's charge that eighty- 
one State Department loyalty files 
have been "raped" to eliminate 
damaging evidence. Senator Mil- 
Jard E. Tydings. Democrat, ol 
Maryland, said today. 

Senator Tydings is chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations sub- 
;committee investigating charges 
by Senator McCarthy, Republican, 
of Wisconsin, of communism in 
the State Department. The loyalty 
records were made available to the 
Tydings subcommittee May 4 by 
President Truman. Senator Me- 
Carthy recently charged ttsey had 
m "raped, skeletonised or tam- 
pered with" so that they did not 
contain all of the relevant ma- 
terial. 

Senator Tydings told reporters 
that upon hearing Senator McCar- 
thy's charge, he asked the Justice 
Department to investigate. Today 
he received the department's re- 
port, he said, in a letter from 
Peyton Ford, assistant to Attorney 
General 3. Howard McOrath. 

The report said. Senator Tyd- 
tngs stated, that a study by P. B. X. 
agents had' shown the flies were 
"intact" and that all P. B. I, 
material on the eighty-one In- 
dividuals involved, whom Senator 
| Mccarty has accused of Cemmu- 
I rust leanings, was included. 
j Senator Tydings also said that 
'study of the files would be com- 
pleted by the subcommittee Sun 
day night. It was not clear, how- 
ever, whether this program was 
acceptable to all subcommittee 
members. 

The above reproductions of two newsstories demonstrate the typical deliberate misrepresentations 
engaged in by the Tydings Committee and the State Department during the. entire course of the 
Tydings Investigation. It will be noted that the letter of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation clearly brands the Tydings statement in the above newsstories as a lie. 



previous page will be found reproductions of news stories 
on this Tydings' interview. 

The matter would have ended there had not I decided 
to ask J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the FBI, about this. 
Mr. Hoover replied on July 10 that this was not true — 
that the FBI had not made an investigation of the files 
during the time the files were available to the committee. 

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation has made no 
such examination," Mr. Hoover wrote, "and therefore 
is not in a position to make any statement concerning the 
completeness or incompleteness of the State Department 
files." His complete letter appears on the previous page. 

Hoover's statement, the direct opposite of Tydings', 
was taken to the floor of the Senate and presented so 
all the country could see. 

Had it not been for J. Edgar Hoover's frank and honest 
report the truth never would have been known. 

Following Hoover's letter, Tydings tried again to 
cover-up this story through the following sequence of 
events : 

(1) On June 16, 1950, Peyton Ford, the man who was 
at all times present and in charge of State Department 
files while the Tydings Committee "examined" them, 
obtained from the FBI copies of all FBI material pre- 
viously sent to the State Department which should have 
been in the files. Proof of this is found in a letter from 
Ford to Tydings, dated July 17, which Tydings refused 
to show the press or put in the record. A copy of this 
letter was obtained by me and given to the press. 

(2) Nearly a month later, July 20, after there was 
ample time to insert the above material in the files and 
after the committee no longer had access to the files, 
the Justice Department ordered the FBI to examine the 
files, to determine whether the material which it had 
sent to Ford on June 16 was now in the State Depart- 
ment files. Obviously the material was now in the files. 
Otherwise, why the request of the FBI to send its material 
to Peyton Ford who was in charge of the State Depart- 
ment files. 

(3) Long after the Tydings "investigation" ended, 
J. Edgar Hoover was ordered by the Department of Jus- 
tice to write a letter to Tydings describing the condition 
of the files. This he did, under date of September 8. 
That letter truthfully stated that the files, when exam- 
ined by them — not during any of the time that the 
Committee was allegedly looking at the files but long 
thereafter — were then complete. 

Rather involved, but a typical example of the commit- 
tee's attempt to hide behind the excellent reputation of 
the FBI. 

If the Tydings Committee was formed for the pur- 
pose of investigating your charges of Communists 
in Government, why was not all of your evidence 
given to that Committee? 

Being a member of the Minority Party, I had no con- 
trol whatsoever over the Tydings Committee. I had no 
power to order the Tydings Committee to hear evidence 
which it did not want to hear. We had available some 
thirty witnesses who were willing to testify under oath 



as to the Communistic activities, associations, and con- 
nections of those whom I had named. Senator Hicken- 
looper asked Tydings to call those witnesses. 268 This Tyd- 
ings refused to do. 

The evidence of Robert Morris, Minority Counsel, 
was repeatedly rejected by the chairman. For example, 
in one case, Morris said: 

"There is a case of a man named Theodore Geiger. 
He has been an employee of the State Department. 
He is now one of Paul Hoffman's top assistants. 
He is doing work that is quasi-State Department in 
character. I have gone and gotten some witnesses 
together who will testify that he was a member 
of the same Communist Party unit as they were, 
and I think we would be delinquent if in the face 
of this evidence that is now on record . . ." 

To this, Tydings replied: 

"Turn it over to the FBI or do something else with 



it 



We don't want to waste this afternoon." 269 



. After Chairman Tydings refused to call the witnesses,' 
the Democrat majority issued a report saying that I 
failed to prove my case. About the only analogy I can 
think of is that of a judge who refuses to hear any of 
the plaintiff's testimony and then renders a decision 
against him, saying he has failed to prove his case. 

You were a judge. Why was not more "court room" 
proof presented on those you named? 

A vast amount of legal proof was offered to the com- 
mittee. Names of important witnesses were given to the 
committee with the request that they be called. 

Failure to Call Witnesses 

The following is an excellent illustration of the com- 
mittee's failure to call witnesses. 

Senator Hickenlooper challenged the committee on 
June 28, 1950, on its failure to call witnesses. He said he 
felt that the committee could not arrive at any final con- 
clusion about my charges unless they called a list of wit- 
nesses which had been suggested to them. To this reason- 
able suggestion Senator Green replied sarcastically that 
the committee did not place "want ads" in the paper to 
find witnesses, adding, 

"It seems to me that we have done all that we need 
to do in connection with the job that was imposed 
on us." 270 

Senator Hickenlooper then reminded Green that the 
committee had not called the list of 20 or 30 names of 
witnesses he wanted to testify before the committee. 271 

Incidentally, a number of the witnesses whom Tydings 
refused to call — such as General Alexander Barmine, who 
testified as to Lattimore's connection with Russian mili- 
tary intelligence — have since been called and testified 
under oath before the McCarran Committee. 

A huge amount of documentary evidence — such as 
photostats of checks, letters, memoranda, signed affidavits 



^s Congressional Record (Unbound), July 25, 1950, p. 11110. 
»» Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt.'3, pp. 2521, 2522. 
2to Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, p. 2519. 
271 Tydings Hearings, Pt. 3. p. '2519. 



74 



and statements — was offered to the Tydings Committee. 
Leads on other evidence were also given that commit- 
tee. Those leads were never followed up even though the 
committee had a staff of investigators. Instead those in- 
vestigators spent months investigating or trying to dis- 
credit McCarthy. An example of the failure on the part 
of the staff to investigate Communist infiltration of Gov- 
ernment is illustrated in the following exchange between 
Robert Morris, Minority counsel for the committeej and 
the Chairman : 

MR. MORRIS: "May I say, Senator, that the first 
basic request that I made in commencing this investi- 
gation was for the books and records of Frederick 
Vanderbilt Field, inasmuch as there was evidence 
that his money was the heart of the Communist cell 
in the Institute of Pacific Relations. I maintain that 
was necessary. It was basically necessary to start that 
kind of an investigation." 

CHAIRMAN: ". . . We are pretty far away from 
loyalty in the State Department when we get out in 
the Instiute of Pacific Relations." 272 

(The McCarran Committee this year seized the missing 
IPR files, estimated at 200,000 documents. They were 
found hidden in a barn near Lee, Massachusetts. At the 
time this is being written, that committee has already 
demonstrated the extent to which Communists and pro- 
Communists in the IPR have shaped our disastrous for- 
eign policy.) 

Senator Lodge in a Tydings Committee meeting on 
June 25, 1950, pointed out 18 examples of leads the com- 
mittee had failed to investigate — leads which I had pro- 
vided the committee in the form of documentary evi- 
dence. 

For instance, he brought up this question: 

"Who in the State Department was responsible for 
obtaining the services of Frederick Schuman and 
Owen Lattimore as speakers for the Department's 
indoctrination course for Foreign Service em- 
ployees?" 273 

Again, Lodge asked, 

"Have we questioned those who have headed the 
China desk in the State Department to determine 
whether Lattimore gave advice on United States 
policy for China and whether this advice was acted 

upon?" 274 

It should be remembered I was not given any funds by 
the Senate to hire investigators. The Tydings Committee, 
on the other hand, was given $35,000 to conduct a thor- 
ough investigation into this matter. 

By contrast with the Tydings Committee staff which 
did not look for or find a single witness who would 
testify to disloyalty in government except those whom I 
produced the McCarran Committee staff is doing an 
excellent job of exposing disloyalty and incompetence in 
government. 

The McCarran Committee is investigating Communists 
while the Tydings Committee spent its time clearing, 



without investigation, those accused of Communist and 
pro-Communist activities. 

Failure to Intelligently Cross-Examine 
Both Friendly and Hostile Witnesses 

Despite the fact that I had been spending practically 
18 hours a day for months on this subject, I was denied 
the right to examine or cross-examine even a single wit- 
ness. 

The Tydings Committee, on the other hand, had the 
full power to examine and cross-examine both friendly 
and hostile witnesses but completely failed to develop the 
evidence which is normally developed by careful exami- 
nation of the witnesses. 

As a member of the Minority Party, which controls 
no committees, you knew that you could not force 
the appearance of any witnesses unless the Demo- 
crat chairman was willing to subpoena them. There- 
fore, why didn't you wait until the Republicans 
were in control of the Senate so that you could 
produce all of the evidence instead of doing it in 
a piecemeal pattern which a member of the polit- 
ical party not in power must of necessity follow? 

I suggest you put yourself in my position. If you were 
a Senator of the Minority Party who knew of individuals 
high in government who were betraying this nation, could 
you sleep on the evidence and refuse to give it to the 
public because you were not allowed to produce a com- 
plete "court room" case? Would you not feel you owed 
the duty to the people whom you represented to make pub- 
lic the evidence which might save our nation from further 
disaster? If you were in my position you could either 
follow the example of Nero and fiddle while Western civi- 
lization burned, or you could attempt to form a bucket 
brigade and wade in and try to put out the fire even 
though firebugs or arsonists were in charge of the Fire 
Department — even though you knew you might get badly 
burned— even though the odds were against success. 

The report of the Tydings Committee signed by the 
three Democrats states that your evidence of Com- 
munists in the State Department was a "fraud and 
a hoax." Is not the average American justified in 
assuming that this report signed by three Democrat 
Senators is true? 

Obviously, in the limited space of this book, it is im- 
possible to give all of the vast amount of evidence against 
those named. For that reason, I shall take a typical case 
and let you decide whether the evidence is a "fraud and a 
hoax." 

One of the cases given the Tydings Committee by me 
was that of William Remington. Remington at that time 
was on the Commerce Department payroll, but working 
closely with the State Department. The following excerpt 
from the Senate resolution shows that the Tydings com- 
mittee was ordered by the Senate to examine cases such 
as Remington's : 



272 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, p. 2519. 

278 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, June 28, 1950, p. 2514. 

274 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 3, p. 2515. 



75 



". . . the committee is directed to procure by sub- 
poena and examine the complete loyalty and em- 
ployment files and records of all the Government 
employees in the Department of State, and such other 

agencies against whom charges have been heard." 
(Emphasis mine.) 275 

After the Tydings Committee had cleared Remington 
and declared my evidence was a "fraud and a hoax," a 
grand jury indicted him on the grounds that he lied when 
he denied membership in the Communist Party. A jury of 
12 men and women, by a vote of 12 to 0, decided that he 
had perjured himself when he stated that he had not been 
a member of the Communist Party. This perhaps better 
than any documents of mine should help the average 
American decide whether McCarthy was right when he 
gave evidence of Communists in government, or whether 
the Tydings Committee was right when it said that my 
evidence that men such as Remington were Communists 
was a "fraud and a hoax." 

The Tydings Committee, of course, was not alone in 
refusing to recognize that there were Communists in 
government. It should be remembered that when the evi- 
dence on Alger Hiss was being made public, the Presi- 
dent gave Hiss a clean bill of health by stating on a num- 
ber of occasions that the Hiss case was merely a "red 
herring." 

The Tydings Report has been called a "Whitewash 
Report." Can you give me one specific example of 
any "whitewashing" that committee did? 

Yes. Take the case of Haldore Hanson. 

Haldore Hanson was a State Department employee who 
was scheduled to be chief of the technical division of the 
Point IV Program which would spend millions of Amer- 
ican dollars in underdeveloped areas of the world. A 
recent phone call to the State Department revealed that 
Hanson's current position is Acting Assistant Adminis- 
trator of the Point "IV Program. 

The Tydings Report gave Hanson a complete clearance. 

Louis Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker and 
the government's top witness in the trial of the 11 Com- 
munist leaders, testified before the' Tydings Committee on 
the Hanson case. Budenz' sworn testimony was that Hal- 
dore Hanson was a member of the Communist Party. 276 

Here is some of the evidence which I presented to the 
Tydings committee on Haldore Hanson. 

Edited Communist Magazine in China 

When the Japanese-Chinese war broke out in China, 
this young man in partnership with Nym Wales, wife of 
Edgar Snow — both of whom have been named under 
oath as Communists 277 — was running a Communist-line 
magazine in Peiping, China. He spent several years with 
the Communist Armies in China writing stories and taking 
pictures which the Chinese Communists helped him smug- 
gle out of the country. 

After his return from China, Hanson wrote a book — 
Humane Endeavor. Gn page 349 of his book Hanson 
condemns the anti-Communist groups in the Chinese 
Government for 



"Fighting against the Democratic Revolution as 
proposed by Mao Tse-tung and the Communists." 

Arrested by Anti-Communists in China 

Hanson points out on the same page, 349, that anti- 
Communist officials within the Chinese government were 
making indirect attacks upon the Communists and that: 

"leaders of the Communist Youth Corps were ar- 
rested by military officers at Hankow. I myself was 
the victim of one of these incidents and found that 
local officials were the instigators." 

So, we find that this employee of the State Depart- 
ment has a record of arrest in China with leaders of the 
Communist Youth Corps. 

On page 350 we find that Hanson's passport was seized 
by the police in Sian when they found that he was travel- 
ing from Communist guerrilla territory to the Commu- 
nist headquarters. He states that: 

"The man responsible for this illegal action was - 
Governor Ching Ting-wen, one of the most rabid 
anti-Red officials in China. The governor's purpose 
was merely to suppress news about the Communists." 

Communist Generals Smuggled Film 
and Newsstories for Hanson 

Throughout the book Hanson shows that not only did 
he have complete confidence in the Communist leaders 
but also that they had complete confidence in him. On 
page 256 he tells how Communist generals Nie and Lu 
Chen-Tsao acted as his .couriers smuggling packets of 
film and newsstories for him with the aid of Communist 
guerrillas into Peiping. In this connection, it is signifi- 
cant that Hanson admits that the Communists do not 
tolerate anyone who is not completely on their side. 

Praises Communist Leaders 

Hanson makes it very clear all through the book that 
he is not only on the side of the Chinese Communists 
but that he has the attitude of a hero worshipper for the 
Chinese Communist Generals. 

His respect and liking for the Communist leaders per- 
meates almost every chapter of his book. For example on 
page 284 and page 285, he tells about how some ragged 
waifs, whom he had gathered into his sleeping quarters, 
regarded as "gods" Mao Tse-tung, the leader of Commu- 
nist China, and Chu Teh, heir of Soviet Agent Smedley's 
estate and the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Red 
Armies now fighting us in Korea. He follows the system 
used in Lattimore's books of praising the Communists, 
not in his own words but in the words of some nameless 
waif who, of course, is anonymous. 

Describes Communist Generals 

as "Straight Shooting" 

Hanson says on page 303 that Communist China's 
leaders "impressed me as a group of hard-headed, straight- 
shooting realists." 



275 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, March 8, 1950, p. 1. 

278 Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 25, 1950. p. 591. 

2" Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, April 25, 1950, pp. 594, 595; McCarran 

Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 23, 1951, p. 680. 



76 



After an interview with Mao Tse-tung, leader of Red 
China, he states : 

"I left with the feeling that he [Mao Tse-tung] was 
the least pretentious man in Yenan and the most 
admired. He is a completely selfless man." 

Following is Hanson's description of how the Commu- 
nists took over China. I quote from page 102: 

"Whenever a village was occupied for the first time, 
the Reds arrested the landlords and tax collectors 
and held a public tribunal, executed a few and in- 
timidated the others, then redistributed the land as 
fairly as possible." 

In connection with Hanson's position as acting assistant 
director of the Point IV Program, the following on pages 
312 and 313 of his book would seem especially signifi- 
cant. He quites Mao Tse-tung, the Communist leader, as 

follows : 

"China cannot reconstruct its industry and com- 
merce without the aid of British and American 

capital." 

Following are my concluding remarks about Haldore 
Hanson before the Tydings Committee: 

"Can there be much doubt as to whether the Com- 
munist or the anti-Communist forces in Asia will 
receive aid under the Point-Four Program with 
Hanson in charge? 



"Gentlemen, here is a man with a mission — a man 
whose energy and intelligence, coupled with a burn- 
ing all-consuming mission, has raised him by his 
own bootstraps from a penniless operator of a Com- 
munist magazine in Peiping in the middle thirties, 
to one of the architects of our foreign policy in the 
State Department today — a man who, according to 
State Department announcement No. 41, will be 
largely in charge of the spending of hundreds of 
millions of dollars in such areas of the world and 
for such purposes as he himself decides. 

"Gentlemen, if Secretary Acheson gets away with 
his plan to put this man, to a great extent, in charge 
of the proposed Point-Four Program, it will, in my 
opinion, lend tremendous impetus to the tempo at 
which Communism is engulfing the world. 

"On page 32 of his book, Hanson apparently tries 
to justify 'the Chinese Communists chopping off 
the heads of landlords — all of which is true,' be- 
cause of 'hungry farmers.' That the farmers are still 
hungry after the landlords' heads have been removed 
apparently never occurred to him. 

"On page 31 he explained that it teok him some 
time to appreciate the 'appalling problems which the 
Chinese Communists were attempting to solve.' 

"Secretary Acheson is now putting Hanson in a po- 
sition in which he can help the Communists solve the 
'appalling problems' in other areas of the world with 
hundreds of millions of American dollars." 278 




Washington, D. C, April 6, 1950, (United Press-Photo)— Sen. Millard Tydings, left, chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Sub- 
committee investigating Sen. McCarthy's charges of Communist infiltration in the State Department, shakes hands with Owen Lattimore, 
right, who appeared today to answer charges made by McCarthy. 



77 



CHAPTER X 



Guilt By Association 



s not a person presumed innocent until proven 

guilty? 

Yes. 

Why do yon condemn- people like Acheson, Jessup, 
Lattimore, Service, Vincent and others who have 
never been convicted of any crime? 

The fact that these people have not been convicted of 
treason or of violating some of our espionage laws is no 
more a valid argument that they are fit to represent this 
country in its fight against Communism than the argu- 
ment that a person who has a reputation of consorting 
with criminals, hoodlums, gamblers, and kidnappers is 
fit to act as your baby sitter, beeause he has never been 
convicted of a crime. 

American People Entitled 
to Benefit of Doubt 

A government job is a privilege, not a right. There is 
no reason why men who chum with Communists, who re- 
fuse to turn their backs upon traitors and who are con- 
sistently found at the time and place where disaster 
strikes America and success comes to international Com- 
munism, should be given positions of power in gov- 
ernment. 

What is your answer to the charge that you employ 
the theory of guilt by association? 

This should properly be labeled BAD SECURITY RISK 
BY ASSOCIATION or GUILT BY COLLABORATION 
rather than GUILT BY ASSOCIATION. 

The State Department, whose publicity agents com- 
plain the loudest about guilt by association, has adopted 
in their loyalty yardstick what they condemn as the 
theory of guilt by association. 

For example, one of the categories of people they have 
declared unfit for service in the State Department is: 

"A person who has habitual or close association 
with persons known or believed to be in categories A 
or B." (Defined as a Communist or one "serving the 
interests of another government in preference to the 
interests of the United States.") 279 

In this connection I might add that the State Depart- 
ment's loyalty and security yardstick is all right. The 
trouble is that they do not use that yardstick when the 
loyalty measurements are made. 

In upholding the constitutionality of the Feinberg Law, 
the purpose of which was to weed Communists out of 
teaching jobs in New York, the United States Supreme 
Court said: 

"One's associates, past and present, as well as 
one's conduct, may properly be considered in deter- 
mining fitness and loyalty . . . 

"From time immemorial, one's reputation has been 
determined in part by the company he keeps ... 



We know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that 
prevents the state when determining . . . fitness and 
loyalty of . . . persons, from considering the organiza- 
tions and persons with whom they associate." 280 

In passing upon the constitutionality of that part of the 
Taft-Hartley Law which requires a non-Communist oath, 
the Supreme Court said: 

"The conspiracy principle has traditionally been 
employed to protect society against all 'ganging-up' 
or concerted action in violation of its laws. No term 
passes that the Court does not sustain convictions 
based on that doctrine for violations of the anti-trust 
laws or other statutes. However, there has recently 
entered the dialectic of politics a cliche used to con- 
demn application of the conspiracy principle to Com- 
munists. 

" 'Guilt by Association' is an epithet frequently 
used and little explained, except that it is generally 
accompanied by another slogan, 'guilt is personal.' 
Of course it is; but personal guilt may be incurred 
by joining a conspiracy. That act of association 
makes one responsible for acts of others committed 
in pursuance of the association." 281 

I have not urged that those whom I have named be 
put in jail. Once they are exposed so the American people 
know what they are, they can do but little damage. 

FBI Head States Exposure 
Cuts Down Danger 

As J. Edgar Hoover said before the House Un-Ameri- 
can Activities Committee: 

"Victory will be assured once Communists are 
identified and exposed, because the public will take 
the first step of quarantining them so they can do no 

harm." 282 

Defense of "Innocence by Association" 

Strangely enough, those who scream the loudest about 
what they call guilt by association are the first to endorse 
innocence by association. 

For example, those who object most strongly to my 
showing Jessup's affinity for Communist causes, the Com- 
munist money used to support the publication over which 
he had control, and his close friendship and defense of a 
Communist spy, also argue Hiss' innocence-by-associ- 
ation. The argument is that Hiss was innocent because 
Justices Frankfurter and Reed testified they were friends 
of his, because Acheson chummed and walked with him 
each morning, because Hiss was the top planner at the 
United Nations conference and helped to draft the Yalta 
agreement. 

We are not concerned with GUILT by association be- 



2to Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations, Feb. 
28, 1950, pp. 596-597. 

280 Justice Sherman Minton speaking for the majority in the decision on the 
Feinberg Law, March, 1952. 

281 Justice Robert H. Jackson in his concurring decision on Taft-Hartley oath, 
May, 1950. 

2.S2 Hearings before House Committee on Un-American Activities, Pt. 3, March 
26, 1947, p. 44. 



79 



cause here we are not concerned with convicting any in- 
dividual of any crime. We are concerned with the ques- 
tion of whether the individual who associates with those 
who are trying to destroy this nation, should be admitted 
to the high councils of those planning the policies of this 
nation; whether they should be given access to top secret 
material to which even Senators and Congressmen are 
not given access. 

The best analogy perhaps is the case of the applicant 
for a job as bank cashier who travels with safe-crackers, 
robbers, and gamblers. Naturally, such a man would not 
be hired as cashier and allowed access to depositors' 



money. The fact that the bank president does not give 
him a job as cashier does not mean the job applicant has 
been found guilty of any crime. It merely means that the 
bank president, using good common horse-sense, decides 
that his depositors are entitled to have this man kept away 
from their money while he has associates who are bank 
robbers and safe crackers. Certainly in dealing with the 
lives of countless sons of American mothers and the 
liberty of 150 million American people, we should be 
using the same good common horse-sense that the bank 
president uses. 



80 



CHAPTER XI 



The Penalty For Loyalty In The State Department 



fs not your claim of Communists in the State De- 
partment unfair to the loyal Americans in the 

State Department? 

This perhaps can best be answered by asking you the 
question of whether it is unfair to the loyal, honest em- 
ployees of a bank to expose and convict the cashier who 
is embezzling the bank's funds. 

I am well aware of the fact that the vast majority of 
people working in the State Department are good, loyal, 
honest Americans. Some of them have unstintingly de- 
voted their entire lives, and at meager salaries, in the 
interest of America. I know perhaps better than anyone 
how painfully aware those loyal people are of the min- 
ions of Stalin who have been betraying this nation. I have 
positive knowledge that they are heartily in favor of my 
fight to remove the traitors from their midst. 

It is those who have insisted on protecting Commu- 
nists in the State Department who are unfair to the vast 
number of honest, loyal employees in that Department. 
Perhaps I have no better supporters in my fight than the 
good Americans in the State Department. 

Real Experts in State Department Ignored 

In this connection, let me quote a statement I made 
before the Tydings Committee on March 14, 1950: 

"The Department of State of the United States 
operates with thousands of employees and requires a 
tremendous budget which has aided materially in 
placing on the American people the greatest tax bur- 
den they have ever been called upon to bear. 

"All but a small handful of those employees are 
honest and loyal Americans. The State Department 
is their life work. They have given to it years of serv- 
ice, unquestioned loyalty; and they have served it 
with great pride. 

"In the far-flung places of the world, these loyal 
men and women have spent their lives and exercised 
all their ingenuity to give to their Department and 
their Government every possible bit of information 
and advice they thought useful. 

"Career employees of the State Department, by vir- 
tue of their long residence in every foreign country 
on the globe and their close association and friend- 
ship with citizens and officials of those countries, 
have had access to, have reported on, every phase of 
economic and political affairs in the nations to which 
they are attached. 

"These are the real 'experts' of the State Depart- 
ment. 

"It is a tragedy when we find the advice and ex- 
periences of such outstandingly able employees stored 
in a multitude of steel filing cases and disregarded 
while the Department of State's closed corporation 
of 'untouchables' calls upon pro-Communist idealists, 
crackpots, and, to put it mildly, 'bad security risks' 
to advise them on American diplomatic policy." 283 

Where have you gotten your information on Com- 
munists in government? 



From a vast number of sources. 

One of the reasons why I have been able to get in- 
formation is that every government employee who gives 
me information knows that he will be fully protected and 
that under no circumstances will his job be endangered 
because he, as a loyal American, has given a Senator in- 
formation on traitors. 

I have not and do not intend ever to break faith with 
those people. The Tydings committee tried to get their 
names, but failed. No other committee will get their 
names. 

If a government employee has information on 
another employee, why should he not take that in- 
formation to the security officer of his department 
rather than to you? 

As far as I know, all information given me has been 
brought to the attention of the proper officials. 

Unfortunately, experience has shown that a State De- 
partment employee who furnishes evidence of Commu- 
nistic activities in the State Department merely endangers 
his job and the information is pigeon-holed. 

State Department Security Officer 
Threatens Retaliation 

Carlisle Humelsine, Under-Secretary of State in charge 
of security, publicly stated on a nationwide .television 
network on August 19, 1951, that if the State Department 
could find out who is giving me information on the Com- 
munists in government, those individuals — not the Com- 
munists — would be discharged. 

Can you give an example of what happens to a State 
Department employee who attempts to expose 
Communism ? 

On June 16, 1948, while General Marshall was Sec- 
retary of State, Robert C. Alexander, who was em- 
ployed in the visa division of the State Department, testi- 
fied under oath that Communists were allowed to enter 
the United States under the protection of the United Na- 
tions. Secretary of State Marshall immediately denied the 
truth of this statement and set up a committee which 
denounced Alexander's allegations as "irresponsible and 
untrue." On September 9, 1948, Alexander received a 
letter from the State Department which contained the 
following : 

"The Department proposes to take appropriate 
disciplinary action against you . . . for misconduct 
in office and dereliction of duty. 

"The intended action rose out of your testimony and 
inferences arising from your statements made before 
the staff of the subcommittee on Immigration and 
Naturalization, Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate 



J Tydings Committee Hearings, Pt. 1, March 14, 1950, pp. 141, 142. 



81 




"Specifically, the department charges that this tes- 
timony was irresponsibly made and at variance with 
the facts. In the opinion of the department, this testi- 
mony constituted an indiscriminate reflection on the 
United Nations and other international organizations 
and consequently embarrassed the department." 284 

"Irresponsible" Charges Proved True 

On June 30, 1949, Senator McCarran wrote Admiral 
Hillenkoetter, who was then head of the Central Intelli- 
gence Agency, to inquire whether Communists spies actu- 
ally were coming into the United States through the 
United Nations. He wrote as follows: 

"Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter: 

"There is attached to this letter a list of names of 
100 persons. . , 

"This is a partial list of those persons to whom visas 
have been issued for admission into the United States 
either as affiliates of international organizations or 
as officials or employees of foreign governments, and 
their families . . . 

"How many of the persons whose names appear on 
the attached list have been engaged in subversive ac- 
tivity prior to their assumption of official duty in the 
United States as affiliates of international organiza- 
tions or as officials or employees of foreign govern- 
ments? The term 'subversive activity' as used in this 
question denotes active participation in foreign intel- 
ligence organizations or active Communist organiza- 
tional work, rather than mere membership in the 
Communist Party." 285 

Many of the names given in this letter of Senator 
McCarran were names which had previously been referred 
to by Mr. Alexander. 

Head of Central Intelligence Agency Confirms 

As Accurate Alexander's Charges Which 

Had Been Labeled "Irresponsible" 

Following are two pertinent paragraphs from Admiral 
Hillenkoetter's answer : 

"Thirty-two of the individuals named in your at- 
tached list have reported or allegedly been engaged in 
active work for the intelligence services of their re- 
spective countries. 

"Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your at- 
tached list are high-ranking Communist Party offi- 
cials." 28 6 

Shortly thereafter Admiral Hillenkoetter was removed 
as head of Central Intelligence Agency and assigned to a 
post of duty in the Western Pacific. 

Robert Alexander's testimony, given under oath, was 
contradicted and publicly denounced by his State De- 
partment superiors including Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall. No apology was made to Alexander when his 
"irresponsible" charges were proved true in every respect. 

Secret Trial of Alexander Ordered 

The State Department proposed to hold a secret trial 
of this State Department official on charges of miscon- 
duct. Alexander, however, refused to attend the secret 
trial, demanding instead that he be given a public investi- 
gation. 287 

This case received such wide publicity — and the State 



Department knew it was treading on such weak ground- 
that it was afraid to fire Alexander; 

Robert Alexander is today still in the State Depart- 
ment. But Robert Alexander is not one of the so-called 
experts or one of the policy makers of the State Depart- 
ment today. Despite his intelligent action on a matter 
which has been of major concern to all loyal State De- 
partment employees, Robert Alexander — like Angus 
Ward and so many other loyal State Department em- 
ployees — has been penalized for his service to America. 
Unlike John Carter Vincent, Ambassador Philip Jessup, 
and so many other State Department employees whose 
main qualification for the top positions they hold seems 
to be their softness toward Communism, Robert Alex- 
ander's advice is not being sought by the top policy plan- 
ners, nor has he been given a position to help lead the 
fight against international Communism. 

In what way have loyal people in the State Depart- 
ment been hampered in their work by fellow em- 
ployees who are pro-Communists? 

The case of General Patrick Hurley, Roosevelt's Am- 
bassador to China, is one of many cases in point. 

When Ambassador Hurley left China for a trip to the 
United States on February 28, 1945, George Atcheson, 
Jr., then Charge d'Affaires during Hurley's absence, sent 
a telegram to the State Department recommending not 
only that we cooperate with the Communists but also that 
we supply the Communists with arms. His message read 
in part as follows: 

"We recommend that the President tell Chiang 
Kai-shek in no uncertain terms that we will cooper- 
ate and supply the Communists." 288 

This was completely against the policy of the United 
States at that time. Ambassador Hurley has said that 
the message: 

". . . Recommended in my absence that the Chinese 
[Communist] armed party, a belligerent whose pur- 
pose was to destroy the government that I had to 
sustain, be furnished lend-lease arms and equipment 
... I opposed that as destructive of the government 
that Ihad been directed to uphold . . ," 289 

Hurley Exposes John Stewart Service and 
Urges His Recall 

Hurley later named George Atcheson, Jr., and John 
Stewart Service as two of the State Department employees 
who persisted in their support of the Communist Party 
against the Government of the Republic of China. 290 

On November 26, 1945, when Ambassador Hurley re- 
signed his position, he had this to say: 

"We finished the war in the Far East, furnishing 
lend-lease supplies and using all our reputation to 
undermine democracy and bolster imperialism and 
Communism . . . 




284 Congressional Record (Unbound), June 14, 1951, p. 6720. 

285 Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization 
on S. 1832, Pt. 1, July 16, 1949, p. 357. 

. 286 Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization on 
S. 1832, Pt. 1, July 16. 1949, pp. 358, 359. 
28' New York Sun, July 28, 1948; Washington Post, Oct. 6, .1948. 

288 Russell Committee Hearings, Pt. 4, June 21, 1951, p. 2905. 

289 senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Investigation of Par Eastern 
Policy, Dec. 5, 1945, p. 38-A, (Transcript). 

zoo New York Times, Nov. 29, 1945, p. 3. 



82 



"The professional Foreign Service men [in the U. S. 
State Department] sided with the Chinese Commu- 
nist armed party and the imperialist bloc of nations 
whose policy it was to keep China divided against 
herself. Our professional diplomats continuously ad- 
vised the Communists that my efforts in preventing 
the collapse of the National (anti-Communist) gov- 
ernment did not represent the policy of the United 
States. These same professionals openly advised the 
Communist armed party to decline unification of the 
Chinese Communist army with the National army un- 
less the Chinese Communists were given control . . . 

"I requested the relief of the career men who were 
opposing the American policy in the Chinese theatre 
of war. These professional diplomats were returned 
to Washington and placed in the Chinese and Far 
Eastern divisions of the State Department as my 
superiors. 

"Some of these same career men whom I relieved 
have been assigned as advisors to the Supreme Com- 
mander in Asia. In such positions, most of them have 
continued to side with the Communist armed party 
and at times with the imperialist bloc against Ameri- 
can policy . . . 



". . . At the same time a considerable section of our 
State Department is endeavoring to support Commu- 
nism generally as well as specifically in China." 
(Emphasis mine.) 291 

Hurley left the State Department, but Acheson's crowd 
stayed on. It would* appear that the only road to swift 
promotion in the State Department has been secretly to 
aid the cause of Communism while publicly voicing oppo- 
sition to Communism. 

What happened to the members of Hurley's staff 
who were relieved by Mm because of their aid to 
the Communist cause? 

Hurley's answer to this appears on August 7, 1949, in 
the New York Times: 

"Nearly all the officials relieved by me in China be- 
cause they were pro-Communist are now in the State 
Department presumably writing alibi White Papers." 



i White Paper on China, pp. 581-582. 



83 



"/ have been warned by many that an outspoken course, even if it be 
solely of truth, will bring down upon my head ruthless retaliation — 
that efforts will be made to destroy public faith in the integrity of my 
views — not by force of just argument but by the application of the 
false methods of propaganda. 

"I am told, in effect, I must folloiv blindly the leader — keep silent — 
or take the bitter consequences." 

General Douglas MacArthur 
Boston, Massachusetts 
July 25, 1951 



84 



CHAPTER XII 



The Smear 



TFThat is the reason for the viciously intense 
YY smear attack which has been waged as 
you since von started to die Communists ont of 
government ? 

The official Ciiihhm! II Party line is to destroy die 
reputation of anyone who daces In expose any of their 
undercover Conananids. Lenin long ago fgfaHrihtd 
this Comraasi^t rale whe» he said: 



toward those who disaeree with as."** 2 

The purpose of this Communis! tactic is two-foH: 
(1) to smear and discredit the individaj. se :: vA - 
evidence on traitors will not he helieved and 2 : : 
discourage others from entering the fight. 

In this the Communists have been singularly suc- 
cessful. Time and again, men in the field of politics, 
writing, religion, and education who have spoken out 
against specific Communists have found themselves 
bitterly attacked, smeared out of office, and prevented 
from getting jobs. 293 

Louis Budenz, who for years was editor of the Com- 
munist Daily Worker, gave the Justice Department the 
names of 400 secret members of the Communist Party 
who are engaged in newspaper and radio work. He 
explained that one of the major aims of the Commu- 
nist Party was to infiltrate as many newspapers and 
radio stations as possible so, as to be able to twist 
and distort the news along the Communist Party line. 
It is very important to the Party that the Communists 
handling news in press and radio remain concealed, 
secret members of the Party because once their mem- 
bership is known they can do but little damage. 

In this connection, the following testimony of Igor 
Bogolepov, former Colonel in the Red Army who worked 
with Russian intelligence, is of interest: 

"Once I read a memorandum written by Molotov 
in our secret files where the problem was discussed 
of our participation and utilization of the Western 
press. I have to explain that before 1931 it was a 
general rule that the Communists should not write 
in the foreign press. It was a shame. It was a dis- 
grace. But Trotsky was expelled from the Soviet 
Union and he had written articles against Stalin in 
the Daily Express, and these articles became very 
popular because they were ' written in the British 
newspaper. 

"This gave the idea to the Soviet authorities that 
it was wrong to seek only the Communist papers. 
In the memorandum of Molotov which evidently 
laid down the foundation for the new trend of Soviet 
policy, written in 1931, it was stated, Who Reads 
the Communist Papers? Only a few people who are 
already Communists. We don't need to propagandize 
them. What is our object? Who do we have to in- 
fluence? We have to influence non-Communists if 
we want te make them Communists or if we want 



to fool them. So we have to try to infiltrate in the 
big press, to influence millions of people, and not 
merely hundreds of thousands. 

"After this argumentation the position was taken 
that we had to change drastically our policy, as I 
said before and do our best in order to carry oat 
the Communist ideas through non-Communist press." 
(Ejnphasi; mine. 29 * 

It has been claimed by some that instead of hurting 
the Cormmmist cause you have aided it. How can 
the average ft— ■■■ m who does not have access to 
all the reeords. decide whether yon have helped or 
hurt the CowuMmisi canse .' 

7: 
nmnifts. '■■ 

rindpal functions af the Deifr Wc 



:-:;::: '.: - _ - ~ — ^ press 
arker, ac- 



cording to all the evidence, is to acr_ aB :--- >-<am- 
munist writers, news conanenlaiois, etc, what die fflS 
Communist Party line is. 

Louis Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker, tes- 
tified: 

"The Daily Worker is not a daily paper in the nor- 
mal sense of the word. It is the telegraph agency of 
the conspiracy giving directives to the conspirators. 

". . . It parades under the guise of a daily paper 
in order to protect itself through the cry of free- 
dom of the press, but it is not concerned primarily 
with how much circulation it has . . . 

"Its concern is to get out every day to the Com- 
munists throughout the country, the active ones, 
the instructions upon which they are to'act." 295 _ 

"Every time the Daily .Worker arrives in the dis- 
trict office of the Communist Party it is read imme- 
diately by the district leader. 'He calls together his 
staff, and he assigns to them their tasks as_a result 
of the Daily Worker articles and editorials." 296 

How did the Communist Party order, its member- 
ship in press and radio to handle the issue of Sen- 
ator McCarthy vs. Communists in the State Depart- 
ment? 

The national secretary of the Communist Party, Gus 
Hall, who has since been jailed for his Communist activi- 
ties, advised all Communist Party members as follows 
in the Daily Worker of May 4, 1950: 

"I urge all Communist Party members, and all anti- 
fascists, to yield second place to none "in the fight 
to rid our country of the fascist poison of Mc- 
Carthyism." 
On April 5, 1950, the Daily Worker had this to say: 

"Communists are keenly aware of the damage the 
McCarthy crowd is doing. They recognize that the 
McCarthy objective is destruction of the Bill of 



292 Quoted by Max Eastman, Saturday Evening Per:, N"0T£=t-=r - '-=±2. 

2»3 For more detailed Information on this see zr^it-i -.-ens' a_ _:ls 

Legion Magazine, September, 1951. _*.-—)-*«*» 

294 McOarran Committee Hearings on IPH, April 7, 18S» (mw Mas jrBSal.} 

295 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR. PI. 2, Aig. 23, 1851. P- 515. 
29« McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pi. 2. Aug. 23, 1531, p. ML 



85 



Rights with its precious safeguards of the freedom 
to think, to meet, and to express one's thoughts 
freely." 

It will be recalled that almost identical language was 
used by Truman in his attack on McCarthy on August 
14, 1951. 

On March 22, 1950, the Daily Worker had this to say: 

"McCarthy today is regarded by many people, may- 
be by a majority, as a clumsy but dangerous clown. 
But it is possible that at some time in the future 
the ravings of McCarthy, together with the irre- 
sponsible charges of the Un-American Committee, 
will provide the 'evidence' upon which labor lead- 
ers, Negro leaders and progressive persons from 
all walks of life, will go to jail." 

By "progressive persons" obviously was meant Com- 
munists. Some of those "progressive persons" have since 
gone to jail. 

On October 9, 1951, the Daily Worker lavishly praised 
Henry Luce, publisher of Time, Life, and Fortune, for 
his intemperate attacks on McCarthy and ended with 
the following language: 

"A broad united front struggle against McCarthy- 
ism is necessary . . . The admissions made by Luce 
in his editorial on McCarthy offer some disinterested 
confirmation of our conviction that such a broad 
united front is definitely a tangible possibility at 
this time." 

On December 27, 1950, the Daily Worker shed tears 
over the exposure of the activities of Drew Pearson. 
Pearson, it will be recalled, sprang to the defense of 
Owen Lattimore when I presented the evidence on Latti- 
more in 1950, and has been carrying on a smear against 
McCarthy ever since. 

Opposite is a reproduction of a letter put out by the 
Communist Party of Maryland. 

It will be noted that this letter was signed by Philip 
Frankfeld who has since been convicted. 

Attached to this letter was a pamphlet also put out 
by the Communist Party of Maryland and widely dis- 
tributed to Communists both in and outside of Maryland. 
The title page of that pamphlet is reproduced on the 
opposite page. 

Following are a few excerpts from the body of the 
pamphlet: 

"Defeat McCarthyism or face the threat of political 
annihilation. ... 

"At all times, remember the fact that the main 
enemy is McCarthyism . . . [we must] direct our 
main fight against it. . . . 

"Time is running out. The great need today is 
unity. Let us start fighting together — and victory is 
assured." 

In September, 1951, an article entitled "Mass Tasks 
Facing the Party Today," appeared in Political Affairs, 
a magazine which has been cited by the House Commit- 
tee on Un-American Activities as "an official Communist 
Party monthly theoretical organ." The article urged that 
"the major task" of the Communist Party was to "seize 



the initiative in the fight against McCarthyism." This 
Communist publication then urged the importance of 
getting labor groups to fight McCarthyism. It urged 
that the fight against McCarthy, to be successful, should 
be labeled "as a fight against monopoly, pro-fascist 
reaction, and for democratic liberties and the Bill of 
Rights." 297 

The above are a very, very small percentage of the 
Communist directives repeatedly carried by every Com- 
munist publication in the country. For over two years 
Communist officials and publications have constantly 
been proclaiming that their No. 1 task is to discredit 
and destroy McCarthy in the eyes of the people. Recently 
they have been equally intemperate in their attacks upon 
Senator Pat McCarran. Senator McCarran, with the power 
of subpoena, an excellent committee, and an excellent 
staff, is doing an outstanding job. He is doing great 
damage to the Communist conspiracy. The nearer he gets 
to nerve center of the Communist movement, the more 
vicious will become their attacks upon him. 

What do you consider the principal purpose of the 
Communist Party line type of smear attack being 
waged against you? 

The smear attacks on McCarthy are no longer being 
made with the hope that they can thereby force me to 
give up this fight to expose and get Communists out of 
government. They have learned by now that I am not 
much concerned and am in no way influenced by their 
smear attacks. The purpose now of the viciousness and 
intensity of the smear is to teach other men in public 
life that the same will happen to them if they dare to 
expose Communists. 

Most of the attacks were thoroughly discredited and 
disproved charges which had been used against me 
in the campaign in Wisconsin in 1946. They were not 
used again until I publicly began my fight against Com- 
munists in government. Who dug up these old attacks 
in an attempt to stop my Communist fight? Where were 
they used? Why? 

In Owen Lattimore's book, Ordeal by Slander, Mrs. 
Lattimore tells of spending days poring over the columns 
of left-wing writers to collect this material from the 1946 
campaign. 298 The original source of practically every one 
of these attacks was the Madison Capital Times, whose 
city editor, Cedric Parker, has been publicly called by 
his own editor and boss, William Evjue, "the Commu- 
nist leader in Madison." 299 These publicly disproved 
stories were picked up by Lattimore and used before the 
Tydings Committee to "prove" that Lattimore was not a 
Communist. Lattimore, incidentally, has since said that 
Joe Barnes, formerly foreign news editor of the New York 
Herald Tribune, helped him prepare his statement before 
the Tydings Committee. 300 Barnes has been named under 
oath as a Soviet agent. This smear, which was used in 
Lattimore's defense before the Tydings Committee, has 
been picked up with a few additional inventions and 





z« Political Affairs, September, 1951, pp. 26, 27. 
a»s Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 40. 
2» Madison Capital-Times, March 14. 1941, p. 21. 
» Lattimore, Ordeal By Slander, p. 56. 



86 



UNITY 
CAN 



COMMUNIST PARTY 

OF 

MARYLAND AMD THE DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA 



Novenber 27, 1950, 

.Baltimore, Maryland 



Dear Sir or Madam? 

The enclosed article* «UHITY CAN DEFEAT MeCARTHYISM", is 
being sailed out to thousands of Karylahders as a public servie© 
by ths Communist Party of Maryland and District of Colombia . 

r- 

We have confidence that ths onslaughts of McCarthyism 
have not bees that successful where mm and women will refuse to 
listen to the BoSiinists of Maryland, ■ 

It is high time that we learn the lesson of Hitler 
GefMany, There a whole nation was betrayed under the slogan of 
"Defeat CommuHiss". Our country is following the sase tragic path. 

If the Coismaiist Party of the USA is outlawed under the 
McCarran, Smith or Ober Laws, then McCarthyism has won a signal 
victory and the Constitution and Bill of Eights has been outlawed 
for all Americans. Then our country has taken a great leap forward 
tewarHs a complete fascist state - and towards World War III. 

The future of our country rests with YOU - individually 
and collectively - and what YOU will do immsdialSTy together with 
the iaany-millioned-najority who support Democracy against fascism. 

The enclosed article is an "Appeal to Reason", 

We urge you to read it, 

Very sincerely yours, 

Philip Franfcfeld, Chairaan . 
George A. Meyers, Labor Secretary 
Roy Wood, Chairman, Washington, D.C. 



A 



McCarthy! sm/ 



h 



fW P fonkfeld 

"CHAIRIfflH OF THE COUDMST MOT OP MaRasMD" 



Letter and pamphlet distributed by Communist Party 



87 



parroted over and over by the Daily Worker, Drew Pear- 
son, the Milwaukee Journal, etc. 

Most of the catch phrases, with which you are un- 
doubtedly familiar, such as— "McCarthyism," "irrespon- 
sible charges," "mud slinging," "shotgun technique," — 
were coined by the Daily Worker or Owen Lattimore. 

Has the Administration aided the Communists in 
this smear? 

From the day Truman announced on February 23, 
1950, that he would do everything in his power to "dis- 
prove McCarthy's charges," the Administration has 
used all of its poWer — all of its publicity agents paid for 
by the taxpayers — to clear men like Lattimore, Davies, 
Vincent and Acheson, and to attempt to discredit and 
smear McCarthy. 

Truman Begins Smear Campaign 

As early as April, 1950, President Truman called to 
the White House for a conference William Evjue, editor 
of the Madison Capital Times, a man who, as previously 
stated, maintains on his staff as city editor, Cedric 
Parker, who Evjue himself in an editorial called "the 
Communist leader in Madison." 

• At the conclusion of the White House conference, 
Evjue announced to the press that the President assured 
him the Administration would continue to fight Mc- 
Carthyism. 

State Department "White Papers" 
on McCarthy 

There is no secret about the fact that the State De- 
partment spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in a 
propaganda effort, to discredit McCarthy. One phase of 
this effort was the series of six "White Papers," cov- 
ering speeches which I had made during May and June 
1950. 

Those "White Papers" were sent to every newspaper 
throughout the country. Their purpose was to "prove" 
that McCarthy had lied. They were cleverly prepared, 
but with complete disregard for the truth— their, hope 
apparently being that if they could get enough news- 
papers to repeat over and over the State Department's 
claim that McCarthy had lied, that some of it might 
stick in the minds of the people. 

For example, when I exposed the fact that the Com- 
munist front publication, over which Jessup had editorial 
control, was supported by Communist money, a "White 
Paper" was issued, pointing out how unfair this was 
to Jessup and inferring that only $3,500 of Communist 
money had been taken. 801 

Since then the McCarran Committee has obtained 
the records of this Communist front and has found that 
over $60,000 of Communist money was used. 802 This 
obviously was known to Jessup and the State Department 
at the time the "White Paper" was written. 

Another "White Paper" was issued after my Roches- 
ter, New York speech of May 25, 1950. In that speech 
I discussed Ambassador Jessup's connection with the 
Communist-front China Aid Council. The China Aid 



Council has been repeatedly recognized and cited by 
legislative committees as a Communist front. 803 The 
sworn testimony of Elizabeth Bentley before the McCarran 
Committee is that Price, the Secretary of the China Aid 
Council, was a Communist agent and that the China 
Aid Council was completely controlled by the Commu- 
nist Party. 304 

After I discussed Jessup's connection with this organ- 
ization, the State Department sent a "White Paper" to 
newspaper editors throughout the country. In that "White 
Paper" they state: 

"China Aid Council: Ambassador Jessup has never 
been affiliated with this organization." 305 

On December 8, 1949, Jessup testified during the trial 
of Alger Hiss, and in answer to questions on the China 
Aid Council, he testified as follows: 

QUESTION: "Did you know whether your wife in 1947 
was a member of the directors of the China Aid 
Council?" 

JESSUP: "I believe she was." 



QUESTION: "Are you a member or have you been asso- 
ciated with the China Aid Council?" 

JESSUP: "I have never been a member of it. / had some 
association with it." 

QUESTION: "Did you tell us in what manner you were 
associated with — your description now is — " ' 

JESSUP: "I don't remember specific contacts. I remem- 
ber that we had questions of common interest about 
arranging meetings, publications, things of that 
kind." (Emphasis mine.) 30e 

In my speech to the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors on April 20, 1950, I exhibited a letter written 
by Lattimore, while he was Deputy Director of Pacific 
Operations, Office of War Information, to Joe Barnes, 
then head of the New York office of the Office of War 
Information. That letter labeled "secret" told Barnes to 
fire all Chinese in OWI except two (Chew Hong and 
Chi) and to recruit a new Chinese force from the New 
China Daily News. s(>1 I pointed out in my speech that 
the New China Daily News was a Communist controlled 
paper. Therefore, this was in effect an order to Barnes 
that in hiring Chinese, only Chinese Communists or those 
sympathetic to Communism should be hired. The State 
Department "White Paper" on this ridiculed my state- 
ment and claimed that the Lattimore letter actually was 
an admonition to Barnes to be careful not to hire Com- 
munists. 308 

This sounded plausible enough to many editors who 
were not aware of the identity of Chew Hong and Chi 
or of the fact that the New China Daily News was Com- 



»i Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 571, June 12, 1850, p. 964. 
602 McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 1, July 25, 1951, p. 7. 
so3 cited as "subsidiary" of the American League for Peace and Democracy. 
(Special Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Repre- 
sentatives, Report, June 25, 1942, p. 16); Cited as a "Communist front and 
a subsidiary organization of the American League for Peace and Democracy." 
(California Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, 1S48, pp. 151, 319, 
336). 

•M McCarran Committee Hearings on IPR, Pt. 2, Aug. 9, 1951, pp. 406-407. 
sos Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 572, June 19, 1950, p. 1014. 
sun U.S. of America v. Alger Hiss, C-128-402, Hon. Henry W. Goddard, District 
Judge, testimony of Philip Jessup, Dec. 8, 1949, pp. 1510, 1512. 
so ? Congressional Record (Unbound), June 2, 1950, pp. 8104-8106. 
*» Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, No. 571, June 12, 1950, p. 966. 



8» 



munist controlled and directed. Some of those editors, 
in fact, editorialized about another "wild McCarthy 
charge." 

The facts are, however, that Chew Hong and Chi had 
been labeled by the Civil Service Commission as Com- 
munist and pro-Communist respectively. Civil Service 
files label the New China Daily News as Communist con- 
trolled. Those files have been made part of the McCarran 
Committee record. 309 In addition, the President and the 
former managing editor of the New China Daily News 
were recently indicted "as part of an international racket 
involving murder, extortion and torture in which Amer- 
ican-Chinese have been mulcted of millions of dollars 
for Red China." The U. S. attorney described the New 
China Daily News as "a racket which is designed to fur- 
ther the aims of the Chinese Communist government." 310 

Maryland Campaign Investigating 
Committee Part of Smear 

There are many other indications of the Administra- 
tion's taxpayer-supported propaganda machine being 
used against anyone who attempts to remove Communists 
from government. The Maryland Campaign Investigating 
Committee went all-out as a part of the smear. My docu- 
mented report on that committee's activities appears in 
the Congressional Record of August 20, 1951, page 10526 
(unbound edition). 

Benton Resolution Supported 
by Communist Party 

The Benton resolution to expel McCarthy from the 
Senate and the Gillette-Monroney Committee which has 
been "investigating" Benton's charges for almost a year 
are also a part of the Administration's smear machine 
which is used against a fight such as mine. 

The Communist Party has fully supported all of these 
efforts of the Administration. In an article entitled "How 
to Fight McCarthyism," which appeared in the October, 
1951, issue of Political Affairs, the Communist publica- 
tion which presents the current tasks and problems of 
the Communist Party, Communist Party members are 
ordered to "support the Benton resolution to oust Mc- 
Carthy from the Senate." 3 11 

It is impossible to estimate bow many hundreds of 
thousands of dollars have been spent by the State De- 
partment and the above mentioned Democratic-controlled 
Committees in an attempt to discredit this fight against 
Communism. 

Some idea of the extent to which the State Depart- 
ment has used taxpayers' money for this purpose was 
revealed by Congressman Hill of Colorado and Willard 
Edwards, long-time Washington newspaperman. After 
weeks of work these men uncovered a large number of 
secret contracts made by the State Department, which 
showed that the department used a $27 million slush fund 
in 1950 to subsidize a number of radio commentators, 
cartoonists, writers and publishers. For example, the 
State Department paid over $2,000 for a book of Herbert 
Block's cartoons entitled Herbloch Looks at Communism. 
Herbert Block is the political cartoonist for the Washing- 



ton Post. He has cartooned violently against every attempt 
to dig out unexposed Communists, including my anti- 
Communist fight. < 
Time Magazine which has consistently distorted the news 
on my anti-Communist fight and which referred to mis- 
quotations in the Marshall speech — misquotations no one 
has yet been able to find in the speech — also received a 
heavy subsidy from the State Department this year, and 
in addition, according to a speech of Senator Harry Cain 
of Washington (April 10, 1950), was subsidized, as of 
December 31, 1949, in the amount of $343,800 by the 
government. 

Why has President Truman repeatedly asked for 
an all-out fight against MeCarthyism? 

Perhaps for the same reason that he felt the exposure 
of Alger Hiss was a personal attack upon himself and 
labeled it as a "red herring." 

Do you claim that all the newspapers that condemn 
you for exposing underground Communists are 
Communist controlled? 

Certainly not. In that connection, we quote General 
Douglas MacArthur: 

"This campaign to subvert the truth and shape or 
confuse the public mind with its consequent weaken- 
ing of moral courage is not chargeable entirely to 
Communists engaged in a centrally controlled world- 
wide conspiracy to destroy all.freedom. For they have 
many allies, here as elsewhere who, blind to reality, 
ardently support the general Communist aims while 
reacting violently to the mere suggestion that they 
do so." 312 

It should also be borne in mind that newspapers oppose 
one for different reasons. 

There are, for example, the completely honest news- 
paper editors who are sincerely opposed to what I am 
doing. They honestly believe that there is some better way 
of digging out the under-cover Communists. Then there 
are papers — like the Sheboygan Press which is a Demo- 
crat paper in my state — which oppose anyone who 
threatens the security of the Democrat administration. 
Then there is a third group into which category fall papers 
like the Milwaukee Journal and the Madison Capital-Times 
in my state. The city editor of the Capital-Times, who 
also writes for the Milwaukee Journal, is Cedric Parker. 
As previously stated, he has been editorially described 
in his own paper, the Capital-Times, as "The Communist 
leader in Madison." Papers in this group are found con- 
sistently paralleling the editorial line of the Communist 
Daily Worker. They, of course, criticize Communism 
generally to obtain a false reputation of being anti-Com- 
munist. They then go all-out to assassinate the character 
and destroy the reputation of anyone who tries to dig out 
the really dangerous under-cover Communists. To this 
group, the real villains are men like General MacArthur, 



sos Congressional Record (Unbound), June 2, 1950, pp. 8104-8108. 

aw New York Times, April 29, 1952, p. 1. 

3U "How to Fight McCarthyism," Political Affairs, October, 1951, p. 29. 

3ia General Douglas MacArthur, Revitalizing a Nation (The Heritage Foundation, 

Inc., 1952), p. 58. 



89 



James Forrestal, Chiang Kai-shek, Martin Dies and Sen- 
ator Pat McCarran. 

There are a sizable number of papers outside of my 
state that fall into the category of the Milwaukee Journal 
—papers such as the New York Post, Washington Post, 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Portland Oregonian. Some 
who read those papers may at first blush violently differ 
with me. However, you need not take my word. Make your 
own decision. First check the editorial policy which the 
Daily Worker consistently follows. Then determine for 
yourself the extent to which the above papers follow that 
editorial policy. Do not be deceived, however, by any gen- 
eral condemnation r tossing of pebbles at Communism 
generally. That is a perfectly safe sport which was in- 
dulged in even by Alger Hiss. The test is not whether 
they are willing to condemn Communism generally and 
the well-known, previously exposed Communists. The 
test is whether they follow a pattern of supporting or con- 
demning the exposure of the sacred-cows — the danger- 
ous, under-cover Communists who have been promoted to 
positions of untouchability by the Communist and left- 
wing press. 

Incidentally, the Washington heads of the three major 
wire services are honest, capable men apparently dedi- 
cated to the task of supplying the papers throughout the 
country with the straight, uncolored news as it happens 
in Washington. They, of course, cannot personally check 
every one of the thousands of stories that daily emanate 
from Washington. Their attempt to do a good job is 
made extremely difficult by the sort of thing that hap- 
pened on June 26, 1950. On that day the President of 
the Newspaper Guild, Harry Martin, attacked McCarthy 
and made it clear to the membership that any favorable 
coverage of my fight against Communists was taboo. At 
the time he made this speech, he was also on the State 
Department payroll working as Director of Labor Infor- 
mation for the EGA. The membership of the Guild con- 
sists of newsmen with practically every important news- 
paper in the country and on the desks of all the wire 
services. Fortunately, the majority of the members of 
the Newspaper Guild do not take dictation from their 
president, Harry Martin. 

Those who have denounced you in connection with 

:he dismissal of men like Service, because he was 
aot convicted of a crime, have not objected to the 
Jismlssal of men suspected, but not convicted of 
graft and corruption in government. How can this 
attitude be explained? 

The exposure of graft, corruption, and dishonesty of 
svery kind in government is vigorously supported by two 
widely separated elements of American life — as far apart 
as the North and South Pole. The good, honest, decent 
people want dishonesty in government exposed so that 
there may be a housecleaning. The Communists are 
eager to have dishonesty flourish in a republic and ex- 
posed to the view of the people, with the hope that it will 
cause the people to lose confidence in their government 
and hasten the day when the Communists can impose 
Communism upon us. 



In this connection I quote an editorial from the Wash 
ington Times-Herald of December 5, 1951 on this subject; 

"Some 50 men and women, concerned in one way 
or another with federal tax collections, have been 
fired or have resigned under pressure. They were 
accused of accepting bribes and of various other 
irregularities and improprieties. Their separation 
from government service can be credited largely to 
the activities of Senator Williams of Delaware and 
the King Committee of the House. A few of the sus- 
pects have been indicted but none has yet been tried. , 

"So far as we know, there has not been a whisper 
of protest against the summary dismissals, and this 
is remarkable only because an enormous hullabaloo 
has been raised by the Administration and in its 
press against dismissals from the federal service on 
well-founded suspicion of disloyalty. 

"The parallel is close. The evidence of disloyalty 
as of bribery was developed largely through Congres- 
sional committees. If there is any difference in the 
quality of the evidence, it is not in favor of those 
suspected of disloyalty, for the investigation of sub- 
versive activities has been going on for years and _ 
the facts have been documented and redocumented. 

"Surely those who shout McCarthyism when the 
demand is made for the summary dismissal of men 
in government whose usefulness to the Communist 
cause has been well established, ought to shout Wil- 
liamism or Kingism when an internal revenue hand is 
fired, without trial, on suspicion of cheating. We call 
this disparity to the attention of the editors of the 
New York Herald-Tribune, the Washington Post, the 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Milwaukee Journal, the 
Louisville Courier- Journal, and the New Yorker, Mr. 
Henry Luce, and others who have been horrified by 
what they call McCarthyism. We think they ought 
to explain what the difference is. 

"They have all told us that the loyalty investiga- 
tions were discouraging good men from entering the 
public service. For our part, we expect that crooks 
today are a little more reluctant to take Internal Rev- 
enue or Justice Department jobs than they were a 
few weeks ago. Maybe if something like summary 
dismissal had been accorded those reasonably sus- 
pected of disloyalty, the other government bureaus, 
and notably the State Department would be in better 
shape today than they are. 

"Surely it cannot be said that the tax fixing scoun- 
drels are a greater menace to the American people 
than the State Department's disloyalists. 

"Nobody knows as yet how much money the 
Treasury did not collect as a result of dishonesty 
within its ranks and in the Attorney General's de- 
partment, but the loss was only in money and the 
evidence now available suggests that the sum can be 
measured in millions. 

"By the way of contrast, look at the record of the 
disloyalists. In money they have cost us billions. The 
dollar outlay for the Korean war alone must now 
approximate 10 billions, and this war never would 
have been started except for the Communist sym- 
pathizers in the Administration who helped bring 
about the Communist victory in China. They also 
made it easy for Stalin to gain possession of his satel- 
lite countries in Europe. Except for that circum- 
stance, there would be no Communist threat in Eu- 
rope today to warrant the 6 billions we are spending 
there this year and the immensely greater sums that 
will be demanded tomorrow. 

"The disloyalists were largely responsible for pro- 
longing the Japanese war for months after the enemy 



90 



had indicated a willingness to surrender on the terms 
finally accepted. They are largely responsible for con- 
scription, which is costing each young man in this 
country two years of his life. They are largely re- 
sponsible for the 100,000 American casualties in 
Korea, including more than 16,000 dead. They are 
largely responsible for the crushing taxes we are 
forced to pay and, it can even be argued, they are 
largely responsible for the corruption in the Treas- 
ury and the Attorney General's office, for if the taxes 
were not as heavy as they are, there would be less, 
temptation to use illicit means of avoiding them than 
there now is. 

"In the light of these circumstances, the tenderness 
toward those suspected of disloyalty and the ap- 
proval of summary dismissal of those under suspicion 
of fixing taxes need to be explained. Can anyone 
suppose that disloyalty which has cost tens of thou- 
sands of lives and billions of money is a less griev- 
ous offense than tax fixing, grave as that offense is?" 

Do you believe in freedom of press? If so, how do 
you explain your attacks on Time Magazine? 

I, of course, believe in freedom of the press. It might 
be well, however, to define freedom of the press. I under- 
stand freedom of the press to mean freedom to print all 
of the truth regardless of how pleasant or unpleasant it 
may be, and regardless of who may be helped or hurt 
thereby. I understand freedom of the press also to mean 
freedom to editorialize as the editor sees fit so long as he 
does not misstate facts. Freedom of the press does not 
mean freedom to lie and twist and distort the facts, as 
some would have the American people believe. 

I did not "attack" Time Magazine; I "exposed" Time 
Magazine for gross, deliberate lying. I disagree with 
those who apparently feel that it is proper to expose a 
liar unless he owns a newspaper or a magazine. I feel 
that it is much more important to expose a liar, a crook, 
or a traitor who is able to poison the streams of informa- 
tion flowing into a vast number of American homes than 
to expose an equally vicious crook, liar, or traitor who 
has no magazine or newspaper outlet "for his poison. 

I have no personal fight with Henry Luce, owner of 
Time, Life, and Fortune. In fact, as far as I know, I have 
never met him. There is nothing personal about my expos- 
ing the depth to which this magazine will sink in using 
deliberate falsehoods to destroy anyone who is hurting the 
Communist cause — nothing any more personal than there 
was about a very unpleasant task which I had as a boy 
on the farm. That task consisted of digging out of their 
holes and destroying the skunks which were killing Moth- 
er's chickens. That was not a pleasant job. I had no per- 
sonal feeling toward those skunks. But someone bad to do 
that unpleasant job also. 

You have given Time Magazine as an example of 
dishonest reporting. Where can I get the complete 
story and all the facts in the Time case? 

Nora de Toledano, wife of Ralph de Toledano who 
was the co-author of Seeds of Treason and who wrote 
Spies, Dupes and Diplomats, did an excellent job of docu- 
menting the extent to which Time Magazine deliberately 
twisted and distorted the facts. Her story under the head- 



ing of "Time Marches on McCarthy" was published in 
the February issue of Mercury Magazine and is available 
in booklet form at 10 cents a copy from The American 
Mercury, 11 East 36th Street, New York 16, New York. 

On February 19, 1952, Congressman Shafer inserted 
the entire article in the Congressional Record. At that 
time he said: 

"Mr. Speaker, the American Mercury Magazine, in 
its February issue, has done a great service to Amer- 
ica in exposing and refuting the deliberate smear 
attack by Time Magazine on Senator Joseph R. Mc- 
Carthy, of Wisconsin. 

'Senator McCarthy is doing a great job, a neces- 
sary job, and one which no one else has dared 
undertake. The article by Nora de Toledano in the 
American Mercury is convincing evidence that every 
right-thinking American should stand behind Senator 
McCarthy in his fearless exposures of these enemies 
in our midst. 

"Let Time Magazine try to answer this. 

Following are two brief excerpts from the de Toledano 
article : 

"But for the most part, Time's editors, so boastful 
of the labor of verification that goes into their cover 
stories, repeated the whole rag-tag of slanders out of 
which the liberals, aided by the Communists, have 
manufactured the scarecrow called McCarthyism . . . 

"In the past, when Time was caught editorially in 
flagrante, it explained away the error by blaming 
the writers, proofreaders, or the pressure of an ap- 
proaching deadline. But in the case of the Senator 
McCarthy cover story, Time compounded the delib- 
erate error of its writer by even more deliberately re- 
affirming and defending it. The editors reason that 
the public's memory is short — and that old sins are 
forgotten sins. But if the cancellations are any indica- 
tion, it will be a long day before Time will be able to 
forget its shoddy effort to write off Senator Joe 
McCarthy." 

Is it not extremely unwise politically to fight power- 
ful combinations of magazines and newspapers 
which can carry their story to millions of Amer- 
icans every day? Won't they ultimately succeed in 
discrediting you? 

Certainly it is politically unwise. I agree that only a 
miracle will keep them from discrediting me and per- 
haps ultimately causing my political defeat. In the mean- 
time, however, I shall have done the type of job which I 
think my people in Wisconsin who elected me expected I 
would do. I like my job in the Senate, but not so well that 
I will bow and scrape to dishonest radio commentators 
and newspapers in order to keep that job. Besides, I have 
seen politicians who loved office for the sake of office so 
much that almost their every act was guided largely by 
the effect it would have upon their votes. I have watched 
those men morally shrink in their own eyes week after 
week, month after month, until they were of no benefit to 
either themselves or the people whom they allegedly rep- 
resented. 

Certain Senators have claimed you were endanger- 
ing freedom of the press by bringing the facts in 



91 



the Time Magazine case to the attention of their 
advertisers. What is your answer? 

To begin with it should be remembered that there 
is no question about the fact that Time Magazine lied 
and that the lying was deliberate. Their own files which 
I made public prove this. Even Henry Luce, owner of 
the Time-Life-Fortune chain, has failed to deny that and 
has failed to accept an invitation which I sent to him on 
November 14, 1951, to see the documentation and proof 
that Time was , deliberately lying. There can be no ques- 
tion either about the fact that the lying was done for 
the purpose of discrediting my fight against Commu- 
nists in the Administration. 

It is equally true that Time's advertisers make it pos- 
sible for the Luce chain to send the above proved, de- 
liberate lies into the homes of millions of American fami- 
lies. Many of those advertisers are militantly anti-Com- 
munist and intensely American. When I know that they 
are not aware of the facts and because of that are un- 
knowingly helping to pollute and poison the waterholes 
of information, I have a duty to bring that to their 
attention. 

I feel strongly about labeling products for what they 
are. Poison should be labeled as poison; treason should 
be labeled as treason; truth should be labeled as truth; 
lies should be labeled as lies. Luce should not object to 
that. I have not asked a single advertiser to shift his 
advertising from Time to magazines like U. S. News and 
World Report, Newsweek, The Freeman, or any other 
specific magazine. But I feel that I have the duty to let 
those advertisers know that Time Magazine publishes 
falsehoods for a purpose. Those advertisers, who are 
extremely busy in their work, are entitled to have it called 
to their attention if unknowingly they are flooding Amer- 
ican homes with Communist Party line material. Those 
advertisers sell not only their own product but also the 
magazine in which they advertise. If they continue to ad- 
vertise in Time Magazine after they know what Time is 
doing, in my opinion no one who is for America and 
against Communism should buy their product. 

At this point I want to make it very clear that I have 
never contacted the advertisers of any newspaper or 
magazine because they have differed with me or edi- 
torially criticized me. That is their right. That is their 
duty if they differ with me. Many good, honest Ameri- 
can publications have vigorously differed with me with- 
out finding it necessary to twist and distort facts and 
dishonestly give to their readers untruths labeled as 
truths. Naturally I would prefer to have those papers 
on my side, but I cannot help but respect the vigor of 
their opposition as long as they honestly and truthfully 
report the facts. 

Those who rail against McCarthy for letting an adver- 
tiser know that he is distributing lies instead of the truth 
would be the first to ask for criminal prosecution of 
the butcher who sold to their wives spoiled meat which 
made their children physically ill. Food for the mind, 
however, is far more important than food for the 
stomach. 



I shall continue to expose every type of dishonesty 
or treason which I consider a threat to this nation. The 
fact that a man may have inherited or accumulated 
money with which he has bought control of newspapers, 
magazines, or radio chains will not make him immune 
from exposure. 

What about the specific smear attacks made on you 
since you began your fight to expose and remove 
from government Communists and pro-Commu- 
nists ? 

The pattern followed by the Communist-inspired smear 
brigade differs but very little from case to case. Never 
do they meet the facts head on and try to demolish them. 
Never do they answer the documented evidence. Always 
they avoid the issue by trying to discredit and destroy 
the character of whoever is a threat to the Communist 
conspiracy. Innuendo, half-truths, and untruths about the 
person exposing under-cover Communists are their answer. I 

Keep in mind the Communist directive issued by 
Lenin : 

"We can and must write in a language which sows 
among the masses hate, revulsion, scorn and the like, 
toward those who disagree with us." 

An excellent example of a case in point is that of James 
Forrestal. He was Secretary ■ of Navy and later Sec- 
retary of Defense. Forrestal was one of the few truly 
intelligent anti-Communists in both the Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations. As early as 1942, Jim For- 
restal in clear, unmistakable terms predicted exactly what 
would happen if we continued to bow and scrape to Com- 
munism abroad and promote Communists at home in 
high policy making positions. Forrestal not only spoke 
out for America, he acted for America and against Com- 
munism. He knew that as a result they would try to 
destroy him. 

A good description of how the Communists, their 
sympathizers, and the left-wing "liberals" destroyed For- 
restal is contained in an article in the American Maga- 
zine written by William Huie, editor of the American 
Mercury. 

Following is an excerpt from that article: 

"The country has never witnessed a more dishonest 
smear campaign. Forrestal was accused of having de- 
frauded the Government in a tax case. He was a 
fascist, a warmonger, a racist, a bedfellow of I. G. 
Farbenindustrie, a dealer in near eastern oil. As a 
climax, Drew Pearson screamed that Forrestal was 
a personal coward, that he had once run out of his 
house and abandoned his wife to burglars." 313 

Drew Pearson while under cross-examination in the $5 
million lawsuit which he brought against me for having 
referred to him as the mouthpiece of international Com- 
munism, admitted that it was untrue that Forrestal ever 
ran out of any house in which his wife was being robbed. 
He admitted, for example, that Forrestal's wife was 
robbed while she was out with some friends, that For- 
restal was home in bed at the time and knew nothing 






sis- William Bradford Huie, "Some Uncensored Footnotes to The Forrestal 
Diaries," Cosmopolitan Magazine, September 1951, pp. 38-41, 112. 



92 



about the robbery. He knew this on January 16, 1949, 
when he broadcast to millions of people: 

"and I would go further and state that a man who 
runs out the back door of his house into the alley, 
leaving his wife to cope with a jewel robber alone, 
would not appear to have the courage or chivalry to 
be the best secretary of National Defense." 

The same pattern of completely dishonest, degenerate 
character-assassination has been followed in the case of 
the other people who have seriously threatened the Com- 
munist conspiracy — men like Chiang Kai-shek and Doug- 
las MacArthur, whom the Communists recognized as 
major threats to the creation of a Communistic world. 

In the case of Forrestal they succeeded. The Commu- 
nists killed him just as surely as though they had physi- 
cally thrown him out of that 16th story window at 
Bethesda Naval Hospital from which he hurdled to a 
death that was such a victory for Communism. 
y- In the case of Chiang-Kai-shek their victory for a while 
appeared complete though that victory may yet turn to 
defeat. 

In the case of MacArthur, it temporarily appeared that 
the Communists had scored a victory on that dark day 
in history when he was removed from his Pacific com- 
mand. Their apparent victory over MacArthur, however, 
may well be the most Pyrrhic victory the Communists 
have ever scored. History may record that the apparent 
breaking of MacArthur marked the end of the forward 
roll of Communism and a reversal of the trend. 

The Communist Party line attack follows the same pat- 
tern in the case of Senator Pat McCarran, another great 
American who is making them bleed profusely. 

The Communist smear brigade has followed the same 
tactic in my case — namely, the tactic of avoiding ever 
meeting facts, but rather using such a barrage of mud 
and dirt that people forget the facts. "IS* 

In the case of Jim Forrestal they dishonestly screamed 
that he had avoided paying taxes, which after Forrestal's 
death was admitted to be untrue. The "tax smear" in 
my case was not as vicious as in Forrestal's case but the 
identical pattern was followed. 

For example, in 1944 I wrote to the tax collector from 
the Pacific, where I was serving in the Marine Air Corps, 
setting forth the facts and asking for an opinion from 
the tax collector's legal department as to whether certain 
income would be considered taxable. Under Wisconsin 
law all such correspondence with the tax department is 
public property, as are all income tax returns. Neverthe- 
less, this letter which was public property from the time 
it was received by the tax collector, was "exposed" by 
the Madison Capital Times, a paper which, as previously 
stated, has bragged that its city editor, Cedric Parker, 
was "the Communist leader in Madison." By constant 
repetition on the part of the Communist and left-wing 
press, that request for a decision from the tax depart- 
ment's legal staff has become "cheating on taxes." Not 
until two years later after I began my campaign for the 
Senate was my 1944 letter to the Tax department an- 
swered. Their legal office then advised it was their inter- 
pretation of the law that the income I outlined was tax- 



able. Having neither the time nor inclination to contest 
this interpretation, I thereupon filed that income. Accord- 
ing to the rules of the Communist smear brigade, this 
became "failure to file taxes." 

Another example of the Communist type smear follows: 

When the housing shortage was greatest, I suggested 
to the Joint housing committee that not only was it im- 
portant to pass laws which would make it possible for the 
young veterans to buy or build a house but also that it 
was equally important to write a simple explanation of 
how they could take advantage of those laws — -an explana- 
tion which would be easily understood by the typical 
home-seeking veteran unacquainted with legal jargon. The 
committee, while agreeing with me on the importance 
of such a task, did not make this a committee project. 
I, therefore, personally undertook the task of writing 
such an explanation of the housing laws in simple under- 
standable language — an explanation which would clearly 
show the average young home-seeker how to take advan- 
tage of the vast conglomeration of involved, confused 
housing legislation. 

At that time the Henry Luce chain of Time, Life and 
Fortune had much to say about the terrible housing con- 
ditions. I offered them the book on housing free if they 
would run it. Time, Life or Fortune Magazine could 
thereby have performed a great service to the millions of 
young men who wanted to build or buy homes but who 
did not know how to take advantage of the existing hous- 
ing legislation. Henry Luce's publications fefused, how- 
ever, on the ground that this would not be a money- 
making venture. 

After the public phase of my Communist fight began, 
Time suddenly "discovered" how unethical it was for 
me as a last resort to give the rights of such a book to the 
pre-fabricated company which would promise the greatest 
circulation for the book. To Luce's chain of Time, Life, 
and Fortune it suddenly became improper for me to keep 
the book up to date (at a fee of 10 cents for each copy 
sold) — as to changes (1) in housing legislation, (2) in 
presidential restrictions on housing credit, (3) in the 
Federal Reserve Banking system restrictions on housing 
credits, etc. 

At that time it was general knowledge in Washington 
that I was writing such a book and that copies were 
presented for criticism and suggestions to every gov- 
ernment department having anything to do with housing. 
The idea of writing such a book for the home-seeker 
was applauded by both Democrats and Republicans. 

When I could persuade no national magazine to publish 
those simple instructions to the young home-seeker I con- 
tacted practically every publisher in the country to see 
if they would be willing to put the book out at a low 
price which would insure wide circulation. The pub- 
lishers' replies boiled down to the statement that they 
could not afford to publish such a specialized book at a 
low cost. The letters of refusal are contained in the Con- 
gressional Record of June 19, 1950, starting at page 
A-4764. 

I then offered the book to manufacturers of good 

prefabricated homes, such as Harnischfeger in Milwaukee 

■ and Lustron of Columbus. Lustron offered an arrange- 



93 



ment which appeared to guarantee the widest dissemina- 
tion of this important simplified information on housing. 

At the time the book was sold to Lustron I held a 
press conference explaining that I was receiving a royalty 
on the book and that I had a contract to keep it up to 
date until my present term in the Senate ended. That 
was about a year and a half before the public phase of 
my fight against Communists commenced. Strangely, no 
one considered this "improper" or "unethical" until I 
started to expose Communists in government. 

Strangely, an Administration Senator who has received 
sizable amounts of money for magazine articles and for 
a book, "discovered" that it was "unethical" for Mc- 
Carthy to charge 10 cents a copy under a four-year 
contract to write and keep a housing book up to date. 

Shortly before Christmas in 1950, the Democrat Ad- 
ministration sunk to a new low in attempting to aid the 
Communist-inspired smear brigade. A week before Christ- 
mas Drew Pearson announced that he was going to really 
"expose" McCarthy in a broadcast on Christmas Eve. 
The Administration's notoriously corrupt Internal Rev- 
enue Bureau was ordered to put as many men as neces- 
sary on McCarthy's federal tax returns and find some- 
thing for Pearson's Christmas Eve broadcast; Reports 
are that George Schoeneman, who was Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue at that time, had nothing to do with 
this. The Internal Revenue Bureau was unable to produce 
anything for the Pearson broadcast. A year and a half 
was then spent carefully examining every item of Mc- 
Carthy's tax returns, with the hope that some income 
could be found which I had failed to report. But not 
one penny could be found that I had not reported. Under 
Administration orders, however, something had to be 
done to embarrass McCarthy. 

After a year and a half,- someone came up with the 
bright suggestion, which was accepted, that even though 
their audit showed that McCarthy had painstakingly 
reported every penny of income, they could take income 
upon which tax had been paid in 1946 and decide that 
tax should have been paid upon that income in 1949 
instead of 1946. Five years having elapsed since the 1946 
tax had been paid, McCarthy, of course, would not be 
entitled to a rebate on what he paid in 1946 but could be 
forced to repay the same amount for 1949. In this way 
he would have to pay more taxes. When I pointed out 
to the collector that it was completely dishonest to make 
a man pay the same tax twice, his rejoinder was that 
if he wanted to protect his job, he had to "hook" Mc- 
Carthy. A record was kept of this conversation. 

My tax returns, of course, showed that I was heavily 
in debt and was paying large amounts of interest, and 
that in some years I had to make arrangements with my 
creditors to defer the interest p-yments. The interest was 
logically taken a? a tax deduction the year that it was 
paid, not the year it became due. The following additional 
method of "hooking" McCarthy was devised: It was ruled 
that the interest should have been deducted the year it was 
due rather than the year it was paid. 

Another clever method of "hooking" McCarthy wa3 
to shift incom-3 horn a low bracket year to a high bracket 



year and to shift deductions from a high bracket year 
to a low bracket year — cleverly dishonest, of course, but 
done on the theory that while McCarthy would have to 
pay lawyers to fight this dishonesty, the Internal Rev- 
enue Bureau's lawyers would be paid by the taxpayers. 
This was done with the full realization that McCarthy 
had to pay this Administration blackmail or legally fight 
it, thereby distracting attention from McCarthy's fight 
against the Communist conspiracy. 

This use of the Internal Revenue Bureau by the Com- 
munist-ridden Truman Administration as a political 
weapon against anyone hurting the Administration is not 
new. In this case it cost me a very sizable amount of 
money which I could ill afford, but I wrote it off as part 
of the high cost of exposing treason. I do not regret 
paying this or any of the price which I have paid and 
will in the future pay as a result of this fight. The price 
has not been too high! 

Gillette-Monroney-Hennings Committee 

Sets a New Record of Political 

Dishonesty in Promoting 

the Smear 

Gus Hall, the national secretary of the Communist Party, 
issued and published in the Communist Daily Worker, on 
May 4, 1950, the following official order to all Com- 
munist Party members: 

"Yield second place to none in the fight to rid our 
country of the fascist poison of McCarthyism." 

Shortly thereafter former Assistant Secretary of State 
(now Senator) Benton commenced a campaign of yap- 
ping at my heels and screaming imprecations at me. Since 
the Communist Party Secretary issued the above order to 
all Communists, 10 of those whose cases I gave the 
Tydings Committee have either been convicted, or re- 
moved from government jobs under the loyalty program.* 

Each time one of the "innocent people" who were 
cleared by the Tydings Committee (some of whom worked 
under Benton in the State Department) were forced out 
of government as a result of my evidence, Benton launched 
a new shrill and squealing attack upon McCarthy's "aw- 
ful" methods. Thus for months did Benton try to make 
himself the champion of what was also the No. 1 Com- 
munist cause — namely, discredit and smear McCarthy at 
all costs and throw so much mud in his direction that the 
more cautious and timid politicians will steer clear of the 
Communist fight. 

I ignored Benton because of the type of attacker and 
the nature of the attack and because I was sure no decent 
respectable Senator would join hands with Benton. I was 
amazed to find Senators Gillette, Monroney and Hen- 
nings crawling into Benton's bed. For nearly a year they 
.spent large amounts of taxpayers' money hiring investi- 
gators, paying for their travel expenses, etc., im.an at- 
tempt to dig up witnesses who would be willing to make 
charges against McCarthy. Finally, the ideal witness was 
found. He was Robert Byers, Sr., of Columbia, Ohio, 
apparently a fine individual at one time with a very fine 
family, but who became mentally affected after a streak 

* See page 13. 




of bad luck. At least the Gillette-Monroney-Hennings staff 
reported to them that he was mentally unsound and that 
his mental condition caused him to develop a hatred for 
McCarthy. The staff reported that this man's testimony 
would be completely unreliable but that he would "make 
an excellent witness against McCarthy." 

It was therefore decided to call him as the witness to 
supply the first day's headlines. It looked like a clever and 
perfectly safe procedure. After all, the public did not 
know that the staff had reported to Gillette, Monroney, 
and Hennings that the man was unreliable and mentally 
unsound. He, of course, would testify to anything sug- 
gested to him. If McCarthy tried to explain that Byers 
was a mental case, it would be heralded by the committee 
members as an "irresponsible charge" — the "smearing of 
another innocent person." So a member of the committee 
staff was sent to Columbus, Ohio with a subpoena for 
Bob Byers. But, as Robert Burns once wrote, "The best- 
laid schemes o' mice an' men gang aft agley." A few days 
previously a judge had committed this star witness to an 
institution for the insane at Lima, Ohio for observation. 
When I first gave the press the story of this witness, 
according to the AP, the committee staff indignantly de- 
nied that they ever intended to call him before the com- 
mittee. However, too many of the staff members knew the 
subpoena had been issued, so it was later reluctantly 
admitted by the committee counsel that a subpoena had 
been issued for him. 

Incidentally, the Democrat Organizing Committee has 
published and distributed throughout Wisconsin hun- 
dreds of thousands of pieces of campaign literature quot- 
ing this man's statements about McCarthy. 

This is undoubtedly the only time in the history of this 
nation that a Senate Committee deliberately attempted to 
use a mentally unsound witness to smear and discredit a 
fellow Senator. Thus did this committee establish an all 
time record of political dishonesty. 

Another example of complete dishonesty in the com- 
mittee's frantic attempt to make the smear stick occurred 
the day Stanley Fisher, one of the committee staff, testi- 
fied. He had been sent by the committee to my home town 
of Appleton, Wisconsin, at considerable expense, to make 
a thorough investigation and to subpoena every letter, 
etc., having to do, with my financial condition since long 
before I became a Senator. Before the public hearing was 
called, Fisher had reported to the committee that every- 
thing about my finances was completely in order — that 
while I had been heavily in debt, no creditor of mine had 
ever lost one penny of either principal or interest. 

But this did not stop the committee. With a great fan- 
fare there was announced that McCarthy's "finances" 
were to be publicly investigated — that the committee's 
investigator, Fisher, would be put on the stand where he 
could publicly "expose" what he had "discovered." This 
gave left-wing Democrat papers in my state, like the Mil- 
waukee Journal and the Madison Capital Times the oppor- 
tunity to headline for days the fact that "McCarthy's 
Finances Are Being Investigated," with the implication 
that a sinister picture was about to develop. 

The dishonesty did not stop here, however. According 
to the testimony of one of the committee's witnesses, 



Clark Wideman, he was present in the committee room 
while the press and public were absent, and heard staff 
member Fisher being criticized and browbeaten for hav- 
ing volunteered the testimony that his auditing showed 
that McCarthy had paid all of his debts and all of his 
interest. Thus did Fisher let the committee down by fail- 
ing to leave a false impression of McCarthy's finances. 

It was almost humorous to watch the committee attempt 
to escape criticism for this dishonesty after they became 
aware that the obvious smear attempt was sickening even 
some of their good friends in the press. After hours of 
smilingly watching their Chief Counsel Moore concoct 
the headline smears and after every drop of slime and 
mud had been squeezed from their own carefully coached 
witness, Monroney, Gillette, and Hennings suddenly with 
a great show of virtue discovered the dishonesty of what 
was being done, and vigorously and publicly criticized 
their Chief Counsel Moore who was operating under their 
direct control. 

Here we see "honest," "upright," "virtuous" Democrat 
"statesmen" "protecting" America and "fearlessly " and 
"bravely" "fighting" Communism. 

If the committee is trying to prove that I am guilty of 
the crime of not being wealthy, I must plead guilty. The 
money I have spent hiring investigators and paying their 
traveling expenses to dig out the evidence on Communists 
has, of course, not improved my financial condition. Then 
also there are the very heavy legal and investigators' fees 
which I have had to pay in connection with the lawsuits 
which have resulted from this Communist fight. Accord- 
ing to Louis Budenz, former member of the Communist 
Party's National Committee, and editor of the Daily 
Worker, the strategy of the Communist Party is to force 
into lawsuits anyone who dares expose Communists, and 
thus through the payment of attorney's fees bleed them 
financially white. If I were on the other side of the fight, 
protecting Communists, unlimited legal services would 
have been offered to me and there would be no objection 
by Benton and no investigation by the Gillette-Monroney- 
Hennings Committee. 

Do you claim that Senators Monroney, Hennings 
and Gillette are knowingly aiding the Communist 
cause? 

No, but stupidity and eagerness to keep a corrupt party 
at the public trough can destroy a nation as effectively 
and as quickly as treason — especially when traitors can 
use men of little minds who put party above country. 

There is no secret about the fact that 10 of those whom 
I named before the Tydings Committee have either been 
convicted or removed from the State Department under 
the loyalty program. Neither is there any secret about the 
fact that my exposure of the Truman Administration's 
whitewash and cover-up of Communist traitors in govern- 
ment has awakened and sickened the American people to 
the extent that a change in administration — either to a 
decent Democrat or Republican— is inevitable unless 
McCarthy can be personally discredited and smeared to 
the extent that his clearly documented proof of treason 
will be ignored. 



95 



Your Marine Corps record has been attacked. What 
are the facts? 

The editor of the New York Post, who admits member- 
ship at one time in the Young Communist League, and 
Drew Pearson launched an attack upon my combat 
record as part of the smear campaign. This attack was 
suddenly called off when the Marine Corps allowed 
Senator Cain to inspect and make photostats of my com- 
plete Marine Corps file. 

After examining and photostating my Marine Corps 
file, Senator Cain made a complete report on it to the 
United States Senate on July 13, 1951. Following are 
some excerpts from that report which appeared in the 
Congressional Record on pages 8323 to 8331 : 

"Until the Pearson broadcast of July 8, 1 had only 
known that Joe McCarthy had seen service as a 
Marine in World War II. It never occurred to me 
that Joe McCarthy had been anything other that a 
first-rate fighting Marine. One has a good habit 
of taking for granted that every Marine is a top- 
flight American. 

"Following the Pearson broadcast of July 8, I 
sought to determine what Pearson was talking about. 
I secured copies of the three Pearson broadcasts and 
I secured Joe McCarthy's official record as a 
Marine . . . 

"Mr. President, now that we know what Drew 
Pearson said about Joe McCarthy's record as a 
Marine, I can legitimately and properly offer Joe 
McCarthy's official record, which will speak for itself, 
and which every American can judge for himself. 

"In Drew Pearson's second broadcast he indi- 
cated that he had seen Joe McCarthy's Marine Corps 
file. I do not know whether he saw it or whether he 
did not see it. If he saw it, I would wonder why he 
was permitted to see it. If he saw it, I believe I can 
establish it to be a fact that he did not see what he 
told his audience he did see. 

"The Senator from Washington has seen that file 
and I have photostatic copies of the pertinent parts 
of it right here in front of me. These photostats indi- 
cate that Mr. Pearson has been providing his large 
audience with misinformation. There is nothing 
strange or new about this Pearson habit . . . 

"Drew Pearson has sought to attack and destroy 
Joe McCarthy's war record . . . 

"The first charge begins when Pearson states that 
there is nothing in McCarthy's Marine file to indicate 
that McCarthy was ever on any combat missions. 

"As an answer to that interesting observation of 
nonsense or criminal maliciousness, I believe that 
Admiral C. W. Nimitz, of the United States Navy, 
ought to be called as a witness. Permit me to call 
him at this point." 

Senator Cain then presented the Senate the following 
citation : 

" 'UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 
Flagship of the Commander-in-Chief 
The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific 
Fleet, takes pleasure in commending 

CAPTAIN JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORP RESERVE 
for service as set forth in the following 
CITATION: 

"For meritorious and efficient performance of 
duty as an observer and rear gunner of a dive 
bomber attached to a Marine scout bombing 



squadron operating in the Solomon Islands area 
from September 1, to December 31, 1943. He 
participated in a large number of combat mis- 
sions, and in addition to his regular duties, acted 
as aerial photographer. He obtained excellent 
photographs of enemy gun positions, despite in- 
tense anti-aircraft fire, thereby gaining valuable 
information which contributed materially to the 
success of subsequent strikes in the area. Al- 
though suffering from a severe leg injury, he 
refused to be hospitalized and continued to carry 
out his duties as Intelligence Officer in a highly 
efficient manner. His courageous devotion to 
duty was in keeping with the highest traditions 
of the naval service." 

C. W. NIMITZ, 
Admiral, U. S. Navy. 
Commendation Ribbon Authorized' " 

"Another qualified witness who wishes to testify 
this afternoon is Maj. Gen. Field Harris, major 
general, United States Marine Corps. I read from a 
letter dated May 14, 1945: 

" 'Dear Judge McCarthy: I note with gratification 
your unusual accomplishments during 30 months of 
active duty, particularly in the combat area, and that 
you received a citation from Admiral Nimitz for 
meritorious performance of duty. Without exception, 
the commanding officers under whom you served 
spoke of the performane of your duties in the high- 
est terms. 

" 'The Marine Corps will not forget the fine con- 
tribution you have made. It is largely through the 
devoted efforts and sacrifice of patriotic Americans 
like yourself that the corps is able to maintain its 
unbroken tradition of defeating the enemy, wherever, 
whenever, and however encountered. 

" 'You have my warm appreciation of your serv- 
ices, and my wishes for your continued success and 
good .luck in the years ahead. 
" 'Sincerely yours, 

FIELD HARRIS 
Major General, United 
States Marine Corps, 
Assistant Commandant (Air) .' " 

"During the war, Joe McCarthy was a captain in 
the Marine Corps. At one period in 1944, his imme- 
diate superior officer was Maj. E. E. Munn. This 
Marine officer had something to say about our friend 
McCarthy, who was under Major Munn's command. 
This is what he said: 

" '1. It is recommended that this officer be given a 
letter of commendation for his outstanding devotion 
to duty and achievement during the training period 
of the squadron and in actual combat as described 
hereunder . . .' " 

"In 1944, Maj. Gen. H. R. Harmon of the United 
States Army commanded all Army, Navy, Marine, 
and New Zealand aircraft in the Solomon Islands 
area. Joe McCarthy was attached for a period of time 
to General Harmon's command where he served as a 
combat intelligence officer. It is good to note in pass- 
ing that the Air Force and the Marine Corps were 
working hand in hand. Before Joe McCarthy was 
returned to his basic assignment with the Marine 
Corps, General Harmon reported on Joe McCarthy's 
efficiency and devotion to duty. It delights me to read 
what General Harmon said about the man McCarthy: 

" 'This officer has shown marked qualities of 
leadership, cooperative spirit, and loyalty. His initia- 
tive, good judgment, determination, and diligence 
have made him an unusually useful member of the 
section in which he is assigned and his unfailing 



96 




iJA 








(Official USMC Pkota) 

GUADALCANAL, Oct. 6, 1943 (USMC Release) — Captain Joseph R. McCarthy, USMC, former circuit judge in Wisconsin, is now an officer with a Marine dive bombing squadron in the South Pacific 

combat zone. Here he is seen interviewing pilots who have just returned from raids on Japanese installations in the Solomons, 



good nature and ready wit has made him well liked 
and respected by his associates. 

' 'This officer deserves to be classified as excellent. 
It has been a pleasure to have had him in this com- 
mand. 

" 'H. R. HARMON, Major General, 
United States Army, Commanding.' " 

"Mr. President, I believe that what I have read from 
Joe McCarthy's Marine Corps record has completely 
destroyed every single one of the silly, unprincipled, 
and untrue allegations made by Mr. Pearson . . ." 



To what extent lias the Communist Party line smear 
against you hampered your work or been person- 
ally disturbing to you? 

It disturbs me not at all. In fact, the louder the screams 
of the left-wing elements of press and radio become, the 
more damage I know I am doing to the Communist Party. 

It has hampered the task to some extent, because it 
scares off the more timid of our friends who are afraid 
of the effect of the smear upon their political futures. To 
those people I commend the following quotation of Abra- 
ham Lincoln, which hangs over my desk: 



"// / were to read, much less answer, all the attacks made on me, this 
shop might as well be closed for any other business. 

"I do the very best I know how — the very best I can, and I mean to 
keep doing so until the end. 

"If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me won't 
amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, then ten angels 
swearing I was right would make no difference." 



98 



CHAPTER XIII 



The Evil Genius 



You claim that Communism is evil. Why do hun- 
dreds of millions of people submit to Communist 

rule? 

To answer this question I call upon Stanislaw Mikol- 
ajczyk, prime minister of Poland before its fall to Com- 
munist Russia, who personally witnessed the dark evil 
cloud of Communism blot out the sunlight over his 
nation. 

In the Preface of his book, The Rape of Poland, Mr. 
Mikolajczyk earnestly asks Americans to learn the lesson 
that Poland learned too late. 

"A raging question in Poland has become, 'How 
long will it take them to communize us completely?' 

"To my mind, however, the question is badly 
framed. I am convinced that human beings cannot be 
converted to Communism if that conversion is at- 
tempted while the country concerned is under Com- 
munist rule. Under Communist dictatorship the 
majority become slaves — but men born in freedom, 
though they may be coerced, can never be convinced. 
Communism is an evil which is embraced only by 
fools and idealists not under the actual heel of 
such rule. 

"The question should be phrased: How long can 
a nation under Communist rule survive the erosion 
of its soul? 

"Never before in history has there been such an 
organized attempt to demoralize men and whole 
nations as has been made in Communist-dominated 
countries. People there are forced to lie in order 
to go on living; to hate instead of love; to denounce 
their own patriots and natural leaders and their 
own ideas. The outside world is deceived by Com- 
munist misuse of the organs of true democracy, 
true patriotism — even, when necessary, true Chris- 
tianity. 

"Who rules Poland today, and by what means? 
The answer is as complex as the nature of Com- 
munism itself. 

"The pattern of Communist rule in Poland goes 
back to 1939, when Molotov and Ribbentrop agreed 
to partition my country. After stabbing Poland in 
the back while Hitler was engaging the Polish Army 
in the west, the Communists established their iron 
rule in the east of Poland. This de facto rule was 
tacitly recognized in the conference rooms of Tehe- 
ran and Yalta. 

"Therefore it is important to recognize the real 
aims of the Communist, his methods, the pattern of 
Soviet aggression. 

"By October, 1947, the month in which I began 
my flight to freedom, the Communists ruled Poland 
through secret groups, open groups, Security Po- 
lice — including special Communist units called the 
Ormo, the military, the Army, Special Commissions, 
and Soviet-patterned National Councils. A million 
well-armed men were being used to subjugate 23,- 
000,000. Control of all top commands was — and 
remains — completely in the hands of Russians. 
Their orders, even some of the more savage ones, 
were and are now being carried out by Poles. 
These Poles are either Communists or men of essen- 



tially good heart whose spirit has at long last 
snapped. They are mainly chosen from among the 
1,500,000 Poles transferred by Stalin to Russia in 
1939. Stalin has 'prepared' them thoroughly for 
their work. 

"The American reader who scans these words while 
sitting comfortably in a strong, free country may 
wonder at many aspects of Poland's debasement. He 
may wonder why the nation did not revolt against 
the Communistic minority which has enslaved it. On 
the other hand, he may wonder why Russia needed 
two and a half years to impose its rule. Or why 
Russia went to the trouble of camouflaging its ag- 
gression during much of that period. 

"But the Communist minority has gained absolute 
control simply because it alone possessed modern 
arms. History reveals instances where a mob of a 
hundred thousand, armed with little more than rocks 
and fists, has overcome despotic rule by one assault 
on a key city or sector. Today is another day. If 
the despot owns several armored cars, or even a 
modest number of machine guns, he can rule. The 
technology of terror has risen far beyond the simple 
vehemence of a naked crowd. 

"We in Poland fell — for this reason and for many 
others. We fell even before the war had ended be- 
cause we were sacrificed by our allies, the United 
States and Great Britain. We fell because we became 
isolated from the Western world, for the Russian 
zone of Germany lay to our west, and Russia leaned 
heavily on the door to the east. In the morbid 
suspicions of the Kremlin, the plains of Poland had 
become a smooth highway over which the armor 
of the west might someday roll. Thus, much of our 
nation must be incorporated into the USSR, and the 
rest must be made to produce cannon fodder to 
resist such an advance. We fell because the Russians 
had permitted — indeed, they encouraged — the Ger- 
mans to destroy Warsaw. In the average European 
country the capital remains heart, soul, and source 
of the nation's spirit. Our capital was murderously 
crushed; its wreckage became not alone the wreck- 
age of a city but the debris of a nation. 

"We fell because while so many of our best youths 
were dying while fighting with the Allies, so many 
of the people who knew the dream of independence 
were slaughtered and so many who constituted the 
backbone of our economy were herded like cattle 
into Germany or Russia. We fell because Russia 
stripped us of our industrial and agricultural 
wealth, calling it 'war booty.' 

"We lasted two and a half years because we were 
the largest nation being ground down to fragments 
behind the Iron Curtain. We held out because we 
are a romantic people who can endure much if the 
prospect of liberty remains on the horizon. We 
lasted because the deeply ingrained religion of the 
country brought solace and hope. We existed because, 
through centuries of hardship, we have learned to 
fend, to recognize the tactics of terror and propa- 
ganda. We held out because the Poles have loathed 
the concept of Communism since it first showed its 
head, and because the strong-armed bands of Com- 
munism — strong as they were — were still not huge 



enough to blanket all the scattered farm lands which 
make up so much of Poland. The sparks of freedom 
flicker and sparkle through the length and breadth of 
agricultural Poland, fanned by priests and members 
of the intelligentsia who hide with the simple peas- 
ants wheu the horrors of life in the cities become too 
great to bear. 

"Russia carefully camouflaged its actions in 
Poland for much of two and a half years, because it 
wished to make certain that the Americans and 
British would again disarm and drop back to their 
traditional torpor of peace.- The Reds took into con- 
sideration Poland's status as an ally, not in any hu- 
mane way, but with an eye to the possibility that if 
they raped us too abruptly, the West might remain 
armed and thus complicate the job of grabbing 
another country. 

"The Western mind may find it hard to compre- 
hend rule by a fanatic handful. Yet such rule is a 
fact, both in Poland and elsewhere in eastern Europe. 
After the fixed elections of January, 1947, the Com- 
munist Party was itself a party subjected to purge. 
Its size in Warsaw, for example, was cut from 40.000 
to 24,000. This murderous group no longer had to 
wear the cloak of democracy, shielding itself as the 
'Polish Workers Party'; 'window dressing' became 
superfluous, as well as the people who filled the 
windows. 

"The Western mind may find difficulty, too, in rec- 
onciling the facts about Poland's rule with the appar- 
parent enthusiasm of the vast mobs one sees at 
Communist rallies, grouped around the speaking 
platforms of tirading, frenzied leaders. It must be 
remembered, however, that these mobs have been 
commanded to gather. A worker who does not obey 



the command of the NKVD's 'adviser' in each 
plant — to appear at a given place and time — is dis- 
missed, and his dismissal means personal catastro- 
phe. For he and his family cannot find work, cannot 
have a food-ration card, and cannot have housing 
for himself and his loved ones, if he does not yield. 
The newsreel cameras, whose film reaches the free 
countries, never show the empty side streets, can 
never film — at close range — the gaunt faces in the 
marching mobs. T have never seen so many thor- 
oughly unhappy people marching,' Cavendish Ben- 
tinck whispered to me the day the Warsaw people 
were commanded to file past the reviewing stand in 
honor of Tito's visit. 

"Will Communist control eventually spread itself 
thin and snap, as did the military rule of Adolf Hit- 
ler? I wondered about this, too, in the dark hours of 
my struggle before I left Poland. The answer appears 
to be an emphatic no. Hitler attempted both to rule 
and to administer with Germans; Stalin rules with 
key Russians in control positions and administers 
with traitorous, corrupt, or weak nationals of the 
country to be ruled. In Russia today men and women 
of every nation are now being trained and schooled 
for the day when they will return to their native 
lands, which they know so intimately, to rule under 
direct command from Moscow. Stalin trains French- 
men to rule France, Italians to rule Italy, Englishmen 
to rule England, Latins to rule the Latin countries, 
Japanese to rule Japan, Chinese to rule China, In- 
dians to rule India, blacks to rule blacks, and Ameri- 
cans to rule America. . . . For Stalin, an evil genius, 
is more grimly efficient than any other tyrant in his- 
tory. And he intends to conquer the world." 314 

8 1 * Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Preface to The Rape of Poland. 



100 



CHAPTER XIV 



A Question For Americans 



Senator McCarthy, what can I — an average Amer- 
ican, holding no public office, and owning no news- 
papers or radio stations — do to fight Communism? 

You can do a tremendous job if you will. You can 
help alert America to a danger much greater than Com- 
munists in the State Department or any other branch of 
the government — a danger much greater than any threat 
from Communist Russia. 

Hitler once said, "Give me control of the minds of the 
youth of a country— give me control of the educational 
system for five years — and I shall control that country 
indefinitely." 

The Communists thoroughly recognize the truth of 
that statement. One of their major efforts, therefore, is to 
infiltrate the educational system of this country and con- 
trol school and college publications. 

The May, 1937, issue of The Communist Magazine, 
sets forth the following directive to all Communist teach- 



"Communist teachers are . . . faced with a tremen- 
dous social responsibility . . . They must take ad- 
vantage of their positions, without exposing them- 
selves ... 

"Only when teachers have really mastered Marx- 
ism-Leninism will they be able skillfully to inject it 
into their teaching at the least risk of exposure." 

In a speech at Brown University on April 22, 1952, 
Dr. J. B. Matthews, former research director of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities, gave some 
general statistical facts on the support given by college 
and university professors to Communist and Communist- 
front organizations. Dr. Matthews stated: 

"Approximately 28 percent of all the top collabo- 
rators with the deceitful Communist-front movement 
in recent years have been college and university pro- 
fessors. 

"Exhaustive research into the personnel of Commu- 
nist-front organizations reveals that some 3,000 pro- 



fessors from approximately 600 institutions of higher 
learning have been affiliated more than 26,000 times 
with these instruments of the Communist Party. 
This is not 'guilt by association' but guilt by col- 
laboration." 

Every man and woman in America can appoint him- 
self or herself to undo the damage which is being done 
by Communist infiltration of our schools and colleges 
through Communist-minded teachers and Communist- 
line textbooks. 

Countless times I have heard parents throughout the 
country complain that their sons and daughters were sent 
to college as good Americans and returned four years 
later as wild-eyed radicals. The educational system of 
this country cannot be cleansed of Communist influence 
by legislation. It can only be scrubbed and flushed and 
swept clean if the mothers and fathers, and the sons and 
daughters, of this nation individually decide to do this 
job. This can be your greatest contribution to America. 
This is a job which you can do. This is a job which you 
must do if America and Western Civilization are to live. 

I warn you, however, that the task will not be a 
pleasant one. When you detect and start to expose a 
teacher with a Communist mind, you will be damned and 
smeared. You will be accused of endangering academic 
freedom. Remember, to those Communist-minded teachers 
academic freedom means their right to force you to hire 
them to teach your children a philosophy in which you 
do not believe. To Communist-minded teachers academic 
freedom means their right to deny you the freedom to 
hire loyal Americans to teach your children. As a prac- 
tical matter we should remember that good generous 
salaries are necessary to attract to the teaching profession 
the kind of people whom you want molding the mind of 
young America. 

We cannot win the fight against Communism if Com- 
munist-minded professors are teaching your children. We 
cannot lose the fight against Communism if loyal Amer- 
icans are teaching your children. 



101 



INDEX 



Abt, John 59 

Acheson, Dean 9, 10, 13, 14, 23-51, 61, 65, 66-68, 77, 79 

Acheson law firm 24 27 

Acheson-Lilienthal Atomic Report 32 

"Agrarian Reformers" ,,33 

Aid to China 35, 37, 33 

Alexander, Robert C 81, 82 

Amerasia 26 58 

Amerasia Case 25, 30, 35,' 53 

Americans for Democratic Action 8 

American Society of Newspaper Editors 88 

Ammunition, dumped in Bay of Bengal 39, 40 

Arming Chinese Communists 35, 38 

Army Intelligence Officers Report on Yalta ...33 

Atcheson, George, Jr 82 

Atomic Energy Report 32 

August 1949 Memorandum of Lattimore 61 

Bachrach, Marian ; 59 

Bad Security Risk by Association 79 

Barmine, Alexander 55, 74 

Barnes, Joseph : 36, 59, 60, 86, 88 

Bentley, Elizabeth 18, 36, 56, 88 

Benton, William 9, 10, 13, 23, 29, 31, 94, 95 

Benton Resolution 89 

Berle, Adolph 23, 24 

Bethel, Vt 53 

Biheler, Otto 32 

Bikini » 32 

Bingham, Hiram 14, 28 

Bisson, T. A 55, 59 

Block, Herbert 89 

Bogolepov, Igor ....27, 64, 65, 85 

Brewster, Owen 4 

Browder, Earl 24, 36, 37, 58 

Brunauer, Esther ....'. 13 

Brunauer, Stephen , 13 

Buckley, Daniel 9 

Budenz, Louis 3-5, 18, 24, 27, 37, 56, 58, 76, 85, 95 

Bullitt, William 40, 45 

Byrnes, James 9, 10, 68 

Cain, Harry 89, 96 

Canning, William '., 56 

Canterbury, Red Dean of '. 27 

Capital Times, Madison 86, 88, 89, 93, 95 

Carp, Sam ,...28 

Carter, E. C ....36, 60, 64 

Carter, E. C. — Letter from Lattimore 61 

CCC 68 

Central Intelligence Agency 82 

Chambers, Whittaker 23, 24, 30 

Chennault, Claire 34, 38 

'Chew Hong 59, 60, 88, 89 

Chi 59, 60, 88, 89 

Chiang Kai-shek 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 45, 50, 61, 65, 90, 93 

Childs, Marquis 3 

China 2, 24, 25, 27, 33-40, 42, 44-47, 50, 61-63, 76, 82 

China Aid Council 88 

Chinese Communist 3rd and 4th Field Armies 44, 45 

China Military Mission 40 

Christian Science Monitor 5 

Chou En-lai 27 

Churchill, Winston 28 

Chu Teh 34, 59, 76 

Ciechanowski, Jan 47-49 

Civil Service Commission Loyalty Review Board 
(See Loyalty Review Board) 

Clubb, Oliver Edmund 13, 29, 30, 33 

Colegrove, Kenneth 42 



Colleges 101 

Combat missions 96 

Communist aim in Asia 32 

Communist Front 53, 54 

Communist Magazine, The 101 

Communist Party of Maryland and D. C 86 

Communist Party of New York State 38 

Communist Party on Benton 89 

Communist Secret Police 48 

Congressional Immunity 17, 18 

Constitution, The 17 

Cooke, Charles M 39, 68 

Courier-Journal, Louisville 90 

Current Soviet Tactics 40 

Currie, Lauchlin 24, 25, 29, 33, 35, 36, 61, 62, 66 

Daily Worker 3, 5, 19, 24, 25, 26, 85, 88, 90, 94 

Daily Worker, comments on McCarthy 85, 86 

Davies, John P 13, 33-36 

Davies, Joseph E 27, 64, 65 

Davis, Elmer , 3, 47 

Democrats 10, 11, 67, 75, 88, 89 

Democrat National Committee 21 

de Toledano, Nora 91 

de Toledano, Ralph 91 

Dies, Martin 90 

Dooman, Eugene 25, 26, 66 

Duggan, Lawrence ..30 

Dumping of Ammunition 39, 40 

Earle, George H 32 

Eastland, James 26, 64 

ECA 90 

Education 101 

Edwards, Willard 89 

Eisenhower, Dwight 49 

Europe 47, 49 

Epstein, Israel 63 

Evjue, William 86, 88 

FBI 13, 20, 26, 29, 31, 54, 58, 62, 71, 74 79 

Feinberg Law 79 

Ferguson, Homer 14, 30, 39, 59, 63-65 

"Field, Frederick Vanderbilt 4, 53, 55, 57, 60, 63, 64, 75 

Fitzgerald, Albert 27 

Flynn, John T 34 

Foerster, W. Rudolf 58 

Ford, Peyton 74 

Formosa 38, 42-45, 61 

Formosa Memorandum 42 

Forrestal, James 2, 90, 92 

Forrestal Plan 31, 69 

Fortas, Abe 20 

Foster, William Z 37, 63 

Four hundred secret Communists in Press 85 

Frankfurter, Felix 79 

Freedom of Press 91 

Geiger, Theodore 74 

Germany, East ...49 

Germany, West 49, 50 

Gillette, Guy 4, 9, 89, 94, 95 

Glasser, Harold 3*1 

Godlize, Sergei 35, 62 

Gold, Michael 30 

Government subsidy to Press 89 

Greece 31, 69 

Green, Theodore 74 

Grew, Joseph C 25, 35 

Gromyko 67 



Guilt by association 79, 80 

Guilt by collaboration 79 

Hall, Gus 85, 94 

Hanson, Haldore 31, 76, 77 

Harmon, H. H 96 

Harriman, Averill '. 8 

Harris, Field 96 

Hennings, Thomas C, Jr 94, 95 

Herald-Tribune, New York 63, 90 

Herblock , 89 

Hickenlooper, Bourke 4, 18, 20, 36, 37, 53, 74 

Hill, William S 89 

Hillenkoetter, Roscoe 82 

Hiss, Alger 3, 14, 23, 24, 30, 32, 35, 36, 47, 53, 54, 67, 76, 88 

Hiss, Donald 23, 24, 27 

History of Congressional Immunity 17 

Hitler 45 

Hitler-Stalin Pact 61 

Hoffman, Paul 74 

Homosexuals , 14, 15 

Hoover, J. Edgar 2, 74, 79 

Hopkins, Harry . 68 

Horsky, Charles A 31 

Housing 93 

Hull, Cordell 61 

Humelsine, Carlisle 5, 10, 30, 31, 81 

Humphrey, Hubert 8 

Hurley, Patrick 24, 25, 33-35, 46, 82, 83 

Immunity, Congressional 17, 18 

Income Tax 93 

Innocence by association 79 

"Innocent People" 19, 20 

Institute of Pacific Relations 
(See IPR) 

International Book Store in San Francisco 63 

IPR . 4, 33, 36, 53, 55-58, 60, 64, 65, 75 

IPR employees named under oath 55 

IPR files 75 

Jaffe, Philip 25, 30, 35, 59 

Japan , 24-26, 36, 37, 50, 61, 65 

Jefferson School of Social Science 62 

Jessup, Philip 13, 17, 42, 49, 53-56, 60, 61, 64, 66, 79, 88 

Journal, Milwaukee 3, 4, 19, 40, 88, 89, 90, 95 

Kalgan Mountain Pass 39, 67 

Kefauver, Estes 8, 20, 21 

Key West 66 

King Committee 90 

Klausen, Max 58 

Kleczkowski, Karl von 32 

Korea 11, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 61, 62 

Korea, Economic Aid to 46 

Korea, Military Aid to 44, 46, 62 

Korean Budget 43, 44 

Korean War , , 34, 44 

Knowland, William 62 

"L" 57 

Lamont, Corliss 27 

Lane, Arthur Bliss 27, 47-49 

Lansberg, Hans 13 

Lattimore, Eleanor 58, 59, 86 

Lattimore, Owen 3-5, 17, 19, 20, 25/26, 30, 33, 35, 40, 44, 46, 

50, 53, 55, 57-66, 74, 75, 79, 86, 88 

Lawrence, David : 18 

Leahy, William 34 

Lehman, Herbert H , 49 

Lend-Lease 31 

Lenin , .42, 85, 92 

"Let Them Fall . . ." .46, 62 



Libel, Communist Party Rule on .....18 

Life Magazine 70, 86 

Lilienthal, David 32 

Lincoln, Abraham 1, 98 

Litvinoff 64, 65, 68 

Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr .4, 75 

Lorwin, V 13 

Louisville Courier-Journal ...... 90 

Loyalty Board of State Department 13, 14, 29, 30 

Loyalty File on Chi and Chew Hong 59, 60 

Loyalty Review Board 13, 14, 28, 29, 31, 33 

Loyalty Review Board Minutes .....14, 28 

Lucas, Scott 19, 71 

Luce, Henry 70, 86, 90, 92, 93 

Lustron 93, 94 

MacArthur, Douglas....3, 5, 8, 26, 33, 36, 42-45, 59, 67, 85, 89, 93 

Madison Capital Times 86, 88, 89, 93, 95 

Madison Square Garden 27, 28 

Manchuria 65 

Mao Tse-Tung 33, 35, 60, 76, 77 

Marine combat missions .; 96 

Marine Corps file 96 

Marshall, George C 23, 27, 33, 34, 37-39, 61, 67-70, 81, 82 

Marshall Embargo 39 

Marshall Mission 34, 36, 37, 62, 67, 68 

Marshall Plan 69, 70 

Marshall Speech 67-70, 89 

Marshall Truces 39 

Maryland Campaign Investigating Committee 89 

Massing, Hede .'. 56 

Matthews, J. B 101 

Matusow, Harvey 62 

McCarran Committee 13 

McCarran Committee, compared with Tydings Committee 75 

McCarran, Pat 32, 33, 37, 38, 60, 82, 86, 90, 93 

McGovern, William 26 

McMahon, Brien 8 

Meigs, Peveril 13 

"Methods" .7, 8 

Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw 3, 47, 48, 99 

Milwaukee Journal 3, 4, 19, 40, 88, 89, 90, 95 

Modus vivendi 61 

Molotov 28, 85 

Mongolia ...65 

Monroney, Mike 4, 9, 89, 94, 95 

Morris, Robert ..74, 75 

Naming Names 19 

National Council of Soviet-American Friendship 27 

National Press Club .40, 43 

New China Daily News 59, 60, 88, 89 

"New Day Which Has Dawned in Asia . . ." 40, 43 

New York Herald Tribune 63, 90 

New York Post 3, 90, 96 

New York State, Communist Party ....38 

New York Times 63 

New Yorker 90 

Newspaper Guild 90, 

Nimitz, C. W 96 

Numbers : 

57: 9, 10 

81 : , 10, 19, 71 

205: 9, 10 

Numbers game 9 

O'Conor, Herbert 32 

"Old Cases" 14 

Open Door Policy ... .....42 

Ordeal by Slander . .,20, 86 

Oregonian, Portland .,...,..,...,..,......,...,.90 

Oumansky ...,..„.„ „„„....... „„,.„.,..... ...61 

OWI — %J3i ... 3, 47, 59, 65, 88 



Parker, Cedric 86, 88, 89, 93 

Pauley Reparations Mission 65 

Pearl Harbor 61, 68 

Pearson, Drew 3, 19, 20, 30, 38, 86, 92, 94, 96 

PM 25, 26 

Penalty for Loyalty 81 

People's Daily World 63 

Pershing, John J 67 

Point IV Program 31, 76, 77 

Poland 27, 47-50, 99 

Polish Loan 27, 47, 48 

Political Affairs . 86, 89 

Polk County Ledger ; 70 

Pope, Arthur Upham , 68 

Portland Oregonian 90 

Posniak, Edward 13, 17, 29 

Post, New York 3, 90, 96 

Post, Washington 3, 89, 90 

Post-Dispatch, St. Louis 3, 19, 90 

Potsdam 33, 47, 65, 66, 67 

President's Blackout Order 8, 9 

Press 3, 18, 85 

Press, Freedom of 91 

Press, Subsidy from Government 89 - 

Press, Wire Services 90 

Pressman, Lee 23, 59 

Proof 13 

Racin 44 

Radio Moscow 40 

Ilaedl 15 

Red China, Recognition of 53 

Red Dean of Canterbury 27 

Reed, Stanley • 79 

Remington, William 3, 13, 14, 18, 75, 76 

Republicans 10, 11, 75 

Robeson, Paul 27 

Roosevelt, Eleanor 68 

Roosevelt, Franklin D 34, 61, 65, 68 

Rosinger, Laurence 63 

Roth, Andrew 53, 58 

Sabath, Adolph 9 

St. Clair, Darrel 29 

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 3, 19, 90 

Saturday Evening Post 20, 21 

Schools 101 

Schuman, Frederick , 64, 75 

Senate Appropriations Committee 23 

Senate Crime Committee 21 

Senate Special Investigating Committee 14, 15, 40 

Service, John Stewart 

7, 8, 13, 17, 24-26, 29, 33, 35, 36, 58, 79, 82, 90 

Seventh Fleet 44-46 

Shafer, Paul 91 

Sheboygan Press 89 

Silvermaster, Gregory , 29, 36 

Smear 85-98 

Smedley, Agnes 3, 30, 33, 59 

Snow, Conrad 10, 63 

Sokolsky, George 70 

Sorge, Richard 30, 34 

Sorge Spy Ring 5, 58 

Southard, Ordway 59 

Soviet-American Friendship, National Council of 27 

Soviet Code 36 

Soviet Military Intelligence 57 

Spain 28, 49, 50, 69 

Speech of March 14, 1951 (McCarthy) 49 

State Department Conference, Oct. 1949 61 

State ^Department employees 81, 82 

State Department files 71, 74 

State Department Jiles, stripping of 71 



State Department Loyalty Board 13, 14, 29, 30 

State Department White Papers on McCarthy .88 

Stachel, Jack 57, 58 

Stary, Jiri 32 

Stassen, Harold 61 

Stefansson, Vilhjalmur 59 

Stein, Gunther 5, 55, 63 

Stilwell, Joseph 33, 34 

Stone, William T 13, 17, 30, 31 

Sullivan, Paul 71, 72 

Supreme Court of U.S ...79 

The Communist Magazine 101 

The Rape of Poland 99 

Thorner, Daniel 63 

Times-Herald, Washington 70, 90 

Time Magazine 19, 70, 86, 89, 91-93 

Times, New York 63 

Todd, Lawrence 30 

Toledano, Nora de 91 

Toledano, Ralph de -^91 

Tom Mooney Labor School 58 

Trohan, Walter 67 

Truman, Harry 9, 13, 33, 37, 46, 53, 63, 65, 66, 71, 76, 86, 89 

Truman Plan , 69 

Truman smear campaign 88 

Tydings Committee 
1, 10, 14, 17-20, 29, 30, 35, 36, 53, 57, 59, 64, 66, 71-77, 81, 86 

Tydings Committee, Resolution setting up 76 

Tydings Hearings 2-5 

Tydings, Millard 4, 5, 9, 10, 19, 64, 71, 74 

Tydings Report 75, 76 

Turkey ..31, 69 

United Nations 13, 24, 28, 32, 42, 44, 45, 53, 81, 82 

UNRRA 31, 37, 47-49 

Utley, Freda 25, 33, 63 

Veterans of Foreign Wars 43 

Vincent, John Carter 24-26, 30, 33, 35-37, 62, 65, 79 

Vishinsky 53 

von Kleczkowski, Karl 32 

Waldorf-Astoria Hotel 28 

Wallace, Henry 35, 46, 62, 65 

Ward, Angus 31 

Washington Post 3, 89, 90 

Washington Times Herald 70, 90 

Watkins, Arthur 45, 64 

Wedemeyer, Albert 25, 27, 39, 46 

Welles, Sumner 24 

Wheeling, West Virginia 7, 9, 10 

White, Harry Dexter 26, 61 

White Paper 42 

White Paper Letter of Transmittal , 47 

White Papers on McCarthy 88 

William and Mary 17 

Williams, John 90 

Willoughby, Charles 8, 56 

Witsell, Edward F 39, 40 

Witt, Nathan 59 

Wittfogel, Karl 56 

Woltman, Fred 25 

World War II 1, 11 



"XL" 



..57 



Yalta 23, 24, 33, 35, 36, 47, 67 

Yalu River Bridges 44 

Yenan 59 

Young Communist League 24, 96 

Young Republicans 69 



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